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Division of Operational and Department of Energy The Northern Marshall Islands Advisory Group met on October 3-4, 1978 to consider the issue of planting coconuts on Enewetak Atoll, recommend cleanup guidance for subsurface contamination, discuss the Enjebi experimental farm, review preliminary results of the plowing experiment and be briefed by TonunyMcCraw on the status of the Northern Marshall Islands Survey. The Advisory Group offers the enclosed comments. The discussion of these and other topics again identified the apparent lack of integration of the efforts at Enewetak and in the other Marshall Islands as the major concern of the Advisory Group. We are in complete agreement that all DOE activities at Enewetak as well as at Bikini and at all other northern Marshall Islands should be combined and integrated under a single DOE administrator with overall management responsibility and authority. We have no criticism of individuals who are involved in the Marshall Islands effort bec?use they obviously are dedicated to their projects. However, the importance and magnitude of the Marshall Islands program requires that these individual projects be part of an overall program plan administered by a well defined management structure. Examination of each project such as the Enewetak cleanup, the Northern M&rshalls Survey, the Bikini Health Studies, the experimental work at the Enjebi garden plot, the work at the Enewetak marine laboratory, the Univer~ity of Washington studies, and the work of the Nevada Operations Office probably would yield few criticisms. However, this would provide no assurance that adequate information will be available to support the technical and political decisions to be made. We are concerned that while inxnediate issues are being individually addressed, the broad andlong term aspects could be neglected. An example of our reason for concern is the singular attention to the transuranics at Enewetak with little effort expended on 9%r and 137CS and the lack of a plan to do a thorough dose assessment
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after the cleanup. Since a thorough dose assessment requires data on the incorporation of radionuclides in food stuffs, considerable advance planning is necessary. I will call you with further comments and
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COMMENTSAND RECOMMENDATIONS BY THE MARSHALL ISLANDS ADVISORY GROUP The Marshall Islands Advisory Group provides the following comments and recommendations on issues discussed at a meeting on October 3-4, 1978 concerning the cleanup and rehabilitation of Enewetak Atoll. 1. Planting of Coconut Trees on Northern Islands of Enewetak The Advisory Group concurs with the DOE letter of September 29 A final decision concerning the permissible degree of occupancy of the northern islands can be made only after conclusion of the present cleanup effort and after acquisition of additional information on applicable living h~bits and food chains and the movement of chains. Pending this evaluation it would be unfortunate if steps were taken that would encourage the Enewetak people to believe that a decision had already been made. (We assume that it has not been stated or implied to the people that they can expect to return to the Northern Islands at the’completion of the cleanup effort.) This is particularly cogent in view of the unfortunate experience at Bikini. That experience suggests that coconuts grown on the northern islands might not be suitable for human consumption and might not be suitable for copra production. To plant coconut trees on the northern islands at this time might, therefore, require their early future destruction, which could have unfortunate repercussions. Alternatively it might require restricting their consumption, which the Bikini experience would indicate to be ineffective. Therefore, the Advisory Group recommends that coconuts not be planted now and that decisions to plant in the future be delayed until dose assessments and evaluations 2. Cleanup Guidance for Subsurface Contamination In some situations, such as those with the subsurface contamination at Boken and Enjebi, it is not appropriate to apply a generic defined as these, pockets of contain on Enjebi be left removal of the asl it is better to reply on judgments specific to We would, therefore, reconmend that the identified nation on Boken be removed and that the contamination unless further definition of the subsurface pockets indicate 160 pCi/gm. Consideration should be given to halt under the soil on Enjebi so that vegetation will grow. With regard to the Aomon Crypt, the Advisory Group would be pleased to review any plan proposed by the DOE or JTG. Based on the few data made available to us and our observations during our visit, we continue to believe it is an engineering problem that can be handled by Col. Bauchspies. Removal of the
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buried material and burial in the sea or in the Cactus Crater seems to be logical. Where the OPLAN conditions are inadequate to fully represent the situation, or where it is unclear how the conditions are to be applied, the Advisory Group believes that situation-specific judgments should be exercised by the DOE technical staff at Enewetak in conjunction with the JTG. Enjebi Experimental Garden Plot During the course of several meetings the Group has had the opportunity to refer to data that might be obtained from the garden plot on Enjebi. During its visit to the atoll in August the group briefly visited the plot. The Group has the impression that the garden has considerable potential for ~rovidinclinformation on the relationships between radionuclides Such information is of paramount importance recommendations about the future use of the Enewetak Atoll and the return of the Marsha” Based on our limited information concerning n soil and =dible crops. in making informed northern islands of lese to these islands. the qarden plot and on our visit to it, we are particularly co~cerne~ that the garden will not be able to provide the information needed in a timely The group strongly recommends that the role of the garden plot as a part of an-overall integrated plan for making radiological assessments be carefully evaluated. If the plot has a key role, it should be clearly defined and adequately supported to carry out its mission. This should include consideration of an alternate location in the event logistics problems are insurmountable after the JTG effort is completed. A review of preliminary data from the plowing experiment suggests that plowing decreased the potential for resuspension of plutonium ‘since the plutonium in the surface soils appeared to be nearly uniformly mixed with all of the plowed soil. Thus, plowing probably would reduce the amount of plutonium that could be inhaled. However, while plowing might reduce the health risk from inhaled plutonium, the possibility remains that plowin3could increase the availability of 90Sr, 137cs, 239Pu and 2 lAm to plant roots. To comment further on plowing, the Advisor Group 24?Am in plowed and unplowed soil and on the uptake of these radionuclides in plants grown in the plowed and unplowed soil. Dose assessments for the two conditions could then be obtained and used in determining the benefits of plowing with respect to rehabilitation of the Northern Islands.
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Chester R. Richmond, ORNL John A. Auxier, ORNL Chester W. Francis, ORNL John W. Healy, LASL Bruce W. Wachholz, DOE
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