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Machine-read from the scan, so expect some errors. Lines that couldn’t be read are left out.
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FGLDER q 7) ‘ 6 [q-al-q7) Stdstinc vol. I Force Commander, which quoted in full a draft prepared by the Commission of a proposed press release to be issued after the first Proving Ground Test, and requested the Task Force Commander’s comments. He then read the reply he had received frcm the Task Force Commander, in which the latter recommended against a release in view of certain complications which might result, but stated that he was unable to evaluate the need for a release and further that issuance of a release such as suggested would not jeopardize his operation. The Commission then proceeded to discussions of various aspects of the problem of issuance of a release, in which Mr. <. Possibilities of effective abservati~n of the Proving Ground by Russia at time of the Test. Mr. Carpenter stated it as the belief of the Military Liaison Committee that it is only remotely possible that Russian submarines are operating within a radius of 120 miles
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delayed should one be kn;wn to be within this area pri~ to the scheduled time for the sh~t. Mr. Lilienthal remarked upon a message received from the Test DLrectcr dated March 25, 1948, commenting upon the effect upon morale of submarine alerts. Commander Ashw%rth stated that in his opinion a submarine more than 120 miles distant would probably not detect the shot with scund equipment but probably would with seismographic equipInterval following the test during which a release migh— give Russian an opportunity to collect val~able technic data, Mr. Carpenter reported that he had been inf?rmed by Mr. Ellis Johnson, special advisor to General Kepner on long range detection, that if Russia should learn of the shot within 72 hours after its occurrence, this might enable it to obtain valuable data on the test by use of airborne filters. the importance of the press relations involved in this question, from the standpoint of possible deteriorat.i of the whole public attitude towards efforts to maintai the security of restricted data. The pursuit of a policy on this release which might be made to appear patently absurd to the press and through it to the public, would make all futul’eefforts to maintain security increasingly difficult. Mr. Carpenter expres his belief in a cooperative stand with the press. He mentioned the possibility of asking key members of the press to refrain voluntarily, at least for a stated
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large and complex ogeratlon, to which there would.b~--- many obstacles, especially in time of peace. Possibility of Leaks. It was agreed that any eff-rts t delay public announcement of the test in the press ml.g be negated by conversations of personnel returning fro the tests through Honolulu and elsewhere. Certain operational military flights to the United States would be necessary nevertheless, starting immediately after It was pointed out that in his message of March 25, 1948, the Test Director had expressed the opinion that the detonation would become publicly known within several days of the event. After this discussion, the following action wzs decided upon with the concurrence of Mr. C2rpenter, who stated that he was speaking for the Secretary of Defense: (1) The Commission will prepare a release for issuanc at 2:00 p.m. Eastern Standard Time, on the Saturd following the first test. This release will be a revision of the draft already seen by Mr. Carpent but will be submitted to Mr. approval prior to issuance. afternoon of the Public and Technical call a meeting In Washington wit of correspondents for press major newspapers late in the Friday following the test. Thos attending will be given advance copies of the release, with a general oral explanation, pr?babl by the Chairman and Mr. Carpenter, of the reasons
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.. =~the press men present will hold the release an the subject matter of the release In complete confidence until the release time set. In the event of’a news leak prior to 2:00 P.m. Saturday, of such nature as to indicate strong the f’utilityof continuing to withhold a relea it may be found desirable to advance the time The Commission will confer with Mr. or to making any release earlier tha Ashworth will arrange to n~tify the Force Cormnanderof’the above decisions, and als to request him to arrange that with the except of necessary operational flights (per~onnel pa ticipating in which should be given strictest security briefings) flights be avoj.dedif poss server personnel at Honolulu or other points w press representatives are present, prior to 2