Atomic Weapons Tests Enewetak Atoll Operation Sandstone 1948 (Volume One)

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[ ATOMIC WEAPONS TESTS EN IWETOK ATOLL . JOINT TASK FORCE SEVEN

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HEADQUARTERS JOINT TASK FORCE SEVENSAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA SLTBJECT: Report of the Commander, Joint Task Force Seven, on the 1948 Tests of TO : The Joint Chiefs of Staff Submitted herewith is the Operational Report of Joint Task Force Seven on the 1948 tests of atomic weapons, Operation Sandstone. This report covers the operations of Joint Task Force Seven necessary to the accomplishment of its assigned mission: the construction of an atomic weapons proving ground and the conduct of tests of atomic weapons early in 1948 at the Eniwetok proving ground. The tests consisted of statically detonating by remote control three atomic bombs of new design, located on the top of 200-foot steel The scientific and technical aspects of the tests, which involved measurement of the explosions and their effect by instrumentation, are not covered in detail in this report. A full report of these scientific and technical aspects, prepared by the Test Director, Captain James S. Russel, USN, for presentation to the Atomic Energy Commission, will be made available to the Joint Chiefs of Staff through the .Military Liaison Committee. In the fall of 1947, when the plans for Operation Sandstone were being developed, it was estimated that the total cost would be $27,500,000. Of this amount $20,000,000 was estimated to be the cost of participation by the Armed Forces above their normal operating expenses. The remainder of this sum, $7,500,000, was the estimated requirement of the AEC to cover obligations directly contracted for by the Atomic Energy Commission. There were of course additional costs carried by the Services as a result of this operation. The estimate of the cost to be met by the AEC for military support of the operation proved to be more than ample. As the tests neared completion, these estimates were revised downward to $10,000,000 (Army: $2,740,000; Navy: $5,100!OOO;Air Forces: $2,160,000) for the Fiscal Year 1948. Accordingly, $8,000,000 was returned to the AEC by 1 May along with a statement that the Departments should be prepared to return an additional $2,000,000 at a later date. At the same time it was requested that $4,000,000 be made available to the Services by the AEC for use during the Fiscal Year 1949 (ArmY: $1,422,000; Navy: $703,000; Air Forces: $1,875,000). It is estimated that this amount will cover the expenses of the Armed Forces in closing out details of the operation so far as Joint Task Force Seven is concerned. In mounting this operation the following fundamental considerations were of primary influence in the formulation of plans and organization:

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a. The tests would provide the Armed Forces with an invaluable opportunity to participate in atomic weapon development; would therefore prove an excellent training vehicle; and would, from the overall viewpoint, be of inestimable value in the gain - to national preparedness and security. b. Although the Commander, Joint Task Force Seven, was charged with responsibility for the conduct of the entire operation, Sandstone was primarily a scientific test with the Armed Forces in a supporting role. c. The security requirements imposed by the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 would be a controlling factor in the conduct of the operation. d. The major expenditure of effort by the Armed Forces in support of this operation would be logistical in nature. e. The international political situation would be an influencing consideration in conducting the operation. The fact that Operation Sandstone was conducted for the fundamental purpose of scientific proof-testing an improved design of atomic weapons by the Atomic Energy Commission, but was under the command of a military officer, posed a special problem of organization within the Task Force. This problem was solved by the organization of Task Group 7.1, to which all AEC members of the Task Force, both civilian and military, were assigned. The Test Director and Commander of Task Group 7.1, Captain Russell, and the Scientific Director, Doctor Darol K. Froman, who also headed Task Unit 7.1.1 within Task Group 7.1, were not subject to staff direction of the Joint Task Force Staff. By mutuai agreement the channel between this Task Group and the Task Force Commander was direct. This solution did not impair the command function of the Commander, Joint Task Force Seven, while at the same time it provided the freedom of action necessary to the scientific elements of the Task Force. Viewed in perspective, it might be said that the Task Force existed and operated to support one of its own subordinate elements. The security provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 served to make the personnel of Joint Task Force Seven security conscious to a high degree. Throughout the op eration, extreme care was exercised to prevent unauthorized access to any data or material of a nature classified as “Restricted Data.” The provisions of the Atomic Energy Act were an important consideration in arriving at the establishment of post-test safeguards at the proving ground. All individuals assigned tr -m associated with the Task Force during this operation were appropriately screened b} me FBI of the Department of Justice. The results of these screenings are noteworthy. A total of over 13,000 persons, including 1,873 who were given the full AEC “Q” clearance, were investigated. Of this number, 11 were rejected because of Communistic tendencies and 20 were rejected for Efficiency and economy in the solution of administrative and logistic problems dictated the decision to rely on the existing command channels of the respective Armed Services for this operation. This solution proved to be eminently satisfactory. Normal Zone of the Interior supply installations and ports for all three Services, and the existing Pacific Command channels, namely CincPacFlt, Pacific Air Command and ATC, and US Army Pacific, were utilized for this purpose. Support provided by the Services was unfailingly of the highest order at all times. Designation of an Executive Agent for the Joint Chiefs of

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Staff proved to be exceedingly helpful in the administration of the Operation. Important policy matters were processed through that oRice with the utmost speed. At the outset it was considered advisable to keep the Task Force small in personnel and material and to function without fanfare. The time permitted the Task Force Commander and Staff to plan and carry out the tests in the spring of 1948 precluded accomplishment of the mission with fewer personnel and ships than were used. Had a full year been allowed for the preparation for and carrying out of the mission, it could have been accomplished with a material saving in the personnel, materiel and shipping required for Sandstone with the resultant saving in money cost. During the fall and winter of 1947-48, important international negotiations, both in the Security Council of the United Nations and in the Four-Power Foreign Ministers’ Conference in London, were in progress. Public release of information that the United States was conducting firing tests of new atomic weapons could have had deleterious effects if misinterpreted. Operation Sandstone therefore had to be developed under a cloak of security, which imposed additional difficulties that would not normally have been encounAs to the selection of the test site in Trust Territory, it was confirmed by the State Department that the terms of the Trusteeship Agreement would permit the tests to be conducted at Eniwetok without violation of the agreement, but that proper notification must be made to the Security Council of the LTnited Nations as to the decision to declare Eniwetok Atoll and the territorial waters thereof a “closed area.” Since delivery of this notification would nullify, to all practical purpoies, the “Top Secret” classification on the existence of the Task Force, a press release was made on 1 December 1947 which resulted in greatly simplified operations due to the lowered classification assigned the project thereafter. The decision to make the press release was hastened by clandestine information as to the project which was already in the hands of the press. Two other press releases were made later in December. Thereafter, it was considered that no further release was necessary or desirable, except for the possibility of some unforeseen emergency. This policy on the release of public information proved sound and was condoned by the press. Declaration of a danger area (150 x 200 nautical miles) around the atoll was a unilateral action on the part of the United States, and due notification to foreign powers was made accordingly. This action gave the Task Force Commander a legitimate reason to warn foreign vessels away from the atoll in case of a close approach to the closed area, and was therefore an aid to enforcement of the necessary security restrictions. Since considerations of national security warranted the exercise of extraordinary precautions to deny information of the tests to agents of a foreign power, The Commander, Joint Task Force Seven, sought authority from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to take steps to warn submerged submarines found in the danger area by dropping depth charges, not aimed to hit, but accepting the risk of a possible hit. This authority was granted and augmented to the extent that if submerged submarines failed to respond to warnings, during actual test periods, depth charges might be dropped closer aboard to intensify the Fortunately, occasion to take such steps did not materialize. Although it is considered certain that submarines were in the “danger area” during the preparatory period, contact

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was never held long enough to permit putting into effect the warning measures. To the best of our knowledge the “closed area” was never violated. In addition to the benefits derived from the tests of atomic weapons, the Armed Services gained substantially from Operation Sandstone. Valuable command and staff training in joint operations was one of the derivatives.

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Table of Contents INTRODt?cT1oN-Purpose of operation Sandstone; Statement of The Mission of Joint Task Force Seven. Statement by The Deputy Commander and Commander, Air Forces, Joint Task Force Seven, Major General William E, Kepner, USAF. Statement by The Deputy Commander, Joint Task Force Seven, Rear Admiral William S. Parsons, USN. Statement by The Test Director and Commander, Task Group 7.1, Captain James S. Russell, USN. NARRA’rlvE-RePort of Operation Sandstone. Section I...... Background of Operation Sandstone Section 5 . . Transition From Planning to Operating Stage Section 6 . Forward Displacement of Joint Task Force Seven . . Construction of The Proving Ground ONE, PART ONE

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Operation Sandstone was designed to conduct tests of atomic weapons to determine the desirability of stockpiling certain weapons of improved design and performance and to establish fundamental data upon which to base future weapon design. The operation was conducted at the behest, and under the auspices, of the Atomic Energy Commission. Joint Task Force Seven was organized and commanded by Lieutenant General John E. Hull at the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The mission assigned the Joint Task Force by the Joint Chiefs of Staff was to construct an atomic proving ground at Eniwetok Atoll for the Atomic Energy Commission and to support the Atomic Energy Commission in the conduct of the initial test operations.

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Report to the Commander, Joint Task Force Seven, by the Deputy Commander and Commander Air Forces, Major General William E. Comments by the Deputy Commander, Rear Admiral Willium S. Summation by the test director, Captain James S. Russell, USN.

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REPORT TO THE COMMANDER, JOIXT TASK FORCE SE$’EX, BY THE FORCES, JOINT TASK FORCE SE}-EN At the close of Sandstone operations which were conducted under your command with outstanding success, I believe that the following comments are pertinent. They are offered with the hope that they will be of advantage to those who may be charged with the next operation of a similar nature. Every effort should be made to have representatives from all three departments report at the same time. The Staff should be assembled completely with all members present so that policies and principles may be enunciated to all, and so that internal instructions can be accomplished without the necessity of repeating each time a new Staff Officer arrives. This Staff should, insofar as possible, be composed of people who have had experience in Sandstone or Crossroads, or at”least should be composed of individuals with some experience in joint operations. It is believed that all operations of one type should be under one subordinate commander. For example, air operations are identical in the Army, Navy or in the Ground Forces. Generally speaking, the problems of training and maintenance within the squadrons and groups are very similar in each service. A great deal of time will be saved if one headquarters can make all decisions pertinent to the overall plan. In the long run, I believe that a more efficient operation can be conducted. These should have specific duties and responsibilities. They should have supervision for the accomplishment of the assigned duties under the joint commander as well as those of a general advisory nature which the joint commander may avail himself of if he deems it advisable. Their functions should be set forth in publications so that the joint staff members may be fully aware of their responsibilities. If deputy commanders represent their respective departments, they should be empowered to act for that department when matters of joint interests arise. If they are to be instructed before acting in each case, then communications of an appropriate type should be provided for that purpose. During Sandstone, the maximum possible security was obtained and results were highly satisfactory. However, the carrying out of these security measures was endured at the at the expense of a great deal of extra work and with some loss in efficiency at the lower levels. I believe this to be dangerous and impractical in actual war operations. Therefore, it cannot be taken as a pattern for combat even though it did succeed in Sandstone. Here we could afford the IOSSof time incurred in each instance, while in combat we could not.

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Moreover, those who are charged with interpreting the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 should be fully educated as to what its implication is on commanders in the field. One who knows nothing about a commander’s duties and responsibilities can unwittingly pre\7ent the success of the task force, if he does not really appreciate the effect of a wrong, or an unsound military interpretation on matters of security. For instance, a prohibition against cameras in the area should state specifically what cameras. Such a prohibition should never be the cause, or excuse, for arbitrarily removing an expensive camera installation from an instrument set up in an airplane. Certainly a camera used only to photograph a “radar scope” does not involve restricted data under the Atomic Energy Act, in the same way it might if used to photograph the explosion, or parts of the bomb. All services should have full and free access to all data affecting its military use immediately. It must be presumed that since they share in the conduct of the test, they must share equally in the responsibility in getting the …