Palomares Summary Report and Project Crested Ice Report (CD-Rom)

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DEFENSE NUCLEAR AGENCY TECHNOLOGY AND ANALYSIS DIRECTORATE KIRTLAND AIR FORCE BASE, NEW MEXICO 87115 PALOMARES SUMMARY REPORT PRIVACY ACT MATERIAL REMOVED

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Alamos SciontLfic Laboratcry as a :ne.".LL and ready advisnr. It im pa nio::- larly fining rhar ihi? summary of Che: PilomaneS accldenE, one uf many

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The accident which occurred over Palomares, Spain on 17 January 1966 and its subsequent recovery operation attracted worldwide interest. This report is designed as a summary which collects the most pertinent data under one cover. The authors, in assembling the records and recollections of the period, are certainly aware of the problems of assigning relative worth to his torical records. The many decisions which had to be made in preparing this summary were based on the answers to two questions. First, "Did the occurrence impact on the Palomares operation or political situation?", and second, "Might a record of the occurrence aid in the prosecution of a similar operation at some time in the future?" If the answers were affirmative, we have attempted to include the information in this sum We are indebted to many individuals and organizations for access to their files and memories. Nine years have passed since the operation, so files and memories were sometimes dusty and sometimes destroyed. To each request for information, however, a positive and sincere at tempt was made to satisfy our requirement. For this effort, we express

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TABLE OF CONTENTS Initial Command Response............................................................... . 17 Establishing Camp Wilson ..................................................................... 25 Discipline and Morale........................................ 35 Logistics and Supply ........................................................................... 35 Aircraft Accident Investigation Board........................................ . 43 Implications of Decontamination Levels............................ 56 The Soil Shipment........................................................................... 65 Return of the Land.................................. 73

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TABLE OF CONTENTS Logistics and Support. . . • • 9 9 9 9 9 9 122 Command and Control. . • 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 136 Search and Identification . • • 9 9 9 9 9 137 PALOMARES AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 147 Relations with the Spanish . • • 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 » 148 Relations with the Soviet Union • 9 9 9 9 9 « * 9 148 Relations with Great Britain . • 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 . 148

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TABLE OF CONTENTS Legal Background for Payment of Claims.............................................. 149 Spanish Laws on Claims..................................................................... 150 Exceptions for Palomares ................................................................ 152 The Orts Claim...................................................................................... 176 Analysis of Mining Slag........................................................................... 178 The Red Duchess....................................................................................... 178 Evaluation of Policies.................................. 188 Press Policy Revisions........................................................................... 190 Approved DOD News Release, 2 March 1966 ......................................... 192 Recovery Release Plans........................................................................... 196 The Final Act............................................................................................ 199 Handling of News Personnel..................................................................... 202 7 SUBSEQUENT BIOMEDICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS . . 205 The Desalination Plant........................................................................... 211

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LIST OF FIGURES 1-2 Air Base Locations............................................................................ 15 1-3 Embankment SE of Palomares........................................................... 21 1-4 Weapon at Base of Embankment........................................................... 22 2-1 Temporary Camp Site.......................................................... 26 2-5 Camp Wilson Laundry Operations..................................................... 33 2-7 Camp Wilson Field Kitchen................................................................. 36 2-8 Camp Wilson Dining Area....................................................................... 37 2-9 Monitoring in Rough Terrain................................................................. 40 2-10 Alpha Monitoring with PAC-IS........................................................... 41 2-12 Temporary Burial Pit............................................................................ 57 2-14 Wetting Down Contaminated Area . 59 2-16 Mulching and Loading............................................................................. 62 2-17 Camp Wilson Temporary Pier........................................................... 67 2-18 Barrel Loading Operations................................................................. 69 2-20 Barrel Loading Operations................................................................. 72 3-1 Southeast Spanish Coast....................................................................... 76 3-3 Modified Chain of Command................................................................. 79 3-9 Search Methods at Various Depths...................................................... 91 3-10 Search Grid Overlay............................. 93 3-11 Waist Boom Hoisting Operation ........................................................... 95 3-15 Parachute Enshrouded Weapon at 2550 feet........................................... 99

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3-18 Underwater Recovery Vehicle (CURV II)................................ 103 3-19 CURV II Recovery System............................. 104 3-20 Sled Towed by USNS MIZAR...................................................... 105 3-21 DEEP JEEP Vehicle.................................................................. 107 3-24 Landing Ship Dock (LSD)............................................................ Ill 3-27 Underwater CURV Camera Shot During Lift.......................... 115 3-30 First Grapnel Attachment....................................................... 118 3-31 Swinging the Weapon Aboard .... ........ 120 3-32 Gen Wilson and ADM Guest with Recovered Bomb ..... 121 3-33 Contact and Debris Pattern ............ 123 3-34 Transportation Flow from CONUS to Task Force 65.............. 124 3-36 Search Effectiveness Probability in Alfa I ....... . 127 3-37 Landing Craft at Camp Wilson......................................... 128 3-38 Beach at Palomares......................................... 129 3-39 Aerial View of Camp Wilson Area........................................... 131 3-40 LSD as a Dry Dock Facility ............ 132 3-41 Debris on the Beach ............................................................................ 133 3-42 Barrel Storage Area.................................................................. 134

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LIST OF TABLES 1- 1 Crew of the Colliding Aircraft....................................................... 16 2- 1 Personnel and Functions............................................................. 27 2-2 Personnel at Camp Wilson and San Javier................................... ..... 28 2-3 Vehicles at Camp Wilson, 15 February...................................... 39 2-4 Equivalences for PAC-IS as Employed at Palomares............... 48 2-5 Environmental and Biological Samples, Palomares........................ ..... 52 2-6 Levels of Contamination..................................................................... 64 2- 8 Filling, Loading, Contaminated Material, Drums,Palomares . . 70 3- 1 Technical Advisory Group.......................................................... 81 3-2 Special Navy Commands.............................................................. 143 5-2 Agronomist Report, Cultivation, Palomares, Spain ..... 163

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For some years prior to the Palomares accident, the Strategic Air Command (SAC) had been engaged in Operation Chrome Dome, the use of airborne alert aircraft carrying nuclear ar mament, This concept generally involved mid-air refueling rendezvous at one or more points during a bomber's lengthy mission (Fig. 1-1). As of January 1966, air refueling oper ations were supported by the Sixteenth Air Force (16AF) with headquarters at Torrejon Air Base near Madrid. Refueling was accomplished by tanker aircraft stationed at Torrejon AB and Moron AB, further to the south (Fig, 1-2). On the morning of 17 January 1966, two Operation Chrome Dome B-52Gs, Tea 12 and Tea 16, * rendezvoused with two KC-135As, Troubadour 12 and Troubadour 14,** in the Saddle Rock refueling area at 31, 000 feet. At approximately 0922Z (local time in Spain is Zulu + 1 hour) the boom operator in Troubadour 12, while refueling Tea 12, reported to Ms pilot that he had observed fireballs and what appeared to be a center wing section in a flat spin. This report of disaster was the first of many dealing with the accident and its aftermath. Tea 16 and Troubadour 14 had collided wMle engaged in the final stages of hookup for refueling. Other aircraft, on other days, and at other places had collided in mid-air. Tea 16, however, was carrying four nuclear weapons. The events summarized in this report were the direct result of that aircraft accident involving nuclear weapons. The crews of the other B-52 and KC-135 could not immediately determine the source of the falling debris. Troubadour 12 completed the refueling (10-12 minutes) of Tea 12 and then returned to the Palomares area to provide reconnaissance. Attempts to communicate with Troubadour 14 by radio were unsuccessful. Subsequently descending to 4, 000 feet. Troubadour 12 sighted unidentifiable burning wreckage and, later, what appeared to be the tail section of a B-52. Other reports reached the Command Post at Moron AB from passing Spanish ships, a British ship, and a civil air liner. The Spanish Guardia Civil (Government Police) began reporting parachute sightings and the status of survivors. When these reports were radioed to Moron AB and passed to Torrejon, the full impact of the accident became apparent. * Crews and aircraft assigned to the 51st Bomb Squadron, 68BW, 822 AD, 8AF, SAC and based at Seymour Johnson AFB, North Carolina. ** Aircraft assigned to the 97th AREFS, 97th BW, 42 AD, 2 AF, SAC Crew assigned to 910th AREFS, 340th BW, Bergstrom AFB, Texas, and was cat temporary duty at Moron

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PRIVACY ACT MATERIAL REMOVED Eleven men were involved in the collision, four as crew members of the KC-135 and seven CREW OF THE COLLIDING AIRCRAFT Name and Grade Service Number Position Name and Grade Service Number Position Electronic Warfare Operator ♦Deceased - did not survive the accident Of the four survivors, all from the B-52 crew, was the only one to come down on land. He was aided by Spanish residents and taken to the Clinic Jacinto Gonzales in Vera,*'-1 about 7 kilometers distant, ei were picked up by the fishing boat, Dorita.l|‘* _ __ was recovered by the fishing boat, Agustiny Rosaf" 5- * Both Iwats put into Aquilas, a nearby port, where the three survivors were taken to the local hospital and treated. Later that afternoon, they were transferred to San Javier, a Spanish Air Force base about 117 miles up the coast, and from that point were** *•* **** ** In pickup truck of Senor Manuel Gonzales Navarro. *•* Bartoiome Roldan Martinez, master **** Alfonso Orts, master

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PRIVACY ACT MATERIAL REMOVED evacuated to Torrejon, ‘ the most seriously injured of the four survivors, was treated at Vera and transferred by civil ambulance to San Javier and evacuated to As is indicated in Table 1-1, seven of the men were killed as a result of accident. Members of the Spanish Guardia Civil under command of Captain Isidore Calin took charge at the acci dent site. Remains were recovered and placed in caskets,** *** ****Seven bodies were identified by the afternoon of 18 January with the help of dental and other records. The remains were re turned to the United States on 20 January. INITIAL COMMAND RESPONSE: The Commander, 16AF, Major General Delmar Wilson, was notified through his command post and passed the report to Major General Donald W. Eisenhart, Hq SAC, at Offutt AFB, Omaha, Nebraska. These notifications set the "Broken Arrow"** response system in motion. The Disaster Control Team from Torrejon was alerted and prepared to travel to the scene. At 1136Z Maj Gen Wilson and three members of his staff*** departed Torrejon by T-39 and surveyed the accident site from the air, landing at San Javier at 1230Z, At 1134Z a C-97 departed Torrejon with 33 members of the Disaster Control Team and three accident investigation personnel and arrived at San Javier at 1240Z. An H-43 from the Torrejon rescue unit and a C-54 carrying jet fuel to support the H-43 were the last aircraft into San Javier on the first day. At 1221Z 17 January, a Disaster Control Team under Maj Gen A, J, Beck, Deputy Chief of Staff, Materiel, SAC, left Omaha arriving at San Javier at 0114Z, 18 January, and at the accident scene at Q630Z. At 1125Z on the day of the accident, the Joint Nuclear Accident Coordinating Center (JNACC) at Sandia Base (now Kirtland Air Force Base), New Mexico, received word of the accident. JNACC is a joint Department of Defense/Atomic Energy Commission (DOD/AEC) organiza tion charged with coordinating assistance for recovery from nuclear accidents. Its files contain information covering status and capability of DOD and AEC accident response teams throughout the world. In addition it has ready access to the technical capabilities of the atomic community centered in Albuquerque, New Mexico, The Air Force Nuclear Safety Directorate at Kirtland AFB advised JNACC that a team of four of their staff had air trans port to Spain and offered space for other response personnel. Representatives of JNACC, Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory**** and Sandia Corporation**** were alerted and de parted Albuquerque on the aircraft at 1800Z, 17 January. * In the face of tragedy, people-to-people response lightens our load. On the evening of the accident the remains of the victims were brought to the Town Hall of Cuevas del Almanzora, northeast of Palomares. There, among burning candles, services were held by a Spanish priest, Maj Gen Wilson received the remains and they were transported to San Javier and from there, to Torrejon. * * Broken Arrow is the code term used in notifications of nuclear accidents. *** One of these was an interpreter. **** Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory and Sandia Corporation are organizations which develop atomic weapons under contract to the US AEC,

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As the official contact between USAF and the Government of Spain (GOS), the Joint United States Military Group (JUSMG) was notified of the accident at once. Chief of the JUSMG, Maj Gen Stanley J. Donovan, called on the Spanish Air Minister and on General Augustin Munoz Grandes, Chief of the Spanish General Staff, informing them of the accident, and then proceeded by plane to San Javier. The United States Embassy in Madrid was notified by the Torrejon Command Post. The Am bassador, Angier Biddle Duke, on being advised, proceeded to the Spanish Foreign Office and reported the available details to the Spanish authorities. The Spanish-American Agreement in existence then, * defining responsibilities in case of an aircraft accident, provided: In case of accident occurring to United States military aircraft or to air carriers which operate under contract to the United States Government, the Spanish and United States authorities will cooperate in the adoption of rescue measures with primary responsibility belonging to the United States authorities. Measures to take charge of and remove the damaged aircraft and its technical equipment are the responsibility of the appropriate United States authorities. Spanish military or police forces shall have primary responsibility for the external security of such damaged aircraft; however, United States military forces, if first on the scene, may assume the responsibility pending the arrival of Spanish military or police Spanish Guardia Civil personnel were the first government representatives on the scene. They began immediately to secure the area and continued to perform in that and similar capacities for the duration of the recovery operation. By the evening of the day of the accident, 17 January, 49 U.S. personnel had arrived at Palomares. That number would increase in the days that followed to more than 650 at the accident site. The tone of the recovery operation was set when President Johnson, while breakfasting in his bedroom at the White House, was advised of the accident and that the situation involved four thermonuclear weapons. He phoned the Secretary of Defense, and after checking on the danger of a nuclear detonation, instructed that we should "do every thing possible to find them. " The village of Palomares lies near the southeastern coast of Spain (Fig. 1-2) in the province of Almeria. It is so small that it is not included on many maps, nor was it included in the census. At the time of the accident, its population was estimated to be approximately 2,000 persons. By American standards Palomares would be considered a poor village, although * Procedural Agreement No. 14 to the 26 September 1953 Agreements, Operation of Military

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probably somewhat richer than most in Almeria, the forty-ninth of Spain's fifty provinces in per-capita income. The area was once rich in metals, with evidence of mining activity dating from as early as 3500 B.C. It was later settled and its metals extracted to support the far-reaching commerce of the Phoenicians. Metals, however, no longer contribute to the area's economy. The abandoned mine shafts are the only remains of this industry. The presence of these diggings in the area was to play a part in the search for a missing bomb. Palomares is also sufficiently arid that its only industry, agriculture, must depend on deep well irrigation. Relying on this irrigation, the village had been able to enjoy a modicum of prosperity. Farming the irrigated land produced alfalfa, beans, cotton and two wheat and two tomato crops in 1965, The tomatoes accounted for the village's principal economic input in that year, …