Memo to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Subject: Actions re the Palomares Incident

Page 1

SUBJECT: Actions Ac the Palorr.ares Incident 104828 The rietins in your office on 4 February v.-as followed, in accordance with your instructions, by a working group meeting which in turn resulted in the dispatch of a guidance teletype to the Air Force on 5 February directing actions in implementation of your 4 February Four additional matters have been discussed by the working group. These are detailed below, together with the group's recommendations: 1. Is there any merit in establishing at this time some limit beyond which we will not go in our search to locate the This would certainly be helpful to the planners and operators in preparing for an orderly termination and withdrawal. Real advantage would be convenience and economy. Pre-judgment, however, would presuppose knowledge and understanding of many complex variables. b. Re c crime n da t ions All interested agencies should think about termination of search under all possible conditions but judgment should be reserved for the time when decision is required. Consideration should be given especially to the manner of withdrawal. It seems likely that a precipitous rather than a gradual withdrawal would suggest .a successful completion of the search. It would thus make more credible any effort to convince the world that the recovery had been made. DOE ARCHIVES

Page 2

2. How should we go about making available to Spain and AEC equipment and technical assistance in order that the offer can be used to our best advantage? Offer already made by Langham will probably have to be honored. Real question is how? Possibly valuable bargaining point for Ambassador. Two possible approaches: Diplomatic approach as evidence of U. S. sincerity and concern. Or pure scientific AEC/NEB exchange. First approach could be taken as evidence of U. S. guilty conscience and of condescending attitude toward Spanish scientific effort. Science-to-science arrangement, especially if initiated by Spanish, would protect image of NEB but would leave open our opportunity to claim credit later if necessary. Ambassador should privately (and in general terms) offer "any necessary resources". This would almost certainly result in a specific request from Ramos Rodriquez. Care should be exercised in discussing this offer to assure that it is clear that the initiative is the Spanish NEB. The U. S. does not consider that there is a health and safety requirement for these measures. However, we honor the Spanish request in support of the effort by Spanish NEB authorities to gain and retain full public confidence. 3. Is it in the national interest to withdraw U. S. operational effort ASAP, leaving long-term effort to Spanish authorities? If so, what sort of support and assistance should be planned and channeled through what agency? a. Considerations DOE ARCHIVES So long as we are there, there will be speculation. The "accident investigation" cover will soon lose credibility. With the exception of actual search and recovery, activities which can be turned over to Spanish authorities will probably be better accepted

Page 3

(and less newsworthy) than similar activities by U. S. military. To a degree, establishment of precedent will also be diminished. Advice, support, and funds will have to be continued, but an objective should be Embassy and 16th Air Force should be directed to give priority to planning for early phase-out of U. S. effort. 4. What kind of "country team" presence should be established in the vicinity of Palomares after search and recovery is There will be a continuing need for U. S. government authoritative representation in diplomatic, legal, fiscal, economic, technical, information, security and other matters. A competent, well-informed and responsive office may be required in or near Palomares, especially if the fourth weapon remains unaccounted for. Ambassador Duke should be requested to comment on establishment of such an office and, if he concurs, to recommend location staffing and charter. Preparatory actions should be taken now to react promptly when the time arrives. Examples: Funding, tentative selection of key personnel, draft inter-departmental agreements, We have drafted and will continue to update for Ambassador Duke a teletype furnishing guidance and rationale to assist him in making U. S. views and recommendations in the Palomares matter acceptable to the Spanish authorities. This teletype is currently being staffed in the State Department.