Memo to E J Valario, Subject: DOE Involvement in the Evacuation of Rongelap Atoll (Att: Memo to Secretary, Subject: Marshall Islands Programs; Note to Hoover, Subject: re Same DTD 5/20/82) Con't

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Department oi Energy Department of Energy (DOE) Involvement in the Evacuation of 9.: q-‘*acIJlti=n of Rongelap Atoll appears to be a totally senseless action unless the role of the Department of Energy in this decision is understood. DOE's involvement could subject this Agency to se,v.ere criticism both nationally and On I-lay21, 1985, the first of about 300 people left Rongelap Atoll claiming their atoll was not a safe place to live. The population was transported to Kwajaleiu Atoll on the Greenpeace Ship Rainbow Warrior, the ship that was sunk in New Zealand about a week ago. The Rongelap people have been disillusioned by what they perceive as contradictory advice from DOE on radiation protection, by monitoring results from a DOE contractor indicating that whole body exposures have increased at Rongelap Atoll (in.a related finding, exposures also increased at Enewetak Atoll), by a high exposure prediction in a Marshallese/English booklet provided by DOE, total radiation exposure experience. While there were undoubtedly other political and legal forces at work, the sum total of DOE's failures is a substantial indictment. The DOE unnecessarily gave the Rongelap people radiological justification to support their leaving Rongelap. After almost 10 years of internal strife over who would manage the programs in the Marshalls, these responsibilities were reassigned from the Office of Environmental Protection, Safety, and Emergency Preparedness (EP) to the Assistant the Deputy for Pacific Operations (DPO) of the Nevada Operations Office (NV) (see Attachments 1 and 2). The complaints about contradictory advice appear to refer to advice presented by the DPO at a meeting at Majuro Atoll ia December 1982. This advice was confusing and non-specific* The Rongelap people were told that they should make their own judgments on radiation protection. They were also told that

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they could eat food that had been restricted for many years (see Attachments 3 and 4). To support these judgments, information on radiation protection fundamentals was also provided in a Marshall&e/English booklet with the intention that the people could make educated decisions (see Attachment 5). Risk estimates, rather than radiation standards that were &ortant in the past, would be used for such judgments, Whole body exposures on Rongelap Atoll measured by Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) increased significantly during 1982 and were still elevated in 1983. The relaxing of a restriction on appears to be a contributing factor. In the past, this restriction was stated clearly as a prohibition (see The high exposure.prediction for Rongelap Island residents of Attachment 51, appears to be an erroneous value not supported by not be acceptable. The whole-body measurements support an exposure less than 100 mRem/yr, provided the food restriction \ Such a high chronic exposure level would remains effective. This latter exposure is within current standards. To my knowledge, this error has never been correctedAttachment 1 contains acute and chronic exposure estimates and Attachment g contains relevant radiation standards. Questions about past radiation exposures on Rongelap have remained unanswered for more than 2 years (see Attachment 1). . Though not requested in writing, it is reasonable to assume the Rongelapese need a discussion of: The possibility of additional delayed health effects for acute exposures received in 1954. The additional chronic exposures received since 1957 for the highly exposed individuals. The chronic exposures since 1957 for those not in the high A comparison of exposures, past and future, with radiation Medical followup and advice has been very good for the Rongelapese, but not providing them information on their total radiation exposure condition, information that is available, amounts to a coverup. The questions the Marshallese have raised

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&out radiological conditions in their atolls have not been that evaluated radiological conditions in the Marshalls in terms of risk and cance_r fatalities instead of using radiation standards. The Marshallese, to my knowledge, have never argued against use of standards or complained that they were not applicable. This booklet may be a factor of confusion rather than education for the Marshallese. The full dimension of the technical aspects of this problem in the Marshalls and the reasons for DOE's loss of credibility with the Rongelapese, are not well known within DOE. Dissatisfaction with the advice they have received reached serious proportions in April 1983 when a party of DOE visitors were interrupted in a meeting with the people on Rongelap by an irate citizen and had to leave the island. The meeting on Ronqelap was never resumed and the people's anger and mistrust Many of us who have worked in the Marshalls have been frustrated by the burdensome dietary restrictions, and we have seen the hardships caused by the loss of use of fallout contaminated islands. All of this is being imposed by application of radiation protection standards mandated by Washington bureaucrats. Right or wrong, I.have argued that exposures not found acceptable for the U.S. population are also not acceptable in the Marshalls, and that radiological criteria should be the same from atoll to atoll. This, of course, is not compatible with the idea that the population of each atoll should make its own judgment. Short of acting against Federal policies, or having the Deparment of Interior (DOI) mount a successful effort to get an exemption from these policies, the DOE appears to have no valid alternative but to continue to apply current radiation standards in the Marshalls. Turning radiological judgments over to the people was a drastic unilateral action. This appears to have been a profoundly disturbing experience for some Marshallese and an action that undermined confidence in DOE and in the United States Government. The new advice that was obviously intended to give freedom of choice has backfired. The Rongelap people foliowed-the advice they were given, made the judgment not t0 accept the risk, and left their atoll.

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Knat has been written about the Majuro meeting (who said what and why) is not so important as what the Marshallese heard and comprehended. The transcript clearly indicates that the DOE _ spokesman's answers to questions were not compatible with past DOE advice and that theMarshallese recognized this and objected (see Pages 49 and 50, December 9, Attachment 3). I reported this problem to DOE staff and to management of Operational Safety--nothing happened, and the Rongelapese have underscored this with their rejection of DOE visitors and with their later evacuation. Still nothing was done to correct the errant advice and to respond to their questions. Now "U.S. government officials" are criticizing the evacuation and are quoted in the press as stating unequivocally that Rongelap is. safe, a question the DPO was unwilling to agree to in Majuro (see Attachment 2, December 9, Page 28, and Attachment 2). Even though DOE'6 credibility with the Rongelap people may be zero, and whether the compact is approved or not, I ruggest to clarify its radiation protection policy in the Marshalls. fr the past that policy was to evaluate radiological idnditions against radiation protection 6tandard6,to recognize that the DO1 is the agency responsible for health and safety in the Marshalls, and to look to DO1 for any decisions related to health and safety in the Marshalls, and for communication of such decisions to the Marshallese. DOE looks to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and to DOI, not to the Marshallese, for decision6 on radiological issues I have identified the problem6 in the Marshall6 but there are also contributing factors within DOE in the management of Mo approved program plan has ever been i66Ued for DOE'6 radiological protection effort6 in the Marshalls. Coordination of radiological protection issues with Less than adequate utilization of DOE technical resources* No liaison vith EPA since 1982. No independent overview. I

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Not to cite a lot of problems without any suggestions, I recommend that a white paper be developed that clarifies DOE's position on radiation protection policy as applied to the _Marahalls along with answers to the questions on the total radiation exposure experience on Rongelap. A good source of - radiological data and advice on these exposures and their implications is available at Brookhaven National Laboratory (see Attachment 11). Translation into Marshallese would be needed, the Environmental Protection Agency should be informed, and the paper provided to the Marshallese through I further recommend that there is a valuable lesson in the creation of this situation that needs to be told. Regardless of interests that were served, and certainly not those of the Marshallese, from a health physics viewpoint, transfer of a unique radiological safety program to DP/NV, a program that required a high degree of coordination and cooperation between DOE, DOX, and EPA at,the Washington level, was a mistake. DP's interest in the program appears to have been primarily the altruistic interests of one person who wanted to change radiological rules used in the Marshalls, rules that were causing hardships through loss of use of contaminated land. HP's ignoble interest in transferring the program to DP was apparently to get rid of a hot potato, and had nothing to do with Safeguard C. The result is a new low in the annals of radiation protection standards implemention that should serve as a warning to those who follow narrow self-serving Radiological Controls Division Office of Nuclear Safety

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NOTE TO: General Hoovem (Signed) - SUBJECT: Status of Marshall Islands Program Transfer Hr. Roser, Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs (DP), Mr. Trivelpiece, Assistant Secretary for Energy Research (ER), and Mr. Vaughn, Assistant Secretary for Environmental Protection, Safety, and fiergency Preparednes's - (EP) met Nay 13, 1982, to discuss the transfer of the Marshall Islands o The ER position is that they do not want to manage the programs but would be interested in contributing expertise and some funding. o Mr. Vaughn sees EP as an oversight office and did not have a prepared position with regard to the Marshall Islands. o DP considers the programs vital to the U.S. Govemmt. It is Mr. Roser's opinion that over the years the programs have been poorly managed by EP. If DP gets the programs, a Headquarters task force will be imediately established (with representatives from EP and ER) to detemine future program policy and direction. Mr. Vaughn will have further discussions with his staff this week in order to develop an EP position. The action memorandum is still in Vaughn's office and once he has staff discussions, he will either fomrard the memorandum to the Secretary or have further discussions with DP, We will keep you informed.

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AND GOVERNMENT @FFICIALS OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE MARSHALL ISLANDS AT MAJURO Note: The attached pages were selected from a 99 pege transcripton of a tape recording prepared’ by Dr. William Bait, of the Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratory.

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Male Person: How much more have we got to cover? Buck: We ate ready to s.tart Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 before the maps. We weren't going to go on to each Individual map. Harshallese: I am asking about cancer and birth defects, but primarily about cancer. How Rlany.cancers have appeared in the Rongelap population since the time of the teiting of the bombs? Harshallese: So, what is Bair: That means that if the next 30 years, not in would..., if they receive the meaning of O.l? people, that if people receiving radiation during would not really expect any cancers are not saying there isn't a chance I don't know how to... but during the next 30 years, we on Rongelap for the next 30 years, we to be caused by the radiation. But we that there might be one. The risk is. Bair: One possible way; if there uere 10 times as many people on Rongelap, If there were 2,000 people today and they 14vtd and had children for the next 30 years, then thee might be one person (receiving) having cancer caused by radiation. There might be. flarshallese: If your figures here reflected the period from the time that the bombs were tested for a 30 year period,,,would YOU be able to make an estimate In figures that way?

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Bair: If I knew the radiation doses, if I knew how much radiation people receiwd, yes. But I don't know how much radiation people received. Marshal'lese: Could you refer to the report of all the teams that have come and visited us and taken samples and examined us and gathered data? Could you not look at that? We have been visited. Bair-: It might be possible to estimate how many but it would be very difficult because you also have to know how much food people ate during that period of time. I have no way of knowing. Cowan: You make assumptions based upon MLSC and the Battelle Northwest diet tn make these brbjections. Couldn't you use the same diet as the basis to make projections based on data (unclear)? Bait: It is not a Battelle diet it is Brookhaven diet. Cowan: Okay, whatever diet, you had to use some basis of food intake to Bait: You could do that. gathered in our population at .Seattlc and looked into this, think that we have had a lots of data Rongelap and if you went to the labs in probably that could be determined. Bait: I think Brookhaven is making a determination on the thyroid; the radiation, the amount of radiation t-he thyroid(s) of the peopk have received. I don't think-their report is finished yet. ?larshallese: I'm just wondering. As we've already asked, seriously 1 wish that you could tell how many people might have died from cancer from the time Of the testing until now rather than this figure which projects into

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Ray: I think the answer, an answer to that question is, yes, a study could be done. Our data and amount of information that we would have about those earlier days would not be-nearly as complete as what we havenow from the 1978 time. Nevertheless some estimate could be made. That estimate still would only be able to indicate the likelihood that, of those people who have died of radiation relateable diseases, some number might be attributable to the radiation. Marshallese: I feel that this whole book is affecting or applicable to the coming generation, the young children, because in the next 30 years my age group and older will be gone. So this isn't really a report for us. it is maybe a report for them ra'ther than us. And, also, that I detect that the results of the infoimation in this book is reporting a time that has much less damaging effects, in fact, it almost looks rather clean in comparison to the number of years which are not included in this book. And, so from my point of view, I don't know that this is.... I would nuch prefer a book that gave the entire picture rather than half the picture and the better half at that. In fact I hesitate to go forward and say much about this &: Well, I would just like to say again, the purpose of this book, that purpose was to provide a basis for informed decisions about future actions. That's the sole purpose of …