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Declassified record · U.S. Department of Energy

United States Atomic Energy Commission Volume XV; In the Matter Of: J. Robert Oppenheimer

Dated
Apr 30, 1954
Declassified
Aug 12, 0009
Document type
Book
Length
158 pages
Open the original scanArchive record OSTI ID 1159741 · public domain

Archive description

In December 1953, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) suspended the security clearance of Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer, and after a four-week, closed-door hearing in April and May 1954, formally revoked that clearance. This document contains Volume XV of the transcripts of the hearings, pages 2707-2861. The witnesses in this volume include: Luis Walter Alvarez, Boris T. Pash, and William Liscum Borden.

Document text

Machine-read from the scan, so expect some errors. Lines that couldn’t be read are left out.

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UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION PERSONNEL SECURITY BOARD In the Matter of Atomic Energy Commission, The above entitled matter came on for hearing, pursuant to recess, before the Board, at 9:30 a.m. PERSONNEL SECURITY BOARD: MR. GOODON GRAY, Chairman. ROGER ROBB, and Co A. ROLANDER, JR., Counsel for the Board. SAMUEL J. SILVERMAN, and ALLAN B. ECKER, Counsel for J. Robert Oppenheimer.

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MR. GRAY: We will resume. MR. ROBB: Mr. Chairman, I have two questions I would like to ask. MR. GRAY: I suggest you proceed. LUIS WALTER ALVAREZ the witness on the stand at the time of taking the recess resumed the stand and testified further as follows: Q Dr. Alvarez, your diary showed, and you testified that you talked to various individuals about your plan and the plans of others for the development of the thermonuclear weapon in early October 1949, is that right? Q At that time these individuals were enthusiastic \ for going ahead with it, is that right? A That was my very strong impression. Q To your knowledge, were those conversations in advance of any talks that these people had with Dr. Oppenheimer? A I think that is so, sir. I am sure it is so in the case of Dr. Serber. I am quite sure in the case of Drs. DuB:ridge and Bacher, and also in the case of Dr. Rabi. Q Subsequently these people changed their views, is

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A Quite drastically, yesr Q Did you learn at .• that time whether in the interim A I am sure that in the interim they talked with Dr. Oppenheimer, because the interim extends until now. MR. ROBB: That is all I care to ask on direct, Mr. Q Self evidently these people have talked to a lot of A That is absolutely right. Q Dr. Alvarez, when you came east with Dr. Lawrence in the trip of which you kept a diary, am I correct in my understanding that the specific thing you were trying to promote for want of a better word, or push, was a reactor pile that would produce excess neutrons? A That :is right, sir. Q Did the Commission thereafter build or cause to be built a reactor to produce excess neutrons? A There are some reactors of that general class now under construction at Savannah River, yes. Q Is that Savannah River reactor not in operation at all?

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A I don't know. I have no knowledge·of this except what I read in the paper. I believe, however, they have not been turned on. That is my impressbn. This can be checked Q Do you know whether the reactor at savannah River A I haven't really any idea, sir. I would assume that his advice was taken, but I believe that the reactors were designed by the engineers of the duPont company, and the only consultant that I know of personally employed by them was Dr. John Wheeler, who was their consultant on the Hanford Pile designed during the war. I think it was pretty much of a company design job, rather than an AEC design. Q Do you know designs for reactors to produce excess neutrons were fairly well along in October of 1949? A The files of the AEC were bulging with designs for reactorF; this is just the point that I made. There were designs by the gallon, but no piles. Q Do you know whether the Savannah River pile more n early followed the designs that Mr. Zinn had participated in making, and he was enthusiastic about than the Chalk River pile or something based on it? A My impression is that Mr. Zinn believed strongly that the ·..piles of the future to give excess neutrons should be enriched uranium piles of the type now in operation at ARCOr

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Idaho. Zinn has believed strongly in the small enriched piles as against the Savannah River design, which is along the broad general lines of the Canadian pile. Q You think the Savannah River pile is along the broad general lines of the Canadian pile? A I have never seen its design, but it is a heavy water moderated pile, using natural uranium, which is certainly what the Canadian pile is, and very definitely different from the many designs which Dr. Zinn bad to do with and eventually bas constructed. Q Are you aware that the GAC did in fact recommend going ahead with the Savannah River project? A Oh, yes, 1 am quite aware of that. I would be interested in the date Wien that project was supported. A I don't know the date. I know, hewever, it was after the Presidential directive, of course. r Do you know that the GAC had been recommending a production facility that would produce excess neutrons for well over a year before the President's directive? A I knew that everyone was in favor of piles but nonetheless no piles got built. o The GAC was an advisorycommittee. A Yes, it was. Q And it advised that such piles be built?

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A I have never seen their recommendation, sir, so I don't know, but being in .favor of piles is like bei·ng against sin. I thi_nk everyone is for piles, but nonetheless none got Q But it was not the GAC's job to build them. A That is true, yes. Q Do you know what the Savannah River pile cost? A I would guess it was in t~e neighborhood of one and a half million dollars, just from what I see in the newspapers. Q Do you think that the Atomic Energy Commission was perhaps justified in entrusting the buildi?V of a billion and a half dollar project to the duPont company rather than A Oh, absolutely. They had tremendous competence in the field, and we had no competence whatsoever in pile design. The only tling we had to off er to the Commission was the ability to build things rapidly in the scientific field. This was a demonstrated capacity of the Radiation Laboratory. Yes, to an even greater wxtent than we did, obviously. And the duPont company had experience in building

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A That is right. The right decision was certainly ma.de there. The duPont company was certainly better equipped to build piles than we were. There is no question about that. O Are you sure that the development of the Savannah River project was not carried at Argonne under Zinn? A I have no knowledge of this, but looking at the pile in the broad sense, I would say it doesn't look like a Zinn pile, and the way that an architect would look at a building and say this was not designed by such and such an 0 It would surprise you to learn that that development was carried out at Argonne under Zinn? A It would not surprise me particularly. I 'WOUld guess that it was .not a development of Zinn, but rather of Q · That would be purely a guess. I would like now to turn to the discussions in the Panel -- I think perhaps yaJ called it the Panel on Long Range Planning, sonething like that. A I believe that was the official name. Q I believe you called it that. I am not sure. It may have been referred to at other times as the Military A Perhaps it was.

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Q In December 1950, you referred to a statement by Dr. Oppenhei•r somewhat to the effect that we all agree e. that the hydrogen bomb program should be stopped. If we did this and recommended it, it would cause too much disruption at A That is right. Q And let it go on and the project would die when the Greenhouse tests failed, as Dr. Oppenhei•r expected them to. Is that substantially correct? A That is substantially the way I remember it, yes. Q I would like you to turn to the first part of that statement that we all agree that the hydrogen bomb program should be stopped. I want to ask you whet.her it is possible that what Dr. Oppenheimer said was that "We all agree that the" hydrogen bomb program does not look very hopefu 1 now. '' A Bo, I am quite sure.I remember it the other way. It was such a startling statement to me that it is indelibly in my mind. I dm't think I could be mistaken on that. Q You of course were a representative of the ether view? A That is right. Q And when Dr. Oppenheimer said that ''We all agree that the hydrogen bomb program should be stopped", did you as a member of the pane 1 say, "We don't all agree; I don't.'' A I didn't interrupt him until he finished his statement at the end of which time, as he pointed out, he said

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he was not going to stop it, and I pointed out since he said he was not going to stop it, there seemed to be no point in arguing about it. <' Butyou did not correct him and way ''We do not all A No. I am sure from what I have said inthis hearing you waild know that I did not agree. Q It is sometimes necessary on cross examination to A Very well, sir. Had he stopped his statement with that first sentence, I am sure that I would have dissemaed Q Was it the fact that everybody there agreed that at that time the hydrogen bomb program did not look very A I don't know whether everyone did agree on that. ~ Did you think at that time that the hydrogen bomb program did not look very hopeful? A I thought it looked exceedingly hopeful. Again I can only see it through the eyes of people like Bdward Teller, who have the technical competence, who know the details of the program:. I am not a theoretical physicist. All I can do is base my judgment on people in whom I have great scientific

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A No. I certainly didn't sense that at all, but I was not ~t Los Alamos. I did not know that things were going very badly. 'Perhaps they were, I don't know. I was not aware of the fact that people were depressed. Q And you had not heard from other people working on the project in December of 1950 that things didn't look so good? A I had heard that the requirements for tritium bad temporarily taken a turn towards larger quantities being required. But I had seen the requirements goq> and down and up and down on many occasions, and this did not disturb me at Q You bad not heard at the time that this was a temporary tur~,that it turned out to be temporary? A I really couldn't say positively one way or the other. r Did the others at the meeting agree thatthe hydrogen bomb program did not look hopeful? A I can't recall. I do know that Dr. Lauritsen apparently had strong reasons, probably mne of a moral nature for not wanting the hydrogen bomb. I do know that Dr. Lauritsen's closest associate, Or. William Fowler, had been giving lectures on the radio against the hydrogen bomb. I was in Pasadena staying with Dr. Bacher one night when I was giving a lecture at Cal Tech, ami at a dinner party that night all. I beard was stories about why you should not have hydrogen bombs, and tl:efact that the members of the staff at Cal Tech

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were giving public lectures and talking on the radio against the hydrogen bomb. I thought Dr. Lauritsen wanted no part of the hydrogen bomb. MR. GRAY: In what period of time was this? THE WI'l'NESS: This was at the time of the panel at the end of 1950. Q Before crafter the Panel, would you say? A During that general period. I could not pinpoint the date precisely. Q Did Dr. Lauritsen express 8J1 views at this panel meeting as to either whether the hydrogen bomb program should be stopped or as to its feasibility? A I discussed the program with him on a number of occasions and I always got the impression that he thought that the small weapons program and the hydrogen bom~ were mutually exclusive· The country could not do both of them at the sane time; since he had stro~ reasons for desiring a small weapons program, he felt that the hydrogen bomb pro)II"am should not go Q Did the report the panel filed say that the small weapons program and the hydrogen bomb program were mutually A Not in exactly those words, but it certainly pointed out tbatthe hydrogen bomb program was taking manpower al

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effort of the Los Alamos Laboratory away from the small weapons program and the panel recommended that it not do so in the A I signed the report, and as I have said, I am sorry said anything about the outlook for feasibility of the hydrogen A Whether Dr. Lauritsen said that it was feasible or not feasible would have made no impression on me, because Dr. Lauritsen like myself waa not entitled to scientific opinion. Neither he nor I have enough knowledge in this field to form an opinion ourselves. Q And you do not recall whether he said anything about it? A No, but had he said so, it would hire made no impression on me. Q Did Dr. Bacher say anything about what the outlook was at the panel for the feasibility of the hydrogen bomb A Again, I can't recall for the same reason. Dr. Bacher was not entitled to an opinion, nor am I. O Did Admira 1 Parsons express a view on that subject? A I think Admiral Parsons stayed very neutral throughout the whole thing. Re was a good naval officer, and I don't

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think that he was trying to inject his own personality into A I don't believe so. I don't know. they all just sat? A Yes. No one commented on this at all. That is to the best of my recollection. Q I understand you are testifying from your I think you said that Dr. Oppenheime~ indicated that he thought that the Greenhouse tests would fail. A That no thermonuclear reaction would take place in the Greenhouse test explosive dev:ic e. In order for a thermonuclear reaction to take place, very high temperatures must be reached, as you know. I think that Dr. Oppenheimer felt that those high temperatures would not be reached, if you can permit me to read his mind. Q I would rather you tell us what he said. A I have already told you what he said. MR. ROBB: Mr. Chairman, everybody else is reading MR. GRAY: The Chair will S1¥i' that there has been a parade of witnesses here who testified on their i~timate

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knowledge of Dr. Oppenheimer, and that they would know exactly what his reaction would be in any particular …

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