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Attorney at Law Executive Director, fi4icronesian Legal Post Office Zux 226 I started to write a longer and more formal response to your— letter forwarding the” reply to the DLIS. I threw it away, and decidcci to forv.’ara the attached copy of the memo I wrote to my staff after reading, ycur reply. ‘fT’lhis is rather ir4 armal, intieed, but 1 wante~ vou ta know how seriously I view the proble=. s we X do not fault you. I si,mply am frustrated and coxicerned. ” I’m still going to try my best, but we now are confronted with new decisions and with a time schedule that may be impossible. Lieutenant General, USAF
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SUBJECT: Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS) 1. We need to have AEC (ERDA) representati~es and DOI representatives read this. Then we need a conference at the earliest possible date to discuss and determine steps to be taken. I dontt want a big 2. If it is decided that we should follow all or a substantial part of of a one year delay. This needs to be assessed AaAF. . a. I cannot go to Congress for the funds we have now requested -~nticipating such a delay, unless I frankly tell them we face such a delay and the almost certain cost escalation. (This applies even if we reject the more extensive soil removal and the ciisposal of radioactive debris away from the atoll. If we accept these more stringent measure the 100 million dollars cited by Ted Mitchell is probably much lower than the ultimate cost. ) In today’s fiscal environn~ent, I do not believe we would have a prayer of getting any such funds. Possibly-we could still convince Congress with the uncertain cost figures, but 1 seriously doubt we could obtain even the first increment (for the base camp) until we can nail down the probable total. We need to assess this of Ted hlitchellts recommendations,b. If we reject all or part (1) Would we face likely litigation? .
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(2} If so, again I need to tell Congr:ss “;nd again I do not “ “ (3) Once we decide on a course of action, we need a meeting . with Tcd Mitchell and this has to be laid out to him - honestly and. “ frankly. If we accept his recommendations and face delays and “ likely failure to obtain funds, then what?- If we reject his recommendations, then what? I want to ask him point blank so that I can be accurate and comdete in my statements to Congress. Because he was so late w-enly to the DEIS. there just may not be time 3. There may bc an alternative course for dealing with Congress: t#l them of the problems and ask for a reduced amount sufficient only to assure present facilities do not further decay. This should be the bare minimum to assure a smooth transition to later preparation of ., the base camp. (In addition to present O&hi, I would “guess” this would be somewhere around four million dollars. ) l . HOW can this be done since th= Pr~sicieniTs buciget has gone in? At may be the lesser of evils. ) We have been honest with them believing (asMitchell. said to me in his telephone call) that his response to the. .. DEIS wouldn’t contain any surprises. It did ! 4. Having read the various replies to the DEIS, it seems to me we have to either reject some outri~.ht, or the return of the people to Enewetak can never take place. This just doesn’t seem Iogiaal, since .$ there are places in the world where people have lived for centuries . . with radiation levels equal to or in excess of those which would remain at Enewetak. It seems to me the statistical risk should be considered. If the Dri- Enewctak want to return to the atoll, are they unwilling to accept any risk? Don’t they face a possibly greater statistical health xisk from other sources (like the suspected ruptured tubular pregnancy -whilewe were there)? I believe if that question were put to them in language they could clearly ‘understand, they would elect to accept the
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enough facts to assure ‘Iprudent risks” we should acknowledge that lack, accept the clclay, and attempt to find the facts. . . b. If Ted Mitchell is wrong, can we convince him he is wrong? 1: : . sure am not the expert. We must rely on .ERD.q for this. It is not c. All of us, including Ted Mitchell are playing “God” and we are 5. Please laY out a time table and keep me informed. Lieutenant General, USAF
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People of Enewetak Draft Environmental Impact Statement CLEAN UP, REHABILITATION, issued by the Defense Nuclea: Agency, Washingtoil, Counsel for the People Micronesia Legal Services Corp. Saipan, Nlariana Islands 96950
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“The impetus for development of this program comes from the long-expressed desire of the People of Enewetak to return to their homeland. Although resigned to their nearly thirty . ‘Tear exile at Ujelang Atol”lI they have never given up hope of returning to Enewetak, if but only if,.it is radiologically safe for them to do so. They are aware of the substantial social and economic problems which necessarily attend the xelo,cation and resettlement of their more than 400 personsr but the difficulty of assessing the risk from the extensive radioactivity present at the Atoll as a result of the nuclear ; oapor,s testing pr~gram there is by far the most troublesome. It is difficult enough for the laym~i LO comprehend what the . experts in the various radiological ~ci.enc= fields are saying ... “ about the effects of radioactivity, but that difficulty is . compounded many times over the differences of opinion found . among the experts, by the realization that even the experts agree that the long term effects of some of the more dangerous radionuclides are mot knoti by anyone at this time and may not become known for many years to come, and it is unsettling to learn that the standards used for the kinds and amounts of zadionuclides to be tolerated in the environment and in nmn are criticized by reputable experts as unreliable and inadequately Their individual and, collect3.ve desire to return to their ancestral homeland is difficult for Americans to fully appre--- -.. ciate. To them land is not a commodity, a thing apart, to be
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brought or sold. In their culture the land and marine environment of the atoll are fully integrated with the human members of the society. It is an economic resource and more. Ownership and use of the land reflects and is inextricably linked to the social organization and to the culture as a who16. 10 be sure, their society has underga.ne and continuously is undergoing change as a result of :orces both within and without, but the extraordinary resettle to the atoll Thus, the People significance of their being able to discovered by their ancestors remains of Enewetak are both the prime beneficiaries and the prime risk-takers in this resettlement program. And it biological health risk that they are the most dependent upon the United States government. The Defense Nuclear Agency and the Aiomic Energy Commission have already devoted great amounts of “ time and money to assessment and remedy of radiological problems presented by this program, but more will have to be done and LL. will k.ave to be~done over a long period of time. And throughout, the People of Ene@-etak will rely upon the responsible agencies United States government to do everything possible to and minimize the risk due to the residual radioactivity Enewetak biosphere. Nothing said in these comments, for example, should ever be taken as an assumption of risk by the-1 people of Enewetak. When they left the Atoll in 1947 at the insistence of the United States government it was radiologically safe. That is the state in which it should be for their return.
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Of course, it cannot ever be restored to that condition, but that must be the assumed objective in order that remedial measures c~a nore likely fall within the safest possible limits, and so that on-going efforts will be made to continually add to the knowledge Gi radiological conditions at Enewetak and refine and improve both risk assessineritand rei,ledialmeasures as the various - relevant sciences develop over the years. Not only is the United States trustee for these people, but it has-an especial humanitarian obligation to them because of the uniqueiy dangerous potential effects due to the use to which the trustee put the Atoll. It is an absolute kind of responsibility to both return the people to their home and eliminate the _ likelihood of so much as a single radiation induced illness or “-- ‘---- A full measure of gratitude is due and hereby given, however, to the considerable efforts which the United States has made thus - far. The planning for resettlement, the planning for the clean-up, all represent to the ultimate~ success of the program. radiological survey, the a very large contribytian And we do not wish to dampen the enthusiasm and interest of the many persons “in and out of the government who have given devoted effort thus far. The comments made here are offered im the spirit of cooperation, with the realization that they will be received in that same spirit. 2. Social and Economic Problems Associated with Resettlement Further consideration of the social and economic problems ---- associated with the resettlement must be given. This i.s perhaps
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one of the weakest aspects of the DEIS as it now stands. Attention is given to both short and long rancje economic the people themselves specific objectives and specific econmic development possibilities must be found so that the shared aim”of economic seif-sufficiency can be achieved. We realize that with all the other aspects of this complex project demanding attention up to now, this was not intentionally underemphasized. But as the program moves into its clean-up phase more attention must be giv& to meeting the future economic needs of the people. This is especially true because since the writing of,the DEIS it has become known that adverse radiological conditions in the northern. and severely if not completely restrict the use of the northern islets for the foreseeable future. The Enewetak Planning Council must continue to be relied upon l to make the final value judgments upon one proposal or another and upon the development of the economy as a whole so that it will. be consonant wi,th their own capabilities and values, but one or more specialists ~hould be engaged by the government and made available in an advisory capacity. They must be carefully selected both in terms of expertise in the field and suitability to this kind of cross-cultural task and to the maximum feasible extent the Planning Council should participate in the selection. Resettlement to Enewetak Atoll from Ujelang will involve an unusual amount of stress for individual members of the grouF and for the group as a whole. Physical stress will, if all goes as
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plannsd, be at a minimum, but we have in mind here the enmti.cnal stress upon the individual and the stress upon group processes. :his matter is not addressed at all by the DEIS. Ultimately, of course, it is for the people to manage the transition well and to adapt with their society intact, but - similar resettlement schemes M available and should be used to increase the likelihood of successful resettlement. The people themselves can benefit’ from greater awareness of the-stresses they will experience and those outsiders involved in planning and ‘working with them must have the same understanding. Dr. Thayer Scudder of the California Institute of Technology, a recognized authority on the subject and an experienced consultant,. should be considered for this assignment and if the Planning Council agrees, he should be engaged in this capacity. has taken a quick lcok at the DEIS at our request. His attached hereto as Appendix I provide valuable insights contribution to planning and execution of the program would appear to be necessary. (The article which he enclcsed is also usefuJ. It is “The Impa<ct of”Human Activities on the Physical and Social Montgomery, J. W. Bennett and T. Scudder, 2 Annual Review of Participation of another anthropologist versed in Marshallese . culture is also in order, to assist both the Enewetak people and the outsiders involved in the program. Working in conjunction with someone like Dr. Scudder, the total contribution would be invaluable. Dr. Robert Kiste at the University of Minnesota has been
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consulted by the governmental planners and meets these requireShort of involving so mny advisors and planners that aecesions and action are unauly impeded, it is essential that those representing all the relevant disciplines work together ;S a group with the Enewetak Fianning Council and the governmental decision-makers. To some extent this is what has been done during planning to date, but for the remainder of the program, the relevant disciplines should representatives engaged and be identified as such, appropriate organized into a more or less formai 3.1. The Radiological Survey The survey of radiological conditions at Enewetak Atoll in 1972 under the auspices of the Atomic Energy Commission is, we . believe exceptionally good as far as it goes, but we have been . advised by capable experts in the field that more work remains to be done and that the qualifications of the four-member Task Group which supervised we conduct of the survey, the assessment of its data and developed final recommendations are open to question. It is also apparent that as detailed and elaborate as that survey was, follow-up gathering of data and careful assessment of that data is absolutely essential, particularly with respect to the risk to the danger posed by those alpha-emitting radionuclides known as We do not wish to detract from the qualifications of the
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members of the Task Group, but in a field involving so m,anv specialties and where equally expert opinions differ markedly, i~ is imperative that the Task Group for follow-up studies be enlarged to include scientists knowrl to take the most conservaat the National Center for Atmospheric Research~ Ar’Cnur R. Tamplin at Lawrence Li.vermore Laboratory, and Donald P. University of Minnesota. Their presence in the their participation in some other direct way in to b: used for the gathering of information and is strongly recommended. Geesaman at the Task Group, or The 1972 radiological Survs”y (NVO-140) must be regarded as an impressive beginning of long-range radiological assessment and monitoring of the Enewetak environment with appropriate emphasis placed upon not only the marine and terrestrial environments but upon the radionuclide pathways to man. AS we shall discuss more - fully below, more information is needed about the presence of hot particles. The long range effects of Strontium-90 and Cesium-137 and other nuclides in the fo@ web cannot be known without experi-. mental planting. ‘(DEIS Vol. II, Tab B, p. 29.) These are only examples. And as time goes on, …
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