Fact Sheet, Subject: Enewetak Operation

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DOCUMENT DOES NOT CONTAIN ECI Subject: Fact Sheet - Enewetak Operation In April 1980 the Depcrtmerlt c,f Defense (DoD} will return Enewetak Atoll to ifs People. T!nis event vJiIl mGrk ihe end of fhe largest radiological cleanup operation ever conducted GT.C!will f~lfill c moral obligation incurred by the United States thirty-three yecrs ego. Tb,is p,o~er sulnrnorizes these events from the Enewetak is tile rmr~hwestern doll in the Mm-shall Is!ands--which themselves are one of the major island groups in Micronesia and in the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (TTPI). ~newetak lies some 2400 nautical miles west-southwest of Honolulu. The atoll is formed by a corol reef, OVGI in shape, which w-rounds a lagoon stretching so~me 23 miies in a generul ncrih-south direction and 17 miles east-west. Rising from Ihe reef at intervals along its circumference are some 40 The People of Enewetck--who have lived on the atoll for centuries, and who are different in many ways frorm otl-,er Marshcll Islanders--subdivide into two groups: the dri-Enewetak, whose hcrne is the largest southern island of the atoll the nuclear age began shortly after World War II, when the security required the establishment of several proving of rwclear weapons. Enewetak was one of the principal testing, particularly for the higher-yield thermonuclear imperatives of national grounds for the testing sites selected for this devices that were then numbering about 150--were reloc;ted in “1947 to a much smaller atoll, Ujelang, some 125 miles to the southwest. A large scientific and military task force, under the joint direct~on of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC--now the Department of Energy (DoE)) and DoD, established its headquarters on the southern islands of Enewetak Atoll. Between !948 and 1958, 43 nuclear tests were carried out on the atoll. The great majority were conducted in the northeastern quadrant, to keep the base camps in the south free of contamination. Some of the “ground zeros” were on the islcnds themselves, some were on the reef, some were in the lagoon, and one was in the ocean nearby. The tests were detonated in the air, on towers, on the surface of islands cnd reefs, on barges, and underwater. The nuclear weapons developed through this decade-long test program have been major elements in the mechcrism of deterrence which has ensured the security of the free world and the absence of r,ucleor wcr for succeeding decades. !n 1958 the U.S. ceased nuclear iesting on Enewetak, in response to a trilateral US-UK-USSR testing imoratorium. However, radioactive debris and fission praducts from the detonations and the resulting fallout contaminated most of the northern islands to varying degrees. The southern islands, which had been used as a base for the scientific task force, rew;uined relatively uncontaminated.

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From 1958 until 1976 DoD retained custody of the atoll, and a small caretaker force remained on Enewetak Island in the south. The atoll was occasionally used for DoD programs not involving nuclear testing. During this period, in 1972, the U.S. Government decided that future national requirements in this part of the world could be met without use of Enewetak; and Ambassador Franklin Haydn Wi Iliams announced that the atoll would be returned to the TTPI Government, for subsequent return to the people--who by this t irne had not seen their homeland for 25 years. The announcement also committed the U.S. Government to cleanup and rehabilitation of Enewetak. Planning for the radiological cleanup and rehabilitation programs was intensive and complex. [t extended from 1972 until 1977, and involved major actions by numerous departments and agencies in the Executive Branch, by the Congress, and by the People of Enewetak. The hallmark of the entire effort was total involvement by the People of Enewetak in all major decisions. The major Imi lestones of the planning effort--each of which required many months or even years of work--were: conduct of a detailed radiological survey of the atoll, its islands, and the lagoon by the AEC; conduct of a comprehensive engineering survey of the structures and debris on the atoll by the Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA); preliminary planning of resettlement options with the People of Enewetak; development and study of cleanup options, and selection of a preferred course of action, by an AEC Task Group; assignment of responsibilities to Executive Branch Departments, as follows: AEC for radiological characterization, DoD for radiological cleanup and operational support, and Department of the Interior (Del) for rehabilitation and resettlement; development of a detailed Master Plan for rehabilitation and resettlement by the People of Enewetak, assisted by Del, DoD, and AEC; development , issuance, and resulting action on an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS); development of disposal/containment options for radioactive soil and debris, and selection or a preferred plan; presentation of issues to the Congress, and ultilnate Congressional authorization and appropriation; development by DNA of a Concept Plan (CONPLAN) governing the cleanup, and its approval by the Joint Chiefs of Staff; assignment of individual responsibilities to Army, Navy, and Air F“”orce; and development by DNA of a detailed Operation Plan (OPLAN) governing all facets of the cleanup operation. At an early jur~cture in this planning process the Defense Nuclear Agency was designated the DoD Project Manager for the Enewetak operation. A key decision in this process was that operations would be concurrent rather than sequential. 7“he normai, conservative approach would have been to conduct the operation in three sequential phases: first, the detailed on-site radiological characterization by AEC (DoE); second, the cleanup by DoD, based upon the radiological characterization developed in the first phase; and third, the rehabilitation (homebui Iding, crop planting, etc.) and resett Iement by Del, once the DoD cieanup had been completed. To save time and money, the planners decided on a much riskier concurrent approach, in which ali three phases would be carried out simuitaneously. Because support costs are a dominant portion of overal I expense,

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this approach shortened the project by several years and saved tens of millions of Because of the isola! ion ond lack of foci lit ies at E.newetak, any productive effort in any of the three phases required establishment and maintenance on the atoll of such supporting infrastructure CIS: cm electrical power generation and distribution system; a fresh waler distillation, s~orage, and distribution system; a complete airhead for air transportation ; cargo-handling piers; regular sealift and airlift to and from the atoll; a tank farrm for receipt, storage, and distribution of various types of fuel; Iivinq and messing accomlnodations for about 1,000 individuals; large-capacity refrigeration facilities for storage of food; extensive medical faci lit ies up to the operat inq-room level; satellite and high-frequency fleet of Navy lancling craft and boats for inter-island water transportation, backed up by major boat rnaintencmce facilities; vehicles for land transportation; helicopters and associated maintenance faci Iities for medical evacuation and other emergency use; underwater demolition and ordnance disposal capabilities; a large maintenance and repair facility for heavy construction equipment (bulldozers, graders, rock crushers, front loaders, trucks, backhoes, cranes, etc.); a postal system; austere retreat iol~ faci lit ies; etc. Many of the early planninq decisions addressed the problems of radiological contamination. It was recognized that a distinction had to be m’ade between two types of soil contamination, “transuranics” and “suburanics.” Transuranics are elements above uranium in the atomic table, s~Jch as plutonium. They typical Iy have very long half-lives, e.q., 24,000 years in the case of plutonium. Suburanics, such as strontium-90 and ces-ium-137, have much shorter half-lives. These two, for example, are 28 and 30 years, respectively. The AEC’S radiological survey had disclosed that, excepl on the island of Runit, most high transuranic concentrations were in the top few centimeters of soil. This was not the case with suburanics, which, because of their water volubility, were distributed to considerable depth. Since the near-surface transuranics had the greatest potential for ingestion or inhalation through resuspension, and since their threat was long-term, it was recognized that the cleanup would have to deal with them. Excision of soil contaminated with suburonics, however, was simply not practicable. To do SO would require such extensive soil removal as to render the island useless for habitation or subsistence agriculture. However, by the same token, cleanup of suburanics was !ess wisentioi because contamination levels were declining measurably year by year. Thus i t wtrs determined that, insofar as contaminated soil was Another key d(-(;i:,ior) concerned the method for disposing of, or containing, conia(minated debris and soil. Various, options were developed and analyzed: Iagoon-durnping, ocean-durnpinq, spreading over the surface of Runit, etc. The method selected ---af fer exter]sive debate on the El S--incorporated the following by boat to the islanci of f?urrit. debris and soil on all islands would be transported

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o The contaminated soil would be mixed wifh cement and formed into a concrete matrix, which would fill the crater on the north end of Runit formed by the IICactus’1 nuclear detonation. o The contaminated debris would be encapsulated in this concrete o The dome-like mound formed over Cactus crater would be covered with a concrete cap to remove any resuspension and inhalation threat. o Since the entire island of Runit would remain quarantined indefinitely because of residual sub-surface contamination in its soi 1, presence of the capped, encapsulated contamination at the north end of the island should pose no future problems for the People of Enewetak. In 1975 the Congress authorized the Enewetak Radiological Cleanup and Rehabilitation Projectj and funds were appropriated in 1976. Congressional guidance was as follows: o The radiological cleanup was to be accomplished by the Military A total of $20 million was appropriated in FY 1977 Military o DoD was directed to draw other needed resources, without reimbursement, from the Military Services’ construction and support forces, their subsistence, equipment, material, supplies, and transportation. o DoD was further directed to employ all feasible economies in the project, consistent with meeting radiation standards established by AEC (DoE). o The People of Enewetak were required to agree that appropriation of the $20 million MilCon funds would constitute the total commitment of the U.S. Government for the cleanup of Enewetak Atoll. During development of the Master Plan with the People of Enewetak, probably the most important decision involved choice of residence islands. Since residence islands would be the site of most subsistence agriculture, as well as living and sleeping quarters and community centers, great care had to be taken to ensure that the living patterns and locations selected would not permit the people to accumulate lifetime body burdens of radioactivity at levels thought by medical science to cause any significant increase in the risk of adverse health effects. From the start it was clear that the dri-Enewetak could return safely to their home island of Enewetak in the south. The three large southern islands of Enewetak, Medren, and Japtan, which had been the base camp for the 4,000-man scientific task force during the test period, had remained essentially uncontaminated by the testing and had served as headquarters for the caretaker force subsequently. The

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level of residual contafnination on these islands was generally less than that of most locations in the United States. At the outset it was hoped that the dri-Enjebi could return to their home island of Enjebi in the north. However, upon analyzing the results of the radiological survey, AEC (DoE) decided in 1974 that residual levels of suburanics in the soil of Enjebi would be such that the lifetime body burden accumulated by people eating crops grown in the Enjebi soil might exceed levels then considered acceptable. Accordingly, the Master Plan developed by the People of Enewetak and the U.S. Government in 1975 cal led for both the dri - Enewetak and the dri-Enjebi -- then numbering about 450 in total--to reside on Enewetak, Medren, and Japtan in the south. Because of the relatively short halfIives of the principal suburanics in the north, it was recognized that eventual return to Enjebi would be possible. In addition to identifying the three large southern islands as the location for residence and subsistence agriculture, the Master Plan also outlined virtually all other major aspects of the future life-style of the People of Enewetak after return to their atoll. For example, in it the people set forth their property boundaries, the desired location of each family’s home, the house designs they had selected, the location and configuration of the community centers, their decision not to have electrical power in their homes, their option for individual water catchment systems rather than a distillation plant, etc. The planning documents identified the desired utilization of each island as either residential, agricultural, or food-gathering. The acceptabi Iity of each island for the desired use depended upon the residual radiation levels, as follows: o Islands whose soil met the tightest standard for amount of residual transuranics could be used for residence (including subsistence agriculture), provided suburanic levels were acceptable. o [stands whose soil met an intermediate standard of residual transuranics could be ust:d for agriculture (e.g., coconut trees for copra production). o [stands whose soil met a lesser, but still acceptable, standard for residual transuranic contamination could safely be visited for food-gathering o only one island of the 40, Runit, had such extensive sub-surface contamination thot cleanup to meet any of the three standards was not feasible. With the agreement of the People of Enewetak, Runit was to be quarantined o J-he laqoon was safe for all purposes, including fishing, for which the The radiologirul cleanup itself consisted of three phases spanning 35 months. Phase 1, Mobil izcrtion, commenced on-atoll on 15 May 1977 and lasted six months, completing on 15 November 1977. Phase II, Cleanup, was scheduled for 22 months,

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terminating on 15 September 1979. Phase Ill, Demobilization, was scheduled for seven months, completing on 15 April 1980. Del’s rehabilitation effort was to start subsequent to DoD’s Mobilization Phase, but was scheduled to complete concurrently with DoD on 15 April 1980. These schedules were established in 1976, during preliminary planning, and the entire project has remained on schedule all the way through to completion. Mobilization began in the spring of 1977. The base camp on Enewetak Island, which had served as the home ot the caretaker force for many years, was expanded manyfold to accommodate the support forces, the cleanup forces who wou Id clear the southern islands of uncontaminated debris, and the Do] contractor who would carry out the rehabilitation effort. An advance camp was constructed on the island of Lojwa in the northeastern chain. Resiclual radiation levels on Lojwa were very low, and the island was of adequate size to accommodate the cleanup force of about 400 men who would clear the northern islands of uncontaminated debris, contaminated debris, and soil with the highest levels of transuranic contamination. Lojwa also served as the base for the sizeable force which carried out containment operations for contaminated material on the island of Runit. Throughout the summer and f al I of 1977 on-atol I personnel levels rose and construction activity increased, until by the end of the Mobilization Phase on [5 November 1977 the camps on Enewetak and Lojwa …