Operation Crossroads and the Stafford Waren Collection. Includes Excerpt from Book: Radiology in World War II

Page 1

United States Senate Dear Senator Cranston: T h i s is i n response to your inquiry of March 30, 1984 regarding Operation CROSSROADS and the stafford Warren collection. I appreciate the opportunity to discuss with you the current status o f our work with Colonel Stafford Warren's papers over the last ten T h e review of the papers has been our number one project related to Operation CROSSROADS for several months. A n intensive review the Navy Nuclear Test Personnel Review team and two DNA-funded civilian contractors. Our objective has been to identify new inforination, catalog the papers, assess the overall meaning a n d impact of the papers, and incorporate appropriate information into the CROSSROADS dose reconstruction and history. T h e initial review and analysis of the papers has been completed and the inclusion of information into the dose reconstruction methodology a n d CROSSROADS history is in its final stage. W e have indexed the collection for our use in preparing the reconstruction and history. I n addition, the Department o f Energy is constructing a more general indexing of the collection by title, key word, etc. Should you desire, we will provide you a copy of these indexes. I will discuss separately each of the points you raised i n the order contained in your letter, but first there are three points I would like to make with respect to the Stafford Warren collection, the Nuclear T e s t Personnel Review program, the number of CROSSROADS personnel who actually had a potential for radiation exposure, and the results of the Centers for Disease Control's SMOKY leukemia study and the National Academy of Sciences mortality study. First, Colonel Warren's papers reflect his personal commitment to making CROSSROADS as successful a s humanly possible from a radiation safety point of view. The Warren papers area tribute to this commitment. Although Colonel Warren in his papers speaks o f many concerns, it was with a view toward averting problems or avoiding their repetition. Thus, many of the expressed concerns are before the fact and can be shown to have corrected anticipated problems. For example, operations a t Bikini were terminated in. mid-August of 1946, largely on the recommendation of Colonel Warren and his radiation safety people.

Page 2

Honorable Alan Granston T h e radiation safety section was concerned vith virtually all eventualities before the fact, and about the slightest infraction o f established limits. Given Colonel Warren's meticulous attention to detail, and his obvious intent to document a n d save all relevant material, the incidents documented in the collection most likely represent the totality o f his concerns in a well-run radiation safety program, rather than examples of typical problems. By his ovn summary, corroborated by responsible experts at the operation, the entire operation was conducted vithout major incident a n d without harmful exposure to anyone. T h e Warren collection is useful from a historical perspective and contains many official documents not seen before by our researchers. I also note, however, that the Warren collection is but a small fraction of the over 100,000 CROSSROADS documents we have recoveted from other archives., O u r analysis of CROSSROADS is based o n -all the available evidence. In addition, there are many things which, unfortunately, the Warren collection does not include. For example, much of the material is qualitative and not quantitative a s required for dose/radiation environment reconstruction. T h e collection is largely anecdotal rather than scientific. Second, although CROSSROADS did have the largest number of participants, not all of the approximately 42,000 had the same potential for radiation exposure. Those with the highest potential for exposure vere the personnel who reboarded the target ships after Test BAKER. Groups vhich had little potential for exposure include personnel not based at Bikini; those aboard 6 ships which d i d not enter the lagoon after Test BAKER; personnel aboard 67 support ships which entered the lagoon but whose mission did not include work aboard target ships; and personnel working in the administrative, engineering, communication, food preparation and other sections involved only vith operating their own ships and not with boarding target ships. In all, almost 33,000 personnel vere not involved with target ships after Test BAKER. Less than 9,000 personnel were directly involved vith target ships after Test BAKER. These are the people of greatest concern from a radiation safety standpoint, and were thus issued the majority of the film badges. Listed below is a summary of film badge readings for Operation CROSSROADS. F i l m badges during this time period were vorn for a single day only, by personnel whose duties carried them into areas where there v a s a potential for radiation exposure: 1 ) For the T e s t ABLE period, less than 0.1% of the 2,399 personnel film badges read greater than 1 rem, and over 998 were less than 0.1 rem, the daily tolerance level, issued read greater than 1 rem, and 90% were less than 0.1 rem. 2 ) For the T e s t BAKER period, only 0.18 of the 8,032 badges

Page 3

Finally, both the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) and the National Acad my of Sciences (NAS) have conducted medical follow-up research o n nucleat test participants. T h e results Of the CDC were published in the August 5 , 1983 Journal of the American Medical Association of the 3,217 test participants at Test SMOKY during Operation PLUMBBOB i n 1957. The Centers for Disease Control did find a higher incidence of leukemia than expected, but a lower incidence o f cancer and death. Moreover, the incidence of leukemia d i d not appear to have any correlation to radiation exposure levels. The article concluded that " t h e leukemia findings may be attributable either to chance, to factors other than radiation, or to some combination of risk factors possibly including radiation." A copy of the Journal o €_ -the American Medical Association article. T h e Defense Nuclear Agency and the Department of Energy are jointly funding the National Academy of Sciences (NASI to conduct a mortality study among 50,000 test participants. T h e study, which encompasses approximately one-quarter of all test participants, is expected to be published later this year. Their objective is t o compare the causes of death among these veterans against the national averages for their age group. Preliminary N A S data from the first test series analyzed (PLUMBBOB) indicate that, a s previously reported S h o t SMOKY. However, there is no excess of mortality from leukemia or from any other form of cancer among the 12,000 participants who witnessed 23 other PLUMBBOB tests. In sum, neither the CDC nor the NAS has found any indication that these veterans a r e suffering any ill health as a result of participation i n atmospheric Let m e turn now to your questions concerning our assessment and speci € i c actions taken o n the Warren papers. From the standpoint of basic scientific data, additional BAKER target ship radiation intensity readings were located and one post-BAKER lagoon water radiation reading vas found. The BAKER target ship readings had little effect o n the CROSSROADS dose reconstructions. The postBAKER lagoon water reading was important and resulted in a major revision to the dose reconstruction for support ships. This revision resulted in calculated doses increasing €or 81 of the ships and decreasing for 29 of the others. T h e remaining ships were unaffected . by the new data. In all cases, the new reconstructed d o s e was within the range of uncertainty of the original dose calculations. T h e new data has permitted us to reduce the uncertainty of the reconstructions. However, because the new data caused a reduction in some of the doses, and because of the large public interest in CROSSROADS, w e decided to submit our methodology and calculations

Page 4

I Honorable Alan Cranston to three independent experts for review. A l l three experts have responded and concurred in our decisions. W e are now correcting the dosimetry records for the relevant CROSSROADS veterans, as well a s finalizing the revisions to the historical and dose reconstruction publications. These publications, Of course, will be made available t o the Veterans Administration and the general I would like to discuss the ingestion/inhalation issue for you in detail. T h e r e were generally five sources for potential radiation exposure at CROSSROADS. They were: a. Lagoon water after Test ABLE, b. Reboarding target ships after Test ABLE, c. Lagoon water after Test BAKER, d. support s h i p contamination to the outer hull below the vaterline and inside the salt water piping systems after Test BAKER, e. Reboarding target ships after Test BAKER. Following ABLE, the lagoon water radioactivity was d u e primarily to neutron induced sodium-24 activation which has a half-life of 14.5 hours. Within one day the entire lagoon was declared safe by Colonel Warren's radsafe organization. Swimming was authorized on the recreation beaches (which were declared safe) and off some of the ships, i f permitted by the ship's captain. T h e target ship radioactivity was induced by initial neutron radiation. Because A B L E was an airburst there was no fallout on the target or support ships. T h e target ship radiation intensity was low and i n a form that could not be resuspended for inhalation, because the activation vas integral to ship material and not loose, Following BAKER, the radiological situation was far more complex and severe. The water contained fission products a s well a s radioactive sodium. Svimming in the radioactive water vas prohibited, and those caught violating this order were disciplined before captain's masts. Drinking vater was not a problem because the process of distilling water aboard ships did not transfer radiation from the seawater to the fresh vater because distillation removed activated materials. The contamination in the lagoon water did become attached to the rust and marine life o n the h u l l and inside

Page 5

the salt Water piping. However, except for one known instance o f cleaning scale out o f the evaporators by hand, there was no potential for internal exposure due to the location of the material from this source. As a result, specific safety instructions to prevent exposure were issued for the handling of boiler scale Thus, the only real potential for internal exposures occurred during the boarding of target snips after BAKER. T h o s e ships nearest the detonation had significant amounts of radioactive coral and fission products deposited upon them. A S a result, all highly contaminated ships to be reboarded were allowed to decay or were washed w i t h foamite, other chemicals and high pressure streams of water prior to reboarding in late July and early August'. T h i s war done from other salvage and support ships standing alongs i d e the target vessel. From approximately August 2-10. target ships were reboarded to conduct local decontamination. Boarding teams stayed for varying periods of time depending upon the level of radioactivity. All decontamination was stopped o n August 10 after alpha emitters were suspected by Colonel Warren's staff o n August 9. Reboarding for a limited time was resumed on August 12-20 for inspection purposes only. From August 20-29, the targets were towed to Kwajalein, where nearly all were later sunk. Colonel Warren's papers clearly describe his concern which resulted in the Commander of the task force ending decontamination and limiting boarding, a s well a s later destroying 38 ships at Kwajalein. During the decontamination phase, and to a lesser degree during inspection of the ship, there was a potential €or inhalation. But for the following reasons we believe internal exposures were a. T h e number of days and hours aboard were quite limited, b. Early washing removed most of the loose and soluable c. The major contamination was confined to the exterior of the ship. You inquired a b o u t the results of the urine monitoring among CROSSROADS participants. Shortly after alpha emitters were suspected, including plutonium aboard ships, urine tests were ordered for personnel believed exposed, to determine i f any of t h e emitters had entered into the participant's body. The water testing laboratory o n USS- HAVEN (AH-12) was converted for urine testing. T h e m e n doing the work used available instruments and developed techniques a s they worked. Alpha detection is a sensitive determination, and the absence of special equipment, couplod with the background

Page 6

Honorable Alan Er an st on Count aboard HAVEN (which was low by health standards but still high compared- scientific laboratory) prevented a clear deter - mination. The Radiation Safety Section reported as light beta activity in 16 of the2,600 samples collected by August 15. Later, 1,300 urine samples were taken from the men working on the target ships. These samples were sent tothe Los Alamos Laboratory for analysis.All samples were reported as negative. The only other non-film badge monitoring program was a blood test program for all participants still on active duty, which began in June, 1947. The results were recorded in individual medical records. A large number of these medical records have been reviewed by the Navy NTPR team and all blood tests were within acceptable limits. No overall study or report on these 1947 tests has been located, The Defense Nuclear Agency i S completing the worst case internal dose reconstructions for fc ur of the major target ships at CROSSROADS: because they represent cases where extensive decontamination vork was done. be lim in ary estimates are that calculated internal exposures tothe bone are less than 10 percent of the current annual Federal guideline of 15 rem per year for occupational radi a - tion workers. I n some cases they approach only l percent of the guideline. These reconstructions indicate that the measures directed by Colonel Warren were successful i n reducing the potential lor To date, DNA has spent over 5800,000 studying the issue of ingestion and inhalation of radioactive nuclides at all atmospheric tests. Enclosed is a compilation of our on-going and completed work. These tests were chosen because of estimated potential exposures. I € the work is in progress,it is listed as a draft to be published i n 1984. Ifthe work has been completed, the dose is listed. All doses are 50 year rem doses to the bone. In addition to our work cited above, we are undertaking two tasks regarding inhalation and ingestion of radio nuclides to support the Veterans Administration(VA)claimants in particular. First, DNA will ' perform individual reconstructions for any VA =ant whose internal exposure could have exceeded 0.15 rem tothe bone i n one year. This threshold was selected because i t is one percent of the radiation protection …