Resettlement of Eneu Island Bikini Atoll - Request of the Secretary of the Interior

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Draft Briefing Paper Request of the Secretary of the Interior The Secretdry has received a request (Tab A) from interior Secrezary Nilliam Clark for advice regarding the possible resettlement of Bikini people on Eneu Island in their home Atoll. in 1979, the DOE response to a similar request led to a decision by then Under Secretary of the Interior James Joseph to place Eneu Island “off limits as a place of residence for the Bikini people for at least another 20-25 years” (Tab B). In view of recent developments, some of which are discussed below, a prompt review and response to Secretary Clark is in order. The people of ~ikini Atoll (167 persons) were removed from their atoll by the dnited St~tes in i946 to permit Bikini lands and w~ters to be used for atmospheric nucledr testing. tiaving been relocated to areas which were remote from the testing sites, the people sustained no signific~nt radiation exposures from the tests, but their home islands, dnd especially the main residence island, Bikini, were contamin~ted with radioactive test debris. After a cleanup ~nd rehabilitation progr~m and the release of the atoll from further U.S. use, a small number of Bikinians (about i40 of the current population of about 1100) resettled Bikini Islarid during the periud 1969-1978. DOE continued to monitor the Bikini environment and the resettled F3ikinians during this period. By the mid 1970’s, as locally grown foods became increasingly available, and as DOE studies estiiblished the importance of the food chain as the dominant contributor to radiation dose, DOE surveillance was intensified. Early in 1978, it became evident that under the conditions then existing at Bikini Island the resettled residents would not be expected to stay within the U.S. Federal guidelines for exposure to radiation. This led to the second relocation of Bikinians from their atoll in August 197d. Recognizing the strong desire of the Bikini people to return to their homeland, the two departments (DOE and 1)01) considered in 1979 whether Eneu Island, a somewhat smaller island in Bikini Atoll, six miles distant from Bikini, might be suitable for resettlement. On April 12, 1979, Under Secretary Joseph wrote to then Assistant Secretary of Energy Ruth Clusen and, in Secretary Joseph’s words “...insisted that a definitive statement on the use of Eneu Island, Bikini Atoll, was an absolute necessity. ..” Secretary Clusen replied on l~ay 15, 1979, with d lengthy drld detailed analysis of the Eneu situation and, although she did not make a categorical or definitive recommendation, her letter left the Llepdrtment of the interior little choice but to take a conservative position on Eneu resettlement. The wording of Secretary Joseph’s stronger than was justified, but is understandable, considering the popular sensitivities and apprehensions regarding radiation matters.

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,! . The Bikini people continue in their strong desire to resettle their home atol 1. Responding to their request, the 97th Congress authorized and funded ($400K) an independent study of the feasibility of rehabilitating Bikini Atoll. The study committee was chaired by Dr. Henry Kohn, Professor Emeritus of Radiation ~iology, Harvard hledical School, and issued its interim report in early 1984. The report (page 22) indicates that Eneu may be resettled now. In Congressional testimony* on ltiay1, 1984, Professor Kohn stated: “Some of the islands are safe for resettlement now. The important one of these comnuttee (The Bikini Atoll Rehabilitation Committee) are lar9elY based upon DOE sponsored field studies and upon calculations of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory under DP’s Marshall Islands Program (managed Assuming Congressional approval of the Compact of Free Association, which the President submitted to the Congress for approval on Aarch 30, 1984, responsibility for decisions regarding resettlement will rest with the constitutional government of the Republic of the Marshall Islands. However, provision is made in the Compact and in a related subsidiary agreement, for the Republic to request, and the United States to provide, technical assistance in this and related matters. In aadition, the United States is committed to assisting the Bikinians with resettlement of their homeland when this becomes feasible. The Secretary of the Interior, therefore, desires to again consider the acceptability of Eneu for 1. The People of Bikini have filed in the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii (Secretaries Hodel and Clark are among the named defendants) to compel the United States to clean up and restore Bikini Atoll. Positive and responsible actions to provide relief to the Bikini people (resettling Eneu, for exdmple) could well influence the progress and outcome of that suit. 2. The concerned Congressional committees have exhibited a strong interest in the plight of the Bikinians, and their perceptions of the administration’s actions in this matter may be expected to influence action on the President’s request for Compact approval. 3* The people of another atoll, Rongelap, were resettled in their home islands in 1957, three years after their relocation. As they have recently become more aware of the circumstances of their relocation and of their resettlement, they have attempted to draw a comparison between their atoll and Bikini atoll. In spite of assurances by U.S. officials and scientists, and in part under the influence of aggressive claims lawyers, they have concluded that they are being deliberately, or at least knowingly, placed at risk. Superficially, the radiological conditions at the residence island of Rongelap and at Eneu Island at Bikini are quite similar, with the difference, in fact, favoring Eneu. Recently, the people of Rongelap have expressed fear regarding their exposure to radiation hazards, and Marshall Islands Government officials have appealed to the United States Congress to authorize and fund their immediate relocation and resettlement. Disposition of the Eneu question will undoubtedly have an impact upon the Rongelap issue. *House Appropriations Subcommittee on Interior and Related Agencies.

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There is a rel~ted matter of unfinished business at Enewet~k Atoll, where a major sub-group, the people of Enjebi, are not yet resettled in their home island. The EnJebi people petitioned the Secret~ry of the Interior in i979 to effect their resettlement. Their attorney has sought to h~ve d resettlement trust fund established as a part of the Compdct approval. Again, the Enjebi question is similar to, and may be expected to be influenced by, U.S. actions regarding ~neu. of the above factors have entered into Congressional consideration of Compact and have been the subject of recent exchanges in the Trusteeship Council of the United-Nations. The WE Role: Historically, the JOE and its predecessor organizations have provided technicdl advice, support, and assistance to those in authority in the Department of the Interior and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. As a practical matter, DOE’S field personnel, including those in the contractor laboratories, have been looked to for ddvice by the resident peoples and their local government authorities. DOE representatives have tried to limit their advice to matters encompassed by their special knowledge and experience, but the complex interaction of cultural, social and economic considerations makes this difficult. In the instant case there is clearly no unique mathematical solution. Even the applicability of Federal radiation guidelines is not entirely straight-forward. Further, when one looks at pathways and sources of radiation exposure, certain assumptions must be made as to lifestyle, availability of imported foods, etc. In fact, the composition of the assumed diet can alone at least double (or halve) the predicted radiation dose. And, finally, the degree to which a potential he~lth risk is iicceptable to the people themselves is a matter beyond the ken of i.)(IEofficials or scientists. Thus, we in DOE are faced with an obligation to do our best to inform the people themselves, and those to whom thej entrust the power of decision, of the likely consequences of the various alternative courses of action, leaving the decisions to those whom the decisions affect. The Department of the Interior view seems to be that implicit in the Trusteeship is the obligation to make and carry out decisions affecting the health and safety of the ilicronesian peoples. But as executive agent for the Trust, the DOI must rely’upon technical advice from the I.)OE. Consensus within the DOE staff will not be easy, for there are honest differences of opinion regarding both the role of DUE and the issue itself. The integrity of radiological safety standards, potential legdl and financial liability, the cost of continued DOE involvement in the riarshalls, the relationship between this issue and the on-continent “down-wind” problems-- are but some of the ramifications. In the face of these, DOE’s recent advice has in general been conservative. Such conservatism, which ultimately has its price in freedom of action and in the people’s right of self determination, deserves periodic reexamination. The Secretary of the Interior has asked the Secretary of Energy for advice in these matters, and has specifically asked to be informed of what conditions, if any, should be iiflposedif the people of bikini are relocated to Eneu Island. The requisite information is availableto allow the formulatiu~[ of such advice. It is recommended that the Secretary direct the staff to review this information ~nd develop realistic options which might De available to zhe Secretary of the Interior.

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The WE i!arshall Islands program, responsibility for wrrich currently rests with DP, is in need of Secretary level review and policy guidance. The matter addressed in this paper is but one fdcet of a DOE responsibility which is currently undergoing dramatic change. The entire Marshall Isldnds program, small in dollar value but high in current visibility and political potential, is a legdcy of the atmospheric nuclear test program in the Pacific (1946-1958). The committees most familiar with and most active in this Pacific area evidence their determination thiit the United States Government continue an dctive role in dealing with the environmental, medical, and radiological consequences of the test program. On the other hand, the committees to which llP looks for authorization and appropri~tions have questioned continued funding for this program by DP. Taken literally, the Compact of Free Association, which is current Administr~tion policy, would terminate DOE involvement. However, without a reason~ble transition to smooth the transfer of responsibility, the likely result would be an abrupt diminution of technical services and support to An early program review for the Secretary is recommended.

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The Honorable Donald P. Hodel Department of Energy James Forrestal Building The Compact of Free Association, which the President transmitted to the Congress on March 30, 1984, will provide the means of terminating the United States’ trusteeship in the Marshall Islands. In the short time that remains before the - termination of the Trusteeship, we are eager to learn your views on the possibilities for the resettlement of the people of Bikini in their home atoll. AS you know, the resettlement of Bikini in the 1970’s was aborted in August 1978 after monitoring by the Department of Energy revealed higher-than- “expected body burdens of Cesium 137. The high counts were seen as resulting from the consumption of foods grown on Bikini. Enue Island, within Bikini Atoll, was then considered as a relocation site for the community, but on the advice of the Department of Energy, the Department of the Interior decided not to permit a resettlement of Eneu in 1979. We would like to determine whether we can permit the Bikinians to return to Eneu before the trusteeship ends. When the Congress approves the Compact of Free Association, the Republic of the Marshall Islands will have a full measure of self-government, and will be responsible for decisions regarding a return to Bikini. Recognizing our trust responsibilities, however, we would like to again consider the acceptability of Eneu for resettlement at this time and, if we cannot now support such resettlement, to provide to the Marshall Islands Government the requisite information for its future management of this The Department of Energy studied the question of relocation to Eneu and set out its findings in a letter dated May 15, 1979, from Assistant Secretary for Environment Ruth C. Clusen (copy enclosed). We would expect, however, that in the five years that have passed since Assistant Secretary Clusen’s letter, some of the uncertainties which then existed might have been resolved, and that at least some improvement might have occurred both in our knowledge and in the conditions which led to earlier recommendations.

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The Honorable Donald C. Hodel It seems likely also that the Bikinians are somewhat more knowledgeable in administrative controls. We believe it is pertinent to note our experience in Rongelap Atoll where we have good evidence, confirmed by DOE’s bio-assay program, that diet restrictions are being adhered to. We would appreciate your advice in these matters and ask you to update the Department of Energy’s evaluation and inform us what conditions, if any, should be imposed if the people of Bikini are relocated to Eneu Island in their home atoll.