United States Atomic Energy Commission Volume XVIII; In the Matter Of: J. Robert Oppenheimer

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UNITED STATES ATOMIC. ~NERGY COMMISSION VOLUME XVI II ID the Matter O&

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In the Matter of Atomic Energy Commission, The above entitled matter came oo for hearing, pursuant to recess, before the Board, at 9:30 a.m. ROGER Ram, and SAMUEL J. SILVERMAN, and ALLAN B. ECKER, Counsel for J. Robert Oppenheimer.

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a witness having been ~eviously duly sworn, was called in rebuttal, examined and testified as follows: be came to Los Alamos there\111.S a hydropn liquefaction plant there. Will you.tell us wbat that was used .for? A Yes. It was actlially one of the first structures erected at Los Alamos, .and reflected the opinion, which turned out to be erroneous, that going from the fission weapon to the fusion weapon would not be too tough a step. Its initial purpose was to make studies of the thermodynamics, and steresis phenomena in the liquefaction of hydrogen isotopes. This work was also conducted by a subcontractor at the University of Ohio •. About halfway through the war, a number .of pofnts arose which changed the program. One I think Dr. Teller referred to. Be discovered in the work - had earlier done - bad left out something vel'J' important and very serious, which proved tba t the ideas we bad bad about how to -Ire this -chine would not work in the form - then bad. Tbe

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pressure on the whole laboratory to get the fission:job done and the difficulties af that job both increased. · The cryogenic facility actually played a small part in our researches for the fission job but I do not propose to describe it. I think it is classified. The head of that group, Earl Long , Dea' of the University of Chicago, left tbe cryogenic job and beca• director of tbe shop. I believe that very little was done with the cryogenic facility in the last year before tbe war ended. I may, if this is still reaponsive to your question, describe what else was going on at Los Alamos during the war related to the thermonuclear program • Q I wish you would, yes. A As nearly as I can recollect, there were two groups in addition to the cryogenic group concerned • One was Dr. Teller's group which toward the end of the war was in the part afthe laboratory that Fermi as associate director ran. It was ct.lled the advanced developat divi&ion, and several young people under Teller were figuring and calculating on aspects of the thermonuclear program. Tbere was another group in which there were three members cl the British.mission, and a number of Americans who were meaauriqr tbe reactivity of the materials which seemed to us relevant to a hydrogen bomb, and who actllll.ly completed some measu~nts on this before the war was over. I think this · is about the wbole story.

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Q As a •tter afcbaracterization, would you say tbat at Los Alamos during the war years the laboratory-was actively working on the development of the thermonuclear b0111b? A We planned to be, but we were in fact not. A J have ou tlined the two mj or reasons. First , we didn't know how to do it, and second, we were busy with other Q At the end of the war, was there any ezpression to you of gover-nt policy with respect to going ahead with tbe A I think I bave already testified, but I am willing to repeat. After the Trinity test, the Ala•gordo teat, but before Hiroshim, I went to Chicago to consult General Groves largely about the major mechanics of the overseas mission, and how we would meet our time schedules. In the course of that, I put up to General Groves -- I think I had already put in writing an account of the problem -- the fact that we hac:I not moved forward, and perhaps had moved som•hat backward OD the thermonuclear program, and was this scmet lliliC that he wanted the labor&tlry to take hold of. This was while :the war was still on. Be was fairly clear in saying no. I believe -- I Will not speculate as to his reasons for that, but it was clear to me. The only other communication to me of. a view on the

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matter was incidental. In Au1111st, Dr. Bacher and I bad com on to report to General Groves, and it was at that ti• tbat I told him that I thougbt I should not continue as director of the laboratory, and tbat we began discussing the problem of who was to run it. Just before I flew weat, I ha.d a •ssage to consult General Groves. I did so. Be told • two things. Be bad bad a conversation with Mr. Byrnes, who was then the 'Preaident's representative on the Secretary of THE WITNESS: This would bave been after the 15th of August, but not much . THE WITNESS: 1945. This is all in the period i11111ediately around the surrender. TBB WITNESS: No, this was Ja•s Byrnes who was very shortly thereafter to be secretary of State. It was then Groves said that in the present state of the world, the work on weapons must continue, but tbat this did not include, he thought, the Super. Tbat was about all. These were not foraal ezpressionsof opinion; they were from my boea to • in a most inforaal way at a tim when I was preparing not to retain active responsibility.

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Q Dr. Teller teEl:l.fied about a board of four people at the end oftbe war, or near the end of .the war, who he understood decided that the thermonuclear program should not be pushed. Can you cast so• light on that? A I think I can. I think I know what Dr. Teller waa There was a panel of four people. Their names were Arthur Compton, Ernest Lawrence, Enrico Fermi and •, Robert Oppenheimer. We had been asked to advise on tbe use of the bombs, OD the general nature Of the future atomic Harrison, on behalf of the Secretary of War,, to prepare as detailed an account as we could of everything we knew that could be done or needed doing in the field of atomic enern. This was not just military things. It involved the use of isotopes and the power problem and t.he military probleE. As a part of this report, we discussed improve•ats in atomic weapons and in the carrier problem. As a part of this report, ws discussed the thermoauclearbomb, the Super, as it was called. Tbat was all we had in mind then. I believe tbat section was written by Fermi. I believe thatDr. Teller correctly testified that his own view on what the problem was, was attached as a slightly dissenting or even stronsly dissenting view to our account.

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We wrote an account whidi was not a recommendation of policy at all, as I remember, but was an analysis of where we thought the matter stood. I think General Nichols' letter • to me quotes from it, and says this program did not appear on theoretical grounds as certain then as the fission weapon program had at s Cllle earlier stage • This was a rather long and circuDBtantial account of what we knew about it •.It was not intended and was not a statement of what should be done. It was an assessment of the technical state of the problem. This board had no authority to decide, it was not called on to recommend a decision, it did not decide nor recommend a decision. It described. I think Dr. Teller was • a little mistaken about what our function was. YR. SILVERllAN: "A gram of neutrons per dayit. I think you will find that in his diary. MR. Ram: Do you have the transcript on that? MR. SILVERMAN: I have it. MR, RCBB: I recall the expression of a gram of MR. GRAY: I think it would be well to 'indicate I think he said "a gram of neutrons per IDR. EVANS:

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MR. Ram: Maybe he did. I don't know. It just be able to look at it. llR. GRAY: Let us hold a minute. llR. SILVERMAN: I think I can find it, sir. OD OCtober 9th in the diary. I will say that there the expression in the diary is just "gr- of neutrons lllR. aam: That is right. MR. SILVERMAN: Let us see what the testimony is. know. What was that date in the diary? YR. SILVERMAN: OCtober 9. Pap 2861 of the transcript. It is on pace 2662 Dr. Alvarez said, "People agree that the idea of radiological warfare was attractive in •ny ways, but a1&in the country had no supply of free neutrons and in order to make these radioactive acents, at least a cram of free neutrons per day would be needed. The military could hardly become enthus·iastic about a program that could not be initiated unless pile s of this type could • be built. We felt that they appreciated the usefulness of this -tbod of warfare, but thought it was so far in the Then I asked the quaation, "Gram o~

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neutrons recommended, is there any comment to make about that." Go abead. I am sorry. I just wanted to get it llR. SILVEJUIAN: I don't s- that it adds any more to the gram per day. MR. ROBB: It is all right. It is on the record, llR. SILVERMAN: That refers to the entry in Dr. BY Mil. SILVERMAN: Q Now, as I say, Dr. Alvarez in his testimony used the expression, ·•a gram of free neutrons per day·•, and in his diary he talked something about a gram of neutrons. Do you know where that phrase first appeared in the A I have not read all the official literature. In the summer of 1948 I was Chairman of a panel of the Committee on Atomic Energy of the Research and Develop-nt Board, which met in Berkeley. I think the members of that Board were all milit•ry, but we consulted with civil experts. In that report, I for the first time wrote that we needed at least a graa of free neutroliS a day, and the facilities for tbat were required for military purposes. That was the summer of 1948. I will not say tba t no one had written it before• I never saw it before, or heard it before. /J

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Q I would like to ask one C1Jestion off, tbe record because I bate to dispose 1117 ignorance. ls tbat a lo.t of A By tben existin1 standard• it see-4 an awful lot 'I MR. GRAY: I tbink it is u•ful to bave it in record if tbis point is meaningful . BY Jill. SILVERMAN: Q Between January 1947 and January 1950, wbich is tbe first three 19ars of your cbair1111.nsbip d tbe GAC, how • many new reactors were started by tbe Atomic Enern co-ission? A This would be better found bJ reading the Commission's reports, and I bave not done so. This work was very slow to get started, but if you include all kinds of reactors, for development, for researcb, and for production, perbaps around eight. Q And did tbe GAC express its vieWB to tbe Connniesion A Tbe GAC wrote reams on tbe subject of getting tbe reactor program off tbe dime. Tbe ream may not bave been • very sensible, but tbey -re clearly addressed to tbill problem. tbe GAC, are tbey not? A Yee, tbey are.

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Q · Aud they are both enthusiastic proponents of the A Yes, they are. I believe today everybody is an Q Did you have anything to do with their appointment? A I don't know. The appointments -re Presidential. I did, however, include the names of von Neumann and Libby on the lj;;t, I believe, d five names that I submitted to Mr. Dean in the summer of 1950. I should for completeness say that tbe other people on that list, as I recollect, though very competent, -:re not ident~fied with enthusiasm for the hydrogen bomb. Bacher, Fermi, · and Bethe were also on the list. Libby was appointed in the sulllll!er of 1950. von Neumann was not, b11t be WE appDinted as soon as a vacancy appeared through the resi1D&tion of Dr. Cjril Smith, Both men served on the GAC for a while Q General Wilson testified, I believe, that at some stage you did not support the installation of two of the three .methods of long ranp detection. D:ld you ultimately support Q And was your decision about suppCll"tinc the

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installation of those two or three •thods lade on the basis on wba t baa is was it made? A This is not recollection • THE WITHESS: This is not a recollection. Tbe only ground for holding up tbe installation of •-thing is doubt as to whether its development had reached the right stage for it to be effective. That is the 'best answer._ I can give to ym. do you recall t_he circumatances of the initiation of that A Yes, I do. This was just.after Hiroshima, and we developed at Los Alamos -- I believe that the man directly in charge was Kenneth Bainbridge -- wbat we hoped might be au effective long range detection device. I directed that we try this out 1iri th. the cooperation of tbe Air Force, and we did succeed in identifying and describing the Hiroshima explosion by flights over the continental United States. Later, WbeD I was OD the General Advisory Co-ittee, I believe the co-itt- wrote something to this effect, that tbe problem of detection of foreign explosions was of unparalleled importance. That since this was not clearly a Co-issicm problem, we did not insist on being informd of the progress of the work, but we wished to record our vi-

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that progress was urgent anil important. It was bll the Defense Depart1119nt that I had a more direct connection with the development of this method. It was completely successful in detecting and describinc the first Soviet explosion, at least the first one - know about. DR. EVANS: That was radiation detector, was it not? YR. KOLANDER: I don't think - should discuss that. THE WITNESS: I am sorry. DR. EVANS: Excuse me. BY YR. SILVERMAN: Q Of the three methods, was that first method the one that has furnillhed the moat sicnificant and important information, as far as you know, or is that classified? A Let - say simply that it has furnished an enormous amount of information which is technically very valuable. Por some purposes the other methods are quite useful in 1ivin1 supplementary data. ·I think I can't Co further. Q Dr. Alvarez testified that at a meeting of the llilitary Objectives Panel in about December 1950, you said something to the effect that "We all acree that the hydro1en bomb program should be stopped, but to do so will disrupt the people at Los Alamos and other laboratoriee, …