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Machine-read from the scan, so expect some errors. Lines that couldn’t be read are left out.
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I wish to acknowledge the outstanding contribution to progress in the development of atomic weapons ~~hicb General Hull has made as Commander Joir15‘Task5’orce Seven. TM support given to the MC Frovinf; Graund Group which conducted the tests was compl~tc, and wit!,out the assistance the test program could not have hccn csrricd. out. ~
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But all of these Wcclporls,as far as their state of development t~lewartime weapon -is concerned, were ‘about on a paro They were . designed ~Jder cxtrcm prcssluru and without regard for many rmoblcms which in tkie lan,grun arc of great i:nport~ncc in the In its January P.Cport t~Jco.ng.r~~s}the Atmnic Energy Cmnission s~id its goal in the field of weapon development was that thorough testing ~fv~capor?s findcomponents is ncccssary t~
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background leading up to the 19.M progranof atoricweapon tests and the’ or~~nizationof the TZS~ F~rce which was forced to carry out the program. Althoughthe testswere conductedby a combinedr~litaryand civilian’ team, Joint Task Force Seven is a mjlitary organization with a great majorityof which ~isted between the r.ilitaryand civilian personnel resulted in the F.~rce,there has not”besn .?single incident which imyeded any test or was re1211yvery inthpqte; for’ example: r.ost oi the tkchnicd sections were staff ed with both civilims .sndimembsrsd the hr.~edForces S>&cial
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AS ~~eneralHull has saili,‘the purpose of these tests w~s not to find the effects of atomic explosions on materiel and enuipn,entas at’Bikini, Yet, since the deto~atio~l~were to be made, several a~enc:es of the Armed l?~rcescarried out tests of this kind. Many cf these tests were not very extensive wd, in ,general;they were designed to fill in gaps in the knowledge gained at 13Mini. TLese tests were successful in the sense that ‘ the desired data were obtained. with us E:ii~;etok, During this tim he contributed very significantly to the success of the cperstion by ascist.in~with the interpretation of the to do it. It has been a ~~reatpersonalsatisfactionto me to be so closely?ssociatsdwith th,:semen and I hsve the highestregardfor the sev~ralyearswe each hzve l-arnedhow the otherthinks. It was easy to learn sincewe think alike,and when C-r?.vesdcts a jcb, I always feel that it has been done GS I would have done it but just a little bit YOU understand, of course, that I ;J,strictly limited in Wh(<t I cm say about the details of the conduct of the tests and about the scientific results, I ;m going to tell you as cuch nspossible now, th~n of the operation: If I ?rlto be quotrd, I would npprecip,teit if you would quote directly f~m th$:senoti:s. There ore sore copies avail?ble icr you.
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utilizationof the nationalre.sou~cesrequiredfor the developmentand the Los ~lWlOS;abor2tcmyh?i devd.~ooednew weapon designs, It is obviocs fruitful if the product of the program never ~ets tested. If the nation elscts to develop and fi,anufactureStcmic wea~or.s,these weapcms must be test?d. Unlike other borbs$ however, the cost in actual cash, rr.anhours For these rczsons, development <id improvement of atomi,cweapons cannot be ~Y,d~roof-t~sting after each chanqe.