Palomares Summary Report (Partial)

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DEFENSE NUCLEAR AGENCY TECHNOLOGY AND ANALYSIS DIRECTORATE KIRTLAND AIR FORCE BASE, NEW MEXICO 87115 PALOMARES SUMMARY REPORT

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For some years prior to the Palomares accident, the Strategic Air Command (SAC) had been engaged in Operation Chrome Pome, the use of airborne alert aircraft carrying nuclear ar mament. This concept generally involved mid-air refueling rendezvous at one or more points during a bomber's lengthy mission (Fig. 1-1). As of January 1966, air refueling oper ations were supported by the Sixteenth Air Force (16AF) with headquarters at Torrejon Air Base near Madrid. Refueling was accomplished by tanker aircraft stationed at Torrejon AB and Moron AB, further to the south (Fig. 1-2). On the morning of 17 January 1966, two Operation Chrome Pome B-52Gs, Tea 12 and Tea 16, ** rendezvoused with two KC-135As, Troubadour 12 and Troubadour 14,** in the Saddle Rock refueling area at 31, 000 feet. At approximately 0922Z (local time in Spain is Zulu + 1 hour) the boom operator in Troubadour 12, while refueling Tea 12, reported to liis pilot that he had observed fireballs and what appeared to be a center wing section in a flat spin. This report of disaster was the first of many dealing with the accident and its aftermath. Tea 16 and Troubadour 14 had collided while engaged in the final stages of hookup for refueling. Other aircraft, on other days, and at other places had collided in mid-air. Tea 16, however, was carrying four nuclear weapons. The events summarized in this report were the direct result of that aircraft accident involving nuclear weapons. The crews of the other B-52 and KC-135 could not immediately determine the source of the falling debris. Troubadour 12 completed the refueling (10-12 minutes) of Tea 12 and then returned to the Palomares area to provide reconnaissance. Attempts to communicate with Troubadour 14 by radio were unsuccessful. Subsequently descending to 4, 000 feet. Troubadour 12 sighted unidentifiable bunting wreckage and, later, what appeared to be the tail section of a B-52. Other reports reached the Command Post at Moron AB from passing Spanish ships, a British ship, and a civil air liner. The Spanish Guardia Civil (Government Police) began reporting parachute sightings and the status of survivors. When these reports were radioed to Moron AB and passed to Torrejon, the full impact of the accident became apparent. Crews and aircraft assigned to the 51st Bomb Squadron, 68BW, 822 AD, 8AF, SAC and based at Seymour Johnson AFB, North Carolina. * Aircraft assigned to the 97th AREFS, 97th BW, 42 AD, 2 AF, SAC Crew assigned to 910th AREFS, 340th BW, Bergstrom AFB, Texas, and was on temporary duty at Moron

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Eleven men were involved in the collision, four as crew members of the KC-135 and seven CREW OF THE COLLIDING AIRCRAFT Name and Grade Name and Grade Buchanan, Ivans, Capt Messinger, Larry G., Maj Wendorf, Charles ].', Capt Service Number Position Electronic Warfare Operator *Deceased - did not survive the accident Of the four survivors, all from the B-52 crew, Captain Buchanan was the only one to come down on land. He was aided by Spanish residents and taken to the Clinic Jacinto Gonzales in Vera," about 7 kilometers distant. Captain Wendorf and Lieutenant Rooney were picked up by the fishing boat, Dorita, * * * Major Messinger was recovered by the fishing boat, Agustiny Rosar*; * Both lx>ars put into Aquilas, a nearby port, where the three survivors were taken to the local hospital and treated. Later that afternoon, they were transferred to San Javier, a Spanish Air Force base about 117 miles up the coast, and from that point were** *** **** ** In pickup truck of Senor Manuel Gonzales Navarro. *** Bartolome Roldan Martinez, master **** Alfonso Orts, master

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evacuated to Torrejon. Captain Buchanan, the most seriously injured of the four survivors, was treated at Vera and transferred by civil ambulance to San Javier and evacuated to As is indicated in Table 1-1, seven of the men were killed as a result of accident. Members of the Spanish Guardia Civil under command of Captain Isidore Calin took charge at the acci dent site. Remains were recovered and placed in caskets.** *** ****Seven bodies were identified by the afternoon of 18 January with the help of dental and other records. The remains were re turned to the United States on 20 January. INITIAL COMMAND RESPONSE: The Commander, 16AF, Major General Delmar Wilson, was notified through his command post and passed the report to Major General Donald W. Eisenhart, Hq SAC, at Offutt AFB, Omaha, Nebraska. These notifications set the "Broken Arrow"** response system in motion. The Disaster Control Team from Torrejon was alerted and prepared to travel to the scene. At 1136Z Maj Gen Wilson and three members of his staff*** departed Torrejon by T-39 and surveyed the accident site from the air, landing at San Javier at 1230Z. At 1134Z a C-97 departed Torrejon with 33 members of the Disaster Control Team and three accident investigation personnel and arrived at San Javier at 1240Z, An H-43 from the Torrejon rescue unit and a C-54 carrying jet fuel to support the H-43 were the last aircraft into San Javier on the first day. At 1221Z 17 January, a Disaster Control Team under Maj Gen A. J. Beck, Deputy Chief of Staff, Materiel, SAC, left Omaha arriving at San Javier at 0114Z, 18 January, and at the accident scene at 0630Z. At 1125Z on the day of the accident, the Joint Nuclear Accident Coordinating Center (JNACC) at Sandia Base (now Kirtland Air Force Base), New Mexico, received word of the accident. JNACC is a joint Department of Defense/Atomic Energy Commission (DOD/AEC) organiza tion charged with coordinating assistance for recovery from nuclear accidents. Its files contain information covering status and capability of DOD and AEC accident response teams throughout the world. In addition it has ready access to the technical capabilities of the atomic community centered in Albuquerque, New Mexico. The Air Force Nuclear Safety Directorate at Kirtland AFB advised JNACC that a team of four of their staff had air trans port to Spain and offered space for other response personnel. Representatives of JNACC, Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory**** and Sandia Corporation**** were alerted and de parted Albuquerque on the aircraft at 1800Z, 17 January. * In the face of tragedy, people-to-people response lightens our load. On the evening of the accident the remains of the victims were brought to the Town Hall of Cuevas del Almanzora, northeast of Palomares. There, among burning candles, services were held by a Spanish priest. Maj Gen Wilson received the remains and they were transported to San Javier and from there, to Torrejon. * * Broken Arrow is the code term used in notifications of nuclear accidents. *** One of these was an interpreter. **** Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory and Sandia Corporation are organizations which develop atomic weapons under contract to the USAEC.

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As the official contact between USAF and the Government of Spain (GOS), the Joint United States Military Group (fUSMG) was notified of the accident at once. Chief of the JUSMG, Maj Gen Stanley J. Donovan, called on the Spanish Air Minister and on General Augustin Munoz Grandes, Chief of the Spanish General Staff, informing them of the accident, and then proceeded by plane to San Javier. The United States Embassy in Madrid was notified by the'Torrejon Command Post. The Am bassador, Angier Biddle Duke, on being advised, proceeded to the Spanish Foreign Office and reported the available details to the Spanish authorities. The Spanish-American Agreement in existence then, * defining responsibilities in case of an aircraft accident, provided: In case of accident occurring to United States military aircraft or to air carriers which operate under contract to the United States Government, the Spanish and United States authorities will cooperate in the adoption of rescue measures with primary responsibility belonging to the United States authorities. Measures to take charge of and remove the damaged aircraft and its technical equipment are the responsibility of the appropriate United States authorities. Spanish military or police forces shall have primary responsibility for the external security of such damaged aircraft; however. United States military forces, if first on the scene, may assume the responsibility pending the arrival of Spanish military or police Spanish Guardia Civil personnel were the first government representatives on the scene. They began immediately to secure the area and continued to perform in that and similar capacities for the duration of the recovery operation. By the evening of the day of the accident, 17 January, 49 U.S. personnel had arrived at Palomares. That number would increase in the days that followed to more than 650 at the accident site. The tone of the recovery operation was set when President Johnson, while breakfasting in his bedroom at the White House, was advised of the accident and that the situation involved four thermonuclear weapons. He phoned the Secretary of Defense, and after checking on the danger of a nuclear detonation, instructed that we should "do every thing possible to find them. " The village of Palomares lies near the southeastern coast of Spain (Fig. 1-2) in the province of Almeria, It is so small that it is not included on many maps, nor was it included in the census. At the time of the accident, its population was estimated to be approximately 2,000 persons. By American standards Palomares would be considered a poor village, although •Procedural Agreement No. 14 to the 26 September 1953 Agreements, Operation of Military

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probably somewhat richer than most in Almeria, the forty-ninth of Spain's fifty provinces in per-capita income. The area was once rich in metals, with evidence of mining activity dating from as early as 3500 B.C. It was later settled and its metals extracted to support the far-reacliing commerce of the Phoenicians. Metals, however, no longer contribute to the area's economy. The abandoned mine shafts are the only remains of this industry. The presence of these diggings in the area was to play a part in the search for a missing bomb. Palomares is also sufficiently arid that its only industry, agriculture, must depend on deep well irrigation. Relying on this irrigation, the village had been able to enjoy a modicum of prosperity. Farming the irrigated land produced alfalfa, beans, cotton and two wheat and two tomato crops in 1965, The tomatoes accounted for the village's principal economic input in that year, about $250,000. Electricity, provided by a local generator, came to Palomares in 1958 and with it, radios and a few television sets. These modern media which were to carry the Palomares story to the world would also involve the people of that barriada (hamlet) in the diplomatic and propaganda maneuverings of the nuclear powers. The people of Palomares are farmers and farm laborers, but the waters off the Palomares coast were the harvest grounds of many fishermen from nearby ports and villages: Villaricos, Aguilas, and Garrucha. These people, after playing the major part in the res cue of the surviving airmen, were to be excluded from parts of their fishing grounds by the extensive underwater salvage operation which was to follow. (Section III). One can imagine the response of individuals on the ground to the collision 30,000 feet above them. The refueling operations were not new to the residents of Palomares. Many "hook ups" had been witnessed on other occasions. This day, however, was to be different. Some saw the collision; others looked up only when they heard the explosion. What all saw was the burning aircraft wreckage falling about their village and farm plots. The B-52 had broken apart at high altitude. The KC-135, however, remaining fairly intact as it plum meted to earth, apparently exploded just before ground contact (1600 ft) and again on contact. Engines, wing sections, gear and other smaller pieces fell about the countryside, in back yards and open fields. The debris pattern on land was spread over several square miles. Father Serraro, a circuit priest from Cuevas del Almanzora who tended to Palomares parishioners, suggested that "the hand of God" had protected the village. Aside from being frightened, no person or animal was injured nor was any structure damaged - other than broken windows and the like. As the first Americans arrived in Palomares, the priorities of the task before them were fairly obvious. First, there was concern for people, crew members of the aircraft and residents of the village. After Maj Gen Wilson had seenJto the condition of the surviving airmen in Aguilas and the remains of the deceased in Cuevas, he was assured by local au thorities at Palomares that no injuries had been sustained by the populace. Some members

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of the response force had performed initial radiation surveys, predominantly around the areas of major wreckage. These surveys indicated that there had been no nuclear explosion. Somewhere, in the gathering darkness, four nuclear weapons had to be located. There were many stories to be told by the Spaniards who had seen parachutes with projectiles attached, but there were few of the Americans who could understand the language. Just before dark, Sgt Ramond Howe, who had been conducting radiation monitoring of some of the wreckage, learned of a possible weapon from a member of the Guardia Civil. That report led the team to its first find about 900 feet from the beach and southeast of the village (Fig, 1-3). The weapon was only slightly damaged on impact. It apparently had fallen against a soft, high bank and rolled to the bank's base (Fig. 1-4). Radiation checks were negative. The team decided to leave render-safe* procedures until morning as it was now too dark to accomplish the task. Air Force guards were posted at the weapon. The weapons were given numbers in the order in which they were found. The team spirit rose at the relative ease of the Number 1 find and at its good condition. Darkness and the rugged terrain in another search area a mile west of the village made it necessary to postpone this search until morning. At first light, the small force gathered at the B-52 tail section which was to be used as a command post (Fig. 1-5). All available personnel were pressed into the search effort. By 0930 hours**, the second weapon was located. Number 2 turned out to be the bomb that had evaded location the previous evening. Unlike Number 1, however, Number 2 had been sub stantially damaged upon impact. Part of the weapon's high explosive had detonated but as designed, no nuclear detonation had taken place.4** Portions of the weapon were in a crater of about 20-foot diameter and 6 feet in depth. Other parts of the weapon assembly were found as far away as 100 yards. Weapon render-safe procedures were not required here. The primary concern with Number 2 was the plutonium contamination that must have been released by the high explosive detonation. Radiation detection equipment indicated the presence of significant alpha contamination in the area. At approximately …