United States Atomic Energy Commission Volume IXb; In the Matter Of: J. Robert Oppenheimer: Classified Testimony of Dr. Lee Alvin DuBridge

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show that ;t this point wh(3n 1 t bucame necessa1•y to question the witness a bout c:lassif ied ina tt era, Mr. Garrison and the others were oxcusecl. The record shoQld uhow that Dr. OppenBY Mil. non: ask you whether or not they state in substance the salient points of the introductio~_ to the VISTA report. , A Is it proper, Mr. Chairman, tor Ill• now to ask Q I am sorry, but even no• .t cannot disclose what the document is, sir, aad u:act·er the c:lrc•:uDst•nces which we A Can you 1;ell me from whose statement ::voQ are Q I nm goiug to .r·aad you the three paragraphs, Doctor, and ask you ,rhethe:1" or not they state in _substance

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2 which you have testified Dr. Oppenheimer holped to prepare. A May I sa:y· I assume you mean the introduction to "l. The available stot:kpile of atomic weapons the polut of view of· available f1$s:lonable materials). to the tacticiil defense o1 Europe in accordance with existin1 weapons should be begun at once. or against European Allliee. Would Iilce me to read any of th~s.e, again~ Doctor? A I may ask you to read them again, but I think I can manke some co11tti1ents.

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into three parts a:ad we suggested rather generally that possibly an equal •:Jivislon would be suitable. I thinl: we did not make i·t accurately equal. That a certain seg111ent of the stockpile should be assigned to strategic o1r c>pera..: t1on, a certain se;iJitent 1;o tactical and a certain segiuent held in reserve to see how the war went and assigned then as the battle progressed, to the particular ·Nords you read, the general idea of throe parts of our stockpile was r~co~ended by_ the VISTA project. As to the secqnd, I. do not recal.~ th.at we made matter that th• record ot the :final VISTA report \Vould show. A I see • You are no·t asking whether this was in t~s final-VISTA report,. but in. an intermediary version of

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·i But I do not recall any such rec1:.imu1endat.!oo ever being proposed that \Ve should annm1nce anything about our atrategic intentions relative to mi at·tack on Russia. strategic air warfa1•e .Pl'oblems in the VISTA stage. But since this question of the possible use of fissionablo materials for tactical s:l tua·tions ·came up we bad to make some suggestions that tactical as well as strategic opera• tions were useful for military pt1rposes. I do recall that the final version ot the rc1port - Q Excuse me, but would you confine yourself to ·the draft for the time being. I don•t want to cut you off in any way, however. tion ever being included in a version of the report. A Tha• is what. I was trying to get at. Tbis state- ~aaely, we recognized the possibility that $t the outbreak instantly a strategic attack ,on the USSR, and that in that case we might st:tll want to use atomic wisapons on the battle Certai'uly t·he report. at vnrious stages did have

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5 a suggestion of ·this sort in it -·· tha·t there migh·t be a A Thatwas in the final report and in the 1.ntervening A Our point of view throughout the VIS'l'A study on therino-nuc'laar weapons was that we did not see that they had tactical value. We made no comment on their importance as strategic weapons. But we ~id say that in as much as we see at the present. t:lme, no ta~tical usefulness to thermonuclear weapons, we '»ill.. not. further discuss them. May I explain that point a bit. A We were envisioning a battle in IVestei-n Burope, presutnably an invasion by Russian armies of Western Europe, and that we would be io:l'cad then into a battle of the NATO i the Rhine and the border of the Soviet Zone. ife loolted at 'the question of atomic weapons being

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West•arn Germany -- ·~o such a great wctent that the use of not foasiblca and no·t desirable aJJd would. be against our Therefore, we saw rio tactiaJal use for it in thot Q I see. W'as it· then that particular point that A General Quesada did not address himself to that nucliaar systo1n in the rango of many megatons that may be

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or anytiling else you wnnt to talT.( nbout. MR. RODB: Tbm~ is what I understand. Perhaps Mr. Chairman, at noon today. THE lUTNEBS: I cannot swear that I know this is a true copy of tbe final report. :r do recognize it as being very similar to the final ve1•sion. I would like to note that the sentence wblcb you,' :r the fissionable material resources of the u.a. were growing at a very large rate and that "We' have a resoarce ot great magn1~1Jde and that oven in the near future we can contem;.. plate many military application~ and a wide variety of targets nuaber of diffe~ont warheads available in the fission weapon r1anging from l to ·soo ldlotons. Then if: goes on to describe the various sizea and d:lametars of m1ch fission weapons and and also design :Lmp1~ov13ments are increasing our stockpile. As one el~u1eat :l.n this picture of our atomic

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but not certain, of a the~:.:"nm-uuc:lear wsupon in tllo rsnge of many megatons t~at may be ::.rraila.ble. in two years, althm1gb time of a fact or a ;possibility arid I think it was a co1•rect certain a thermo-nuclear aystem iu ·thia range of many megatons and that the c'ost, characteristics and utility could not then be estimated. Q I had the idea :Zrom some of tbe testimony here ·thai; in the spring of 1951 there was a disco'irery madtt which made A Certainty in a· new f.ield does not. occur until one taiuty came until ·the tes~ts were successful, At this time I think it could not be cortain at· that timethat a many tne.gaton yield was available. It is cor1"ect to say that there was. a pruspect, but riot cer1:ain·ty .~ Q What sort :of te1-1ts had been muda at that time, A This was the latter part of 1951. The final report

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charactariatics of that t~st. A The a1J::me.~ iii that tbe:re werf3 some tauts. I ot our VISTA study. · fectly true that thc.r·e ·was a very complex technical s:ltuation ·ments cannot be discussed inpublic because they.are highly and at each stag«• .there have, of c•ourse, been differences of. opinion as to the beet technical app:roach and the possible :prospects of suec:esn a11d the degree to which success would be achieved and ha.11 SOOD it would be achieved and what the ess1antial, inevitable aud desirable. And to :tnter1>ret any ::1ucT.2 di:ff erences of opinion or s·ta·ten1en·ts ma do during the

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into the loyalty of an :t11divl.dtlal. I mtly ·wan·t 'to lilalte it study was. a study iu which nJ.1 possible ideas ·.vere 1stated; iexplored, inqui1•nd into, .argued about, disagreed about.