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97713 'rSfT FADIOIBGICAL SAFETY SUPPORT UNIT Chemical Corps TraininE Cornnand 1. This Unit reported to the Sevada Proving '?round 2 March 1953 with as tren Eth of one hundred forty-f'o'onr (144) Enlisted Men, one (1) Warrant The Knit &!lased out gradually Last element of unit 2. The Col1omir.E a is sion was as sip ed by the Rad-Safe Officer, YPG: b. A complete a mito ring procram. C.Issue rind prs ces s in l : ofall personnel dosage devices. e. Control and operation of personnel and equipment decontamif. Record and control all radioactive material enter in q or leav3. This unit was present for eleven (11) miclear detonations. Thirtycirht (38) personnel exceeded the maximum permissible dosage of 3.9r. Epch care was invest ir at nd and neglipence was found i n tm (2) cases. one FJd ahs7rbin - 16r and an at her EM 17r. These two men were relieved and returned 4. Discipline - seven (7) minor infractions of discipline were disposed o " under Article15, 'hiform Code of h lil it my Justice. C?*lrt resulted in a cyd it tal. sli lw que nt trial and red'iction i n rank. Two (2) cases of AAaL resulted in relief and 5. '7elfaT.e P. " orale - Two outings were held for the entire unit in velaLed much team-work and esprit de corps and added t o general morale, util iz in p off - the.
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SITRJECT: After - 4ction Report Operation TJpshot-Knothole 11 July 1953 6 . Personnel were utilized by monitoring and process in f scientific parties, normally till Dplus3or precedine shot, then pre par in p the tar - ret area for the followin? shot. There were six (6) general t arE et areas. (See at tech ed sketch) 7. The follorvinp: sections operated on a twenty-four (24) hour basis : b. l ' lott in f an4 Fri ef inc rl. Vehicle Decontamination Station This jyas accomplished by orlTanizine shifts within the sections. Xsv, every man in the unit was present at the Rad-Safe buildinp: and observed 8. Control of the unit was exercised by Commanding OFficer in the position of On-Site C per at ims Officer directing all section leaders. On Shot Day, the Commandinr Officer placed himself at the dial phone inthe Plott in p and Fri ef in p section, where he was in a position to receive all missions and instructions from the Rad-Safe Officer in the Control Office o f CP 41 and have same transmitted over High Frequencey radio to monitorine teams and checkpoints in the field. 9. The ma,jority of scientific projects were most cooperative in adher in r to the process il r : procedures developed bv this unit. 10. k ring roll - up,all contaminated areas were properly marked and final surveys conducted, with semi-permanent barricades being erected.A detachment o f two f 2 ? officers and twenty (20) E37 remained atthe Nevada Pr3vinp Cround t o conduct interim operations. "a" clearances were delayed and some "9"'s necessary had not tR. been processed and forwarded yet at the end o f operations. b. Qualified administrative personnel, both officers and enlisted men, were not available in the unit for On-Site Operations section,Plc t tinE and Briefin. section and " ? on it or in s section. C . There was a lack of ad qu at ely trained motor vehicle operators. Some individrinls received only basic motor vehicle operators trn i ring and on arrival at the site :';ere placed uSite Operations
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'&ere i t was not possible to continue their train in e or supervise such t,raininE. This resulted in three (3) motor vehicle accidents in the OffSite section as compared t o one (1) motar vehicle accident in the On-Site snnnel on r)at?ched q er vice,s tren pth accountability was a t times difficult, hecause -Khan officers and enlisted men did not report for duty on specified dates '1s nrdered, they could nqt be accounted for on the MorninE Report until physical lv present. nation with each parent or ? s niz ation, which would not have heen nec ess aly !-.s,j officers and enlisted Zen been as sic ned to this unit. This caused an unnecessary problem o f coordiPs c tion Type vehicle Ye, agency %.timated Dsmap ilff - Site 3,/4 ton w'c-Army 400.00 f. Much difficulty was experienced with radio conhimications on first rive (5) shots. The unit did not have any qualified communications personnel. l his necessitated requesting one (1)ot fic er on Trly from CC TC t.o siirvc:: the entire comuni cat i < > n sn etat the Nevada Fro v in r <round. a . Tnformsl interviews with officer sfio m J!eadrjuarters, P.rmed Ca:'e Siip ? r t Unit in the future woiild be resp on sib lo for terrain monitor in p n p 811 "'f-zitn ys it ions in addition to the On-Site mission. ;:er,. w.,!e af this office tQ siibxit reconunnndations for namin p : table for tract ar. ' his vmiild require the followit+- nil it ary vehicles : one f11
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. ; ~ t en pe rations orf ice as adv is3r and one t o work in the control room o f Ted-Saaevi ?n!-ineer shw.1d no the placed in a com and posit i :n but rather One to serve in the Onq iii red be s,d mitte d to s-,? of the Cm l Corps Tnz Command six / 6 \ inonths prior totne start ofa pendin? operation. K. That personnel adeqiiately trained in reneral administration he as s if me ? to tile On-Site Pper at ims section and the Records qnd Dosimetry and qualified as mot.or veh i clc operators. i. Recqmc!end the unit connander be del ep at ad authority to appoint and redr;ce individuals up t o and in cl udine grade E4, Corporal, when unit is a;iav from home station. i. Ilnit Co;rmander did not have sufficient officer personnel tu draw on to in sure competent, efficient officers in key positions, such as section leaders.Itis rrandatory that each cec tion be headed by an officer :rith initiative and drive. an officer ,iho " just wants toget by'' i s inadeqrlate to fill a key position in this or rani z st,ion. l he operation is a fast-mavin? situation and pan.{ unit on fiiture operations. There were several cases o f delayed effic ien cy reports due to dist aq ce involyiad and the records being stored at .:eadqusrters, CCTC. Even thouEh rosters of rat inc and in dor s in p officers were s ~ : b mitte d to CC TC,a fe7v rat in cs, which were due in April, were not accomplished until return of unit,latter park of Juns. 1. See inclosure #4 for recommended Functional Chart for Rad2.Vehicle A Radio Requirements Commandinr 3 . Sketch o f Yucca q atTar pet Area
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1 Capt * h rlmini str nti ve Executive 1 Lt Col. * Opera tim s Officer 1Lt * Ad n in is tr at ive Officer Plott in ? and R rie fin g Section 1 Capt * Section Chief 1 Pfc Radio Operator and Draftsman m sine try and Records Section 1 2 P f c General Dosimetry and Records :.'mi tor Sec tion 1Ltl lehi cle C,>ntrol and hlappinp Officer 1 S.t Vehicle Control Ass ' t Sicns and St,akes Officer
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Recommend that the Fhnctional Chart of the 1st Radiological Safety Support Vnit be amended t o include a Laundering Section.
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TO$ Chief, I n t e l Pr FROM: Chief, P&O Br DATE: 7 Aug 53 COIMEPIT NO. 2 Bfter Ahion Report Gperation UPSHOT KNOTHOLE 1. It i s not considered necessary that this divisjon comment tothe Cornanding Officer, Chemical Corps Training Command on t h e inclosed report. 2. In regards t o the reference i n the report and i n Comment No. 1to the laundry section, a specific part of the radiological safety activity of this unit is a provision of protective clothing t o all personnel connected with the tests. and issuing thereof. T h i s provision of clothing include3 the laundering, storing, Chief, Plans and Operations Branch
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C:,ZNC-T I After Action Report Operatim UPSHOT KN(NDT3Om Chief, Intel Fir 1. Subject report, dated ll July 1953, with b inclosures, i s attached f o r your infornation and commnt. 2. The consolidated and edlted comments of the PT&I Division w i l l be sent t o the Commanding Officer, Chemical Corps Training Comand, f o r his information and 3 . The following comments and recommendations are numbered t o coincide with the referenced paragraphs arid inclosures of subject report: I l a and 12f. Six months i s not usually. enough time t o secure I'Q" clearances, Tfiese require an FBI investigation and should be requested for the people who will require then at. the earliest possible time. b2t not excessive time. A year in advance will give ample time 7g and Inclosure b. This office does not understand the need fora laundry The mission of the unit isto provide radiological safety support.wit o r section. awed on the principle that the unit will be equipped only for housekeeping and trainin gat its home station and the AB2 will provide instruments and housekeeping support on an operat.ion through its contractors or other agencies, t h e unit is not expected t o be self sufficient. Laundq facilities should be prodded by the contractor or should be fwnished by t h e Task Force, t h e Armed Forces Special Weapons Project, or All vehicles on an operation at either of the proving grounds This has been the policy inthe past. 12d. Do not concur. There should be no requirement fora 7330 in this not available, then a 7330 should b e used. farther be emphasized that in all cases this unit will be operating under the control (command) of the Rad-Safe Director who is a 7339 o r equivalent. the DA policy that all newly graduated 73301s ulll attend the first atodc operation following the completion of their academic work t o complete their training. This source should provide more than sufficient 7330's. concurs inthe T/D which designates the C manding Officer a733dth additional ones as needed drawn from t h e Navy and Air Force. An intelligent graduate of the ADO course should be competent t o handle thege However, this office will concede that,if a qualified AJXI graduate is See paragraph 1 2 j below. It should I n view of the above, this office