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Machine-read from the scan, so expect some errors. Lines that couldn’t be read are left out.
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JOINT CIHEFS OF STJJV FOR THE ENIWETOK PROVING GROUND I have lnf’orm~llysecured the approva..lof the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the ~ubject matter, and desire that the Enclosure “B”) be circulated for Information. All necessarY implementing action in this matter has been taken. Anderson (Dir. PLO, Air) Gen. Todd DDI) Gon, HuH Joint Task Force 7)
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From Bradley. The following me~sage Is sent for the Joint Chiefs of Staff: “The Atomic Energy Commission desires tha upon completion of operation SANDSTONE, the Eniwetok Atoll reta.i,nedas a permanent proving ground for atomic weapons. Is contemplated that the Eniwetok Atoll and its territorial waters will remain a ‘closed area? under the provisions of Strategic Trusteeship agreement of the United Nations Chart throughout the remainder of this year and for the year 1949 Y~u will be advise6 of any changes in these plans. “On or about 1 June 1948, the exc.ctdate to be a+ mutually a between yourself and Commander, Joint Task Force Seven, you assume over-all military responsibility for the Eniwetok At znd the atomic veapona proving ground established thereon. fulfilling this rcwponsibility you will, with minimum force required for the accomplishment of your mission: (1) Estab a garrison on Eniwctok AtOll; (2) Maintain the status of En Atoll and its territorial waterz as a ‘closed area’; (3) Ma tain the existing standby facilities as t%mned over to you Co~ndep Joint Task Force Seven; (4) Maintain housing and megsing facilities suitable for the support of Post-SANDST scientific and survey parties of not to exceed 50 men at a one time;’ (5) provide necessary safety measures to protect members of the garrison forces from radi.ologlcalhazards. will not be responsible for the safety measures adopted to tect the members of duly authorized scientific and survey parties from radiol~gical hazards. This reaponaibility wi rest with the senior member of the pcrty.
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General surveillance only of the cntlre Atoll need be malnta~.nedin order to neet the requi,rctnentsi,mpooedby paragraph (2: above. This surveillance will be uuch as to insure against the removal ‘CYunauthorized agents of significant 9anple9 from the islands which have bcea used for detonation of bombs. It ia also desired to prevent unauthorized photography, trespassing, or the removal of smaller sanples. However, because of limitation in available mmpower, Per~nent guard of the contar.finotedislands of the Atoll need not be maintained normally. In carrying out your assigned mlsslon with respect to Enlwetok Atoll, you arc authorized to call on all three Serviceg in the’Pacific coi~nd for such support as may be required. Armed.Forces Special Wecpons Project will, upon re,quest,make availcble to your command the necessary radiological monitoring personnel, to include sne radiological medical offl.certo carry out the provisions of prwcgraph
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REPR’XJUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES FOR THE ZNIWETOK PROVING GROUND STATEMENT OF TIEEPROBLEM To determine the Post-SANDSTONE military requirements cmd responsibilities for the Enivetok Proving Ground. BACKGROUND AND DISCUSSION ‘ 1. In a memorandum of 2Q December 1947 to the Joint Chiefs of staff, (JCS 1795/14) the Chairman of the Atomic EnergY CO~- (AEC) and Joint Task Forcc Seven (JTF-7) work out the details Joint Chiefs of Staff directed the Commander JTIVF-7 to inplement the suggestion of the Chairman, }A!JC. 2. Inasmuch as the nature of any futu~c test is undetermined, between tests may meet urgentrequircments, it appears that onlY limited preparations cre justified. It is believed that construction or other to.sksperformed in preparation for future tests should be only those which presently can be foreseen 3. It is assurncdthat the Eniwctok Atoll will renain closed and that the United States must appropriztcly secure the area ifithe interests of safeguarding restricted data. 4. After the SANDSTONE tests have been conpleted, all islands on which bombs have been detonated will present a radiological hazard for a period of time which can be determined only by periodic surveys following the tests. Since these contaminated
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REpRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES ccmmand, this control vculd lsgically revert to Commander in Chief, pacific (cINCPAC). A small garrison detachment Qt Eoiwetok could then meet minimum requircncnts for security, safeguarding of government property, an,dmaintenance of f~cilities for a snail number of official visitors. There will be a requirement for radiological safety personnel, probably conaistlng of two monitors and one medical officer. ke prepared to furnish t~ Armed Forces Special Weap~ns Project (AFSWP), upon request, persormel properly qualified for this assignment. Although, In the aksence of a permanent garrison, security and surveillance cm.dlogistic support for official Post-SANDSTONE survey parties c~uld be mranged by Island Comnaniler,Kwajalcln, it is understood thzt the AEC favors a garrison at Eniwetok. 7. Necessary standby preparations and close-out facilities to ready Znlwetok Atoll for the reception af a small permanent gcrrlson are being -performedby JTF-v troops as they become available from other tasks and will be carried out during the rollup with a negligible cxpendltwe of funds . It is planned that these preparations will be completed without delaying t~ any :erious extent the depsrture of the bulk of JTF-7 troops far their home stations. 8. The Atonic Energy C~~~is~i~n should be prepared to allocate funds to doi’raythe cost af any ~pecial itcmm not normally borne by the three ServAces as a part of their routine 9. It is recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff: ~. Note that the necessary prepara-tlons for the reception of a small gas?rls~n force on the Eniwet~k At~ll are being accomplished by JTF-7 as part ~f SANDSTONE rollup.
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REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES , :meas will present a heclth hazard, proper supervision and control of the areas must be established. The following precautionary measures will he undertaken b-yJ’I!F-7. ~. After each shot is flreii,the used igland will be posted as a danger~us ~re~ by appropriate signs in English, ~, If determined necegscry by scientific Iurveyg to be conducted in the near future, the craters on each Zero Island will be covered with sand or dirt in order to make the removal of samples more difficult. This action would also reduce the radi~loglcal hazard. 5. Informal advice from the AEC is that it is desirable to provide absolute Lnsurznce for an indefinite period against s.ny unauthorized entry and the securing of information, particularly the collection of samples on the ground, but that this would be prohibitive in cost because of the size of the force required. A calculated risk in this regard seems to be Impliclt in the decls’lonto conduct teats outside the continental limits of the United States. The dangers of unauthorized agencies obtaining technical information of value on the Zero Islands are: g. Determlnatlon of blast and radiological effect by examination of test structure on Zero Islands. JTF-7 Will obliterate or move Zuch structures to prevent accurate ~. Collection of samples around the tower sites for later laboratory tests. In order for any unauthorized agency to obtain profitable sample naterials, It Ts estimated that (after filling the craters with sand or dirt if this is necessary) gurface soil would have to be removed in quantities readily detected by general surveillance ‘6, On about 1 June 1948, when JTF-7 will have taken measures necessary for rollup and establishment of the military responsibility for Eniwetok Atoll should assume control. Since the kkarshcllIslands subarea is a part of his
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tilitary responsibility fm the ~niwct~!cAtQll to CINCPAC on or about 1 June ~948. ~. Obtzin the c~ncurrcnce ?f the AEC to the attached the Appendix hereto to CINCPAC for inplemcntation.
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DIRECTIVT TO COMMANDER IN CHIEF PACIFIC Subject: Over-zll Military Contr~l of Ehiwetok Atoll 1. The Atomic Energy Commission desires that, upon completion of operation SANDSTON?I,the Eniwetok Atoll be retained as a permanent proving ground for atomic weapons. It is contemplated that the Eni,wetokAtoll and its territorial waters wI1l remain a “closed area” under the provisions of the Strategic Trusteeship agreement of the United Nations Ch@rter throughout the remainder of thts yea-rznd for the year 1949. YOU will be advised of any changes in these plans . 2. On or about 1 June 1948, the exact date to be as mutually agreed between yourself and Commander, Joint Task Force Sevens you will assume over-cll military reaponalbility for the Eniwetok Atoll and the atomic weapons proving ground established thereon. In fulfilling this responsibility, You will, With minimum forces required for the accomplishment of’your mission: ~. Maintain the status of Eniwetok Atoll and its terri- ~. Maintain the existing standby facilities as turned over to YOU by CJTF-7. Q. Maintain housing and messing facilities suitable for the support of Post-SANDSTONX scientific and survey parties of not to exceed 50 men at any one time. e. Provide necessary safety measures ts protect members of the garrison forceg from radiol~gical hazards. You will not be responsible for the safety measures adopted to protect the members of duly authorized scientific and survey parties from radiological h~zcrds. This respo~ibllity will rest with the senior member of the party.
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3. General surveillance only of the entire Atoll need be maintained inordcr to meet the requirements imposed by paragaph 2b above. This surveillance will be such as to inswe against the removal by unauthorized agents of significant samples, from the islands which ‘ave been ‘Scd for detonation of bombs: It is also desired to prevent unauthorized photography, trespassing, or the removal of smaller samples. However, because of limitation Unavailable manpower, per~nent .,: guard of the contamimted islands of the Atoll need not’be’ .... Enlwetok Atdll, YOU are authorized to call on 9, quired. AFSWP will, upon request, make availibli the necessary radiological monitoring personnel,