Joint Task Force 132 Commander Task Group 132.3 Final Report - Operation Ivy

Page 5

Joint Task Force 132, operating under the Chief of Staff,. U.S. Army as &eoutive Aeent for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, wee to conduct tests at the AEC Pacific Brovine Ground in the Fall of was the 1J~vo.l Conponent of t:his Joint Task Force. This report relates to the activities of the Navel Task Group; its miseion, or&nizction, trrinini: end execution of plans. . Conclusions reached as a result of observations made during, the operation, and recommendations made for the consideration of tnose who may have a part in ylannin, similar operctione in the future are set forth in aone detail in the various parts of the . report indicated in the followi- Table of Contents: The most siylificant of the Conclusions rmd deco-uendations are: 2. There were no sigificrnt oaeri tional ocsuclties to, 3. There wp.8?o evidence of r.tter.?pts by unfriendy forces. or abents to reoonnoiter the test area or to interfere with 4, The tinin& of the movement of subordinc?te units to

Page 6

5. All unite upon reyOrtin&‘to the l?F.sk Group were well trcined, equipped audIcapable of perfomlng their assigned tank!. 6. The forces provided the Task Grou? were eddquate~for the acconplishnent of the nission; however, sever6l units, e.e. the Boct ,Pool, the Patrol Squ.adr%‘u”tnd:the.“&i&opter’iTnIt, were extended to the practical 1. To fecilitcte plcnnine, end to reduce CO~niCFtiOn.-requirelents, it is recbnnended that the. steffs of; the. TO& Force Comrnder Md durinl the plmnlno phrse and be enbnrked in the sane ship.vhen both rfe ’

Page 7

2. It is reccmmi.ndcd that t&e ccpcbilitios of ths Nnvy Task Croup personnel 2nd fscilities to support ad assist in scientific 3. In the determinrtion cf force requirements, considorction should be given to the scopa end probrble durction of contomplstcd oaorntions in rolaticn to Onorction IVY, with recognition of the feet t5r.t in M sevcrnl units were oxtend~d to tho prrctical limit of their ccpabilities. 4. It is roccrnncndod that tho Navy T&c Grou;, be orgnnised 5. In deciding upon security opcrcticns to bo undcrtakon, c realistic otDluation of tho most probcblo intonticns of friendly powers should be ntdo ?nd ;>rcccutionary mensuras it is rocommcnded that zzq?ericnccd communicction teams of that cnrcful ccnsidcrntion bc given to tbr; sorry of conclusions rcczzcndrtions sot forth on pngo 16-16 tad 16-17 of t:;is report. ro-oxnmincd in the light of currant AECWD rcgul:.tions with a viov tcward reducing their numbor significantly,

Page 8

8. It is recmr,..ndcd that thr rcgulnticns concorning badge view to liriting rtistricted croes defense of the Unitea Stetes w;thin the neaning of’the espionf(e lavs, Title 18, U.S.C., Sets. 793 end 79$> the trrnsnission or revelttion of vnich in eny nanner to en uncuth,o~~ize$ person is prohibited by lnv. BEST AVAILABLE COPY

Page 9

Iiissionof Task Group 132.3 Organizationand Comend Relationships Lovcnentto the ForwardArea and iisserzbly

Page 10

1. The mission assigned .)p C-a&em Task Croupl~2.3 was set ' forth in Comtwnder Joint Task Force ~?Im.se.tionPlen So..: 2-52 to be the a. Provide for the security of the ENIWETOKDanger Area (1) Maintaining.the st@us of the dlosed area. (2) Detecting, warping,” end escorting unauthorieed vessels out of the Danger Area. ’ b. Provide suitable water transportation and shipboard COBmend facilities for the experimental devices to met the iequirenents administrative space for-Gadquarters, TG 132.1 and Headquarters, d. Provide ship to shore and intra-atoll surfaoe and helicopter trausportation, to include fli&ts for damage survey aud recovery of scientific smples and filn. . ‘: 2.. The nission assiaed to Comander Task Group 132.3 as set forth in parcgraph 1. EbOVe,,wasfurther.expanded by CJIF’l32 in Amex G to CJTPI32 Operation Plau ‘No. 232, which set forth the sunnary of tasks for the Naval Task Group as follows: * a. By use of assigpsd destroyers and patrol aircraft,.conduct BEST AVAILABLE COPY

Page 11

aad conbot air patrol, detect the presence of unauthorized’a~rorakt in C. Deny entry to the closed area of uhauthorieed vessels and fi Provide suitable escort for the USS:CUhTI.SSvhen.transporting special devices. Maintein a plot .of ships and alrcrkt trauslting the When directed, assume responsibility foi the secreh and operating in the EfiIWETOKAreain ecoomplishing this cission. ’ copter transpottetion,‘to include fli&ts for dzusage survey id recovery of scientific samples and filn; .!. .: k. Direct the movement of Pekonaei between ship end shore. durin‘ the evecuetion and reentry periods.

Page 12

station vhile the Task Force is afloat. 9. Monitor the progress of the ‘i’n~tnllntion of special 2.. Provide necesacry transPortatien fer the ,-establi&nent Of the outlying veether StFtiOnS. ‘< By nems of amphibious aircraft, and such other shipping RS is nvaileble, provide trcnsportation for linited re’sup2ly of wer.ther t. Provide for delivery of Task Force priority air orrgo, froc hi..&I.ZIN to the TESICForce while cflont, US Provide for gathering of weather infomr.tion fron Tz.sk Group elepents as required by the T’&skFosce Wer.ther Centrrl.

Page 13

3. Although nowhere in the assignmnt of nission or tasks was it specifided that the Naval Task Group would support Individual sclentific projects aud pro&mm; a large nunber of units of the task group eventually were delegated to such support either ns secondmy or primry assignrent. This subject will be covered more fully in the sections on planning sad on operations. 4. Ptrearaphs 1 aud 2 nbooe forned tlw basis upon which CTG ljZ?.,3 mde his nssigment of tasks to units of td;t Navy Tnsk Group, The nlssions aad tasbassigued to the Navy Task Group for this operation were appropriate and adequate except for the omission of one _ requirement, that of support’for scientific projects by units of the Navy It is recosmende+:t&tr the Navy Task Group Gomaader be assigned an additional lask for the next operation, such as, “using aircraft and appropriate surface units, provide, within ova capabilities, limited support for test projects bein= conducted by the Scientific Task Group

Page 14

‘he basic diagram of the orgmivation of Tosk,Group 132.3 was as’ given in tho block diagram on, pago 2-5 of this section. This orgsnisa- . tlon was generally satisfactory, although specific changes were medo on occasions to meet new requirements or to profit by experience gained Two changes in the organization were r@o whfch were effective during practically the entire period tho Task Group was in the forward mea9 These cbsngos were 1) IST 836 uas.ryved from the Transport Element, TE 132.31, and was assigned to the.support of the BIKINI buildup for CLFTLE,and 2) tho ESTKSnas offectivoly removed from the same Task Element for the ontiro operation by the ~oquiremmontrot, as firing ahip for MIKEShot and as tho Unit in vhich the Senior Air Controller u&s embarked for KING Shot, she could not remain with the reminder of tho units of the TE 132.31 during periods wbon thy Task Group was at sea. This rcsultod in the Comm:ndi.ngOfficer of LEC aotlng as Tho Task Group orgmizatlon for. MIKKShot was the same as that glvon in tho block diagram in tho OpPlan and on pngc 2-4of this so&ion with the following exceptions which were reflected in OpOrder No. 2-52.

Page 15

and the IST 836 was on independentduty at BIKINI. , ‘. (4) OX HILL aoted independentlyon,a scientificprojectsupport Be~uso of tho dopartwe of scvcral,unitsof TG 132.3 from the desirableto effectadditionalchcngcsin tha Ta&,Group organizationfor. . I r that &hot. Tho organizationso affectedis giv,enin the blockdiagrcxnon BEST AVAILABLE COPY .-

Page 16

sh the assigned mlrslons ord tasks. It is recommendedthat the Task Groupbe organirdfor addnlstratlvopurposesIn tho prclinimry planning alagem along lines of the snticipatod basic taoticcl organization for operationalroquiroments. Hovever, it must bo expected that each different shot vill most Ukolp impose nodiikxitions upon tho original orgfmiaation.

Page 18

AS REVISEDFOR KIN3 SHOT uss OAK HILL (LSD-7) USS OAK HILL (LSs7) MONITORING PROJECT IS COMPLNmD. AT BIKINI ON INDEPEN%XT WY. AT BIKINI TO J&VOIDFiLLOUT.

Page 19

PART 3 - PLAUNINGAND TRAINIE Planning for IVY at the level of the Navy Task Group Staff was corn-- menced in late April and early 1Lay at the office of CTG 132.3 in the Naval Gun Factory, Washington, D. C. Although some personnel had reported to the staff prior to this time, the Task Group Commander and his Chief of Staff reported in late April and the Operations Gfficer in early Way. It MS after this time that effective planning for the Navy Task Group could be undertaken, The office space assigned to CTG 132.3 was located in Building 126 at the Naval Gun Factory in Washington. This presented the disadvantage of being physically separated from the.Joint Task Force Headquarters in Temporary Building U at the corner of Constitution Ave. and 12th St. N.W. with no secure means of telephone communication between the two offices. _w-. The Task Force Staff was organized well prior to the assembling of the Task Group Staff, and as a result had done much preliminary planning of a basic nature affecting Navy Task Group affairs prior to the reporting of CTG 132.3. It was some time before CTG 132.3 and his staff caught up with the planning done by the Task Force Staff and were able to coordinate Navy Task Group planning with that being done by various Task Force r echelons relative to acquisition and pre*paration of Navy units for participation in the- prospective operations. At the time when staff. planning for the Navy Task Group was initiated, ._ l it was g~ncrally firm that the following units would be assigned to TG 132.3:

Page 20

USS OAK I-JILL(LSD-T) 1 DD or DDE DIVISION BOAT POOL UN.XF&W~ DEECXON UNIT It had alreadybeen establishedthat the-firstshot to be firedwould be the therm+nuclcardevice (MIhEShot)dth‘targetdate of 1 November, and that the secondshot (KING)wouldprobablyfollowNIIZ in abmt two weeks'time. Predictionsof yield from the MIW device,whichwas to be fired staticallyon Elugeiab(FLGRA)Island,were not firm and blast and wave effectsat pointsas far away as Parryand EniwetokIslands,19 and matedwith sufficientaccuracyto allownmkingthe decisionwhetherto leave or not to leave smallcr‘aftof the Navy Task Group Boat Pool at theirmoorings off those two islands. It also had been determined1) that all personnel shouldbe evacuatedfrom the islandsof the atollbecauseof the poseffectsand 2) that no shipwould be allowedinsidea distanceof 25 nautical safe for personnelon board ship even in the eventthat the maximumpossible field shouldbo obtdned from the device. A minimumslantrangeof 20 miles for aircraftwas cstablishzd at the same time,but this minimumdistancewas increasedjustbeforePIE Shot. TUG minimumdistanceof 25 milesset for surfacecraftwith personnelembarkedrewired that all majorunits of the Kavy Task Groupevacuatethe lagoonfor the thenno-nuclearshot,

Page 21

Requirements for evacuation of the atoll for KINGshbt at that time were not firm. It was estimated that KINGshot would follow MB by about fourteen days, KINGbeing air dropped over RUN?T(‘WONNE)Island. The yield from KIl!!c Shot was expected to be substantially lower than that from ME;?, but the aistrnce of the detonation from PiPRY and !?XEl’OK Islands in this case would be 9 and 12 nautical Ales, respectively, and the hazard to personnel from fallout, thermal and secondary blast effects were at that time considered to be of possible importance. & 12 Pay it was decided that the concept of the organization, tasks, and operations of the Kavy Task Group were sufficiently firm that a draft able for the C’TG132.3 to submit to members of the staffs of CINCPXPIT and COLSZRVPXfor informal comments as he passed through Pearl Harbor about 27 May on his way to inspect the site in the forwexd area. The draft copy of the GpPlan was finished on 23 Lay and was taken to Pearl Harbcr by a member of the Navy T.ask Group Staff accompanying the Commnder . CH his return through Pearl on 2-3 June the Commanderreceived During his return flight to :!aahington, CTG 132.3 incorporated the recomrmnd*d changes into the draft OpPlan, and on 6 June, the day after his certain annexes and appondicos, was completsd ,and submitted for final typing. Distribution of this GpFl-n to prospective units of the Task . Group and other intcrcsted qncies was made shortly after the middle of

Page 22

Cn 10 June an Facuation Conference was held at Los klamos and ~8s attended by representatives of th3 Task Force Headquarters and the varfous task groups. In this conference were discussed the maximumnave, blast and thermal effects to which shore installations and small ‘crft left at moorings might be pub+ct.ed. The hazard from radicactive fallout was also discussed, but f9.r less concrete answers were given on this sub,@t. The conclusions, in general, rcg::rding the mcst probable effects were: (1) Only 2 very few spcci.il stxvctiires on QlW?OT and P..P:fc Islands might recoivc SXE damqgc from blast effects; in general, damage (2) Thensi effects would not ba a cause for any concern on either PATE or FNk?NK Island, nor at small craft moorings off those (3) The maximum --.-possible waves tiich might be expected in the lagoon would hnve the folltwing characteristics: (a) In deep water (grcstcr than 50 f;ot depth) the waves would be approxizm,:oly 16 to 17 feet high (maximum) (b) The velocity of the waves would with a distance between crests of 1 to 3 miles. r (c) Vaves break in a depth of water twice the height wave, and on breaking, the wave itself doubles its original height. sequently, wvos c,ff E”iI’.ZTCKand PARY Islands might possibly break . . . about 35 feet of water and reach a height of 32 tc 35 feet upcn breaking. (cl) After breaking, the waves wuld fast lose their energy

Page 23

. (4) In view of (3), smaJ.1craft left at moorings in the southern end of the Ingoon in over 50:feet of water or hauled out onto high ground on either rS\‘IYZ”?GKcr PAPEi Island would suffer no danage fron wave effects. (5) &Z~?IXI tind velocity at small craft moorings would be a ninety mile gust dtio~ing linearly to zero Velocity in ten soccnds. k more prcbable ra.ximumfigure would, howcver, be h5 knots. Neither of these would pose any threat of damage to SIX$ craft properly secured at (6) Varying estimates of possible fallout were m.30 but no definite predicaticn ‘was given as to the time the Task Force might expect to be able to reenter the lagscn. Prior to the availability of the information received at this conference it had been variously estimated that any small craft left within the lagoon might be destgyed by tiavo or blast effects from lZK3 Shot, and a letter received from CNOdated l&y stated that it was considered that arrangerunts f!*nuld be made to evacuate all small craft from the IXIETOK Lagoon during that Shot. Because of the lack of availability of an additioniil LSD for assignment to the Task Group, this would have required the OAKHILL to make at leasttwo trips with small craft to RlJ!.EIN pr!or to evacuaticn of a final load to sea the afternoon before the shot. This evacuation of small craft during the time when the demand for small craft services was to be greatest would have placed very great obstacles in the way of$completing final preparations and uvacuation for HIKE Shot. L The result of the conference of 10 June was made known tc CNOand a secmd letter of insfruction was received from CNOdated 24 July, in which it was stated th,at in view of the channngosin estimates of wave

Page 24

heights and blast effects, and s&e it appeared,to be impracticable to nake arrangments to evacuate all small craft, therefore, “--to the …