Manhattan District History; Book I - General; Volume 14 - Intelligence & Security

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tin, to the aecurlty or a projeot wbloh, 'by direction of the Prea14ent of the United Sta ... ea, hat 'been more clraatioally t.:uarded than any other hi~hly aecret war cleTelopmentJ and to proTide a permanent record ot or the Intolll~aao and 8eourit7 DiTiaien boo... eetabllabecl aa the reeult or experlenoo. The ~oeaaary data tor thia aooount were drawn from the Diatriot orrtoe filea and troa the reoolleot1ona or the author• ct the Tarioua aeotiona, who are peraoaa with long ezperlenoe in the lsrtelUgenoe and Seourlty DiT1rHon. The text baa HOD written •• or 11 beoauae the period to thoae 4atoa repreae~ a aore oorreot ploture of oertain act1T1t1ea than would be preeentod it 11 O.oeaber were

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Keoeaalty tor Seourlty Pregraa Soope of Seourlty PJ--vam (6) Prognm to SafegW\rd Military (T) Operation ot Conprehenein Relat onahip or Dletrlot Foroea to other

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SECTION 4 - PLAIT PROTECTION Plant Inepeotiora and Su~ Seow-1ty Aaalnanoe to Contractors Proteothe Meuurea tor Prtmmtion ot SuM'ey or Shipaaent Seourlty a. Other Beourity Meuvea

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Scope ef Program for Safe~rd1nt ~~111 tary Seourl ty of Illf'ormation Hlatorioal Development of lntell1~nee and Seourity Dirieion •· Proteoti w Seourity Section

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Seourity to Branoh lntelli~enoe 4, Organlaation of lntelllgenoe and leourltr •· Mail and Recorda and Claeeified File

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1. Introduction. - The euooessful deTelopment and uee of an. atomic weapon required that the aeti•itiee of the Manhattan Dietriot be afforded the hl,heet poeeible degree of eeour1ty. An 1ntene1Te pro~ am. therefore, wae eeeential to aaintain the aeoreor of tM tire, exploaioc, and a1milar interference. the fact that 0...-.aay that ettort8 to aalatain secrecy, eenoenalllf; the prov••• of the Project, were aueoeaatul. Sinoe the Projeot·waa without 1•ogra~hlc ln order to aalnta1n aecurlty etteotiV.ly, it waa eaaentlal that the eeovrity program be pared to perform a numbflr of epeo1albect tunctione; i.e., e eubwreiw inwatigatiw prop-UlJ a peraonnel aecurity prOIJ"UlJ a plant protect~ on protrllmJ a Tid tor control programr a ahlpaeat aJ.'ld courier ayatemJ a progr• to eafecuard of perlaeter pt.ee and Tital U!lita and laatallaticme, a tire pre• .,.lltlllll pro~•• the aalntenanoe or a aunloipal pollee force and Renew Boarda aad the haadl1Jlt or all adlftlnhtratl.,. IUlttera ,-rta1n1ag to theee tuncticma. In aooompllahlnr thia program lt wae aeceaaarr tor the Dietriot Intell1senoe and Security Dinalon to reliew the Ser•ice C~~d• of rearoneibility tor inspection or certain plant. or •eotions of plan.;.-• enra,-d on Dietriot work. It

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oaaee, and approx1aately 100 euapeeted eabota~ eaaee. 3. Peraonnel and O!S!&IlY Clearanoe. aonnel 11ourit;y qwetionnalree or peranal ldetory aW.ta..U• or 1nteraat1 011 to wbloh 11hey had acoeaa • aa4 wre aub jlot te

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in.. etigation, the ext.nt of whioh varied acoordin! to their agenoy oheolcl ot key peraonnel. In all, approxbaately 800 ••- euney or Ti tal plante aad in1tallatiou. Although ••preheui..-e engaged OD t.portallt ~ ot illtereat to the Dtatrlot. Atter 10 Septeaber lH!, aueh ou,...ya enered all upeota or plant. 111 ' tiona to production or the lose or oa.p~•• of elaaa1t1ed in-

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were •ade on a apeoial aur.ey report form to the Area Engineer or other offioer reaponaible tor the aeourity or the faoillty. or all blportant taollitl" waa eatabliahed on 16 April 1M4 I.Dd pre•enoe wae aeoo••U"J' to the ad~no~~aent of the work at tlle

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Control wu eJ:6rohed by r-equ'irinc enoh vidtor to obtain, prior to hh Tbit, the wittec authorir.ation of apecified reapondble tlp to Jl Lleoeaber 1946 there were no aerloua oo."latruo• tion or production tnterruptiona attributable to aeourlty baaarda• nor any known aerioua eoeproatee of olaaaified information, attr1butable to laelc of phraloal prot.oticm at:ainat eepl~ge. Thu it la appareat that the Plant Proteetion Program wae a auooeaa. In the early etape or the Project, aeour1ty wae tnaured by adhera apeoial program to provide efteotin aoouri ty tor ah1paaente of ued to pro11eot rall or aotor ahlpatente amonr, tohe a•eroua oonViorka. Pool• of ottloer ed guard eourlere wre eetabllahed at C&k Rid~e, lew York. Chioago, Santa '•• and Rtehland. and the oouriert

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of hirhly olaseiried and Titally important aateriala. Other ••an• of aeourity were alao uaed where praotioable, auoh ••• ..aled eoninapeotione en route. port ahtpaeuta wre aa4e. In orcler to proteot elaaaltlecl projeot lDtONatlOD rr. the enemy, there waa aeed tor a pro~ whlob would a1n1a1ae the all projeot poraomael en the ......tv ot protenlDt: auoh t.r....- Cenaorahlp et Publleatloaa.

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Regulations" waa iaeued b lonmber 1948 and later euppl•fllted by a Dietr1ot Ciroular Letter. All doowaents oontainint olaaa1tittcl who wre roapcmalble tor applylng ...vlty pol1o1oa wlthill tilelr latloat wat oonduoted to ...... the oooperat1 on ot aowpapera in ~rlot7 ot educational aedia were ueod to remiad projeot portoanol ~ neither to c!1eeue1 nor to otroulate nowa artiolot or naora oOD• 1aade on the uounde of patr1ot1a, loyalty to the titfltine: aon al¥1

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the enemy. The Security Educa+.ion Program. by oonT1noin~ project workers of the neoeaeity tor aeour1ty, rreatly etrengthened pl&At relating to atcmlo theory, oquip.ent and aateriala, waa laaue4 lrJ joote. Cllpplnp, periodioall or booka oontainlng nolat1ena or latlona were referred to the otrlee or Cenaorahlp ter aotion. aa the Intelltpaoo ad S.OUJ"1t:y Dirtaton aad •• the preduot ot oraatlon of tho Dtatriot. a Protectin S.ourlt,' Seotlon earr1o4 out t1on ud aatepardiq ailltary 1Dtcrrw.t1on. In Febrvaey 110, tile Diatriot IntelU.pnoe Section wae created. and u oN'ioor in t:M

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aa liahon offioer with the llt.triot Int.ellif?:ence Section. bmediate atepe were tllken to eetablbh Branch Intelli~ence Oftioee, which eubeequently reached eleYen in number, each responaible fortil 1ntell1rence and eeourity within ita geographic area. In May 1943; reeponeibility tor pereonnel eeourity waa tranaferred from the Proteot1Te Security Seotian to the Intelligence Oftioea. In July quarter• at Oak Ridge, Tenne1aee. With the addition of new ail1• the Seotion wae oreated ln febnary 1M4J a Shipaenta aA4 Courier Deoeaber 194~, a Dtetriot Counter-Intel1icenoe Corpe Detaohsent wee o~~niaed and euftioient pereonnel were aeeigned thereto to oarry 1>1'fiaion wae re-organised and iaoreaaed. In Kay 1914, the Thirteenth were traneterred to the CIC Detaobaent, lkanhattan DS.atrlot, tor Ae or 1 July 1946, the Intell1genoe and Security D1Tb1on Pareona, Chief of the Dt.taion, and was orr,aniaed into eix branoheaa

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three (l1htrie't Security Brafloh, :,dmini.et.:rt~tion Branch, and Clinton On 7 SepteMber l94F the tunctione and operation of the the T&riout Area Engtneera. The Security Divition ot T4etrtot tiead• cmaea na auumed by the latel Ur,enoe Unit in adc!ition to reaprnli• With the creation of the Counter-Intelllrence Cnrpa De· 4•nttal tundt at Clinton in~ineer lorka, euperviae branoh otttoe expenditures, and prooure, i1eue, and aooount for all 1nTeet1gat1Ye tration or the Detachment was oentraliaed at Dhtr1ct. lie";c'quartera. Special Inyeattha~lYe equipment was obtained tran the Count~•- the Rranoh Otf'icee. Confidential tund~ were obtained tro. the G-2

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Be;dquartera and for operation of the ~ail and ieoorde and Claaeitied Jille Section of the lBtellipDoe and Seourlty D1Tldon.

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aearoh and denlopment in the field or atomic ener,-y and to conatruct and operate the neceaaary plants tor the production of atomic eary to afford it aa.xi•um protection and to cloak it in the utlaost that the auoceeetul campletion of the American Project prior to the German mi(;ht decide the oourae of the war and be a dominant taotor in the poat-war peace. The oonaequenoea of the uae of atonic weapona by the eneay were tri~tfully obrtoua ehould it attain ita objeotin firet. Speed, therefore, wae of par•ount importance, whioh aeant that the Project could \»rook lio 4uage, interterenoe or other aet1vitlee which would oauae delay. It waa to be ex• peoted that once the enemlea of the United Statea learned of the Project, they would try eyary ..ana w1 thin their power to aabota,_ formation oonoerninr. the Pro.1eot from the ene~Dy and of takinr e-..ry preoaut1on to eecvre it from attAmpts at aabotare waa obTioue.

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29 June lit~, tran the f·reddent of the United Statet to Br1pd1er was to be taken to insure the eeourity of the Project and e•phaai&• inr that ita etcnU'toanoe to the ution Nqul.-.4 eftn aore draatlo lD lte tu knhattan Projeet wu ll&klag progreae ud that a ••- ati.llulue to the O.NIUl aolentlata uc! politteal leadera. Jiot 01117 un required tho lotob to eapead ~· vtaoat ettcrte to H&t the ..troua tor the Alllea. jpparently, llowner. th4t Ger.au felt that and objeotlw ot tho aoourtty·prov• ••to prorlde tho aooreoy tap, 4aago. lllterteronoe or other banatul ettoota wbloh alf1\t end.r10r the auooeaetvl eaaplotion ot the Projeot.

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tiTe, under the oiroumatanoea prevailing in the Manhattan Diatriet Projeot, entail•~ the eolution of problema of unpreoedented oaaaoient1tio knewledho at T&rloua pointe tnrovghout the oouatrr. employ.•• wre oaretully •tohed at all tlaea. periodic inspection or all important 1u•tallat1one, to proteot thea

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rupted production (See Section 4). trol admittanee or peraona other then eaployeea to plante and reead product, in their W&nalliaaten trfltl1 one looatlon to another (See (a) eduoattnr all a.plo,eee aa to the neoeeaity or refra1Diag tram ot the work beiDt clone by the lllanhattan Diatrlct, the aot~p~ of' the Project, the identity of oeril&il'l prCillliDent people oozmeoted with the Projeot. or the ..... and looattce of badependent oontraotore ptln~: and takin& pNY811'tiW aatton on all looae talk oaaeaa and (7) Operation or a O'!prehenaiYO aeourity prQGr&m to the r.eneral project areas and to facilitate tile 1ny,reaa and e~reaa

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of legitimate worker• with a sinlaum or tnterferenoe (See Par. •-e)J tlon provam, laTolrlng the peri.odio iuapeoticm of Ttt.al alta ad fbe leotarlty provam at I&Dt'ercl II outllawd ill ... n. lte aeourlty probl•• and p-opoaa. The proc;nm at tho Cllatoa ta1nlag to aalatonanoe of' the ataff and oqulpaont aoooaaarr to the 1-4. Relattoaahlp et Dlatrlot foroee to other 1o.eraaent 1• reapenaible tor pertoraanoe of the foregoing tunotiona aaly

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•• found. neoeaae.ry, in order to avoid unseemly conflicts of juriediction, to take apecial etopa to define a!'ld delimit the ltivb1on' • euoh as the Service C0\2J!Ilanda and the federal Bureau of Inveanlga• tion (FBI), whloh would ordinarily also have juriadlotion o~r auoh aattera. Efteotlw 1 January 1944 (See App •.A-2), the Connandinr; batelli~enoe reaponaibility with respect to the Project, althou,n their tacllitle• have been utilised tor routine lnveati~ationa, agency eheoka, aalntenanoe or routine llahon with other inveet1pt1n Command• of reapona1b111ty tor oontinuinr inepeotion or planta enga~d, in whole or 1n part, en wort tor the Manhattan Dlttrlot, and, wher~ thle authority hae been exeroiaed, auoh reaponaibillty has ~een_aaauaed by the Manhattan Viatrlot. Full reeponeibillty hal been aaa..-d by the wlatrlot lntelllfenoe and Security D1Yialon tor the in~atl~tlon or all aubTerliTe aot1Y1ty at Clinton Enr;lneer Worka, Banford Entlneer Worke, and Site •ytt at Los Alamoa, liew J.texioo. At other looationa the DiTialon bad only auoh jur1a• dlotion to lnYeatlrate eubvera1ve activity a1 waa allotted to it by drtue or oral arran,.....nt with the F"IU and the orrtoe or Naval quently broadened, aleo by oral arranr,ement, to inolude jurladio• tton oTer those plents, or ooopletely eerr•rated portione of planta

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tera tall1n&; within jurildlctlon ot the FBI. AgeDta in ebarp ot the ftl"loue Fll field orrs.... ve adrleed of the loeatlcm of Ia• portant Manhattan Dlatrlot oontraotora, aacl ol01e llaiaon 11 aalntalned between ••h field otfioea and the ad.ropriate Branoh Inoa••• where a obannel tor paealnr Projeot lnter.atlOD waa eatabliabed the reolplent or ~· tatoraatlon waa a nOD-Dlatr1ot e.plorea

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wre exerted to aa1nta1n the Horeo7 of the Project, it oould not ..ttera ot a Rbvaraiw aatu.re nlatl.,; to the Projeot and within persona, or thoae who are pot.entially auohJ all inoidante haTing thorlaed 41eoloauree of olaa•ified project 1nformat1onJ as well u a conliderable suaber of mhoellaneoua oases, the import of wh1oh might

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the extent ot eaoh lllftatlpticm ltu been ln dlreot proportl011. to bw-.tlpttoa•, who of aeoeael~ llad to follow the aoth1.tiea et key projeot ,.raODMl who had .-.ooratly alvated to the United Statea oould be entrueted with olaaattied llltOI'Utlon. tbeae ocmditlona, tolf'ther with a reoop1t1on that buun Mture b aomnhai: epredlotable ·when aubjeoted to v.nueual preeaure. uoeaaltated aore or leaa their Intellirenoe rtl•• dlealoaed oonaiderable 1ntoraat1on about

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er planned att..rt• to obtain additional Projeot tat~tloc at illt: or thla plan, laaedlate atep• wre taken to tdfttity thle Projeot

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meet likely to transmit olassiried project inf~tion to un&Qlll<!llllbera of any eapiOim!:"' network, including both ilietriot and nonDistrict employees; (b) the modus eperandi for infiltrating Projeot at District installations even though widely aepareted geor.raphieally. became proficient in all phases of investigation ~hniqut~. ~ of th<~!!~ displayed skill and ingenuity t!I18Ul"passed by the moet exaoti?i~iaa were obtained by u.e or a telephoto lenae or a epeolal of night club photo~hera to obtain oertain pictures. oontraetora, I!:II!Rblere, etq. Ono auapen liiAT have wondered wh;y tba

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aent led to oonolueione of po.. ible eahotare whenenr 1uoh equipadoption of reMedial aeasuree Whiob aided the pro~•• of ooaatruc- •re euttinr, out theae wlree to wean them together to form a oolOPtiable reuon fer wmiaation if an eaployee po.eeated a riftg, peel out, ottez:, f'r\'flll ftry eaaentlal equipaezrt, in o,.der tor acme tbourhtleaa tftdiTldua.l to u.ke a rlnr, for hlmtelf, hie apouae or hla awoe'bheart. luitlal information on auoh inoldent.a waa properly believed to 'be planned, willful aahota~ to effeot a delay in thle tremendoualy important war work. At ti~e, a oo~bination of olr-

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wae detected endeaTor1ng to pa.. a ratf! with a lenr,th of pipe, len(.th• of wirea, dry aell batteriea and an alarm alook, oarefully wrapped and eonoealecS. Only an explodw w.e laoklar to fabrloate that the ortender bad taken the alook to the plant to repair lt, were belar atolen tfll' hla peraonal uee ln Ma h..-.Jte. fo be eure, a ._p or deatruotlon to project property. Boweftr, a1aoe tileae haa been admirably, etfioiently and euooeaafully pertor-ed. laatton wae d. wn to tnwat1pt1ona of eaployeea whue loyal tiea ~o the United Stat.aa were queatlnable. Generally, there were two aethoda hy whloh deroptory lntOI'It&tlon waa obtalae4s (1) peraonnel olearanoe 1u.eattgatlona, (2) the owrall aurvelllanoe pror.r-m of Sinoe the allegation or diwloyalty 1• a eer1oua one and eonewhat diffioult to oontlrm or deny, r.eneral aub'n're1n

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inveatitatione were necceaarily delie~te in nature and required to· produee tanrt ble erlclenee euppoM:inr auoh an aaael"ttoa. file objeet of tM. Counter-intelllr;enoe Corpa we to get the f•ota 111 aade ehargee about peracme w1 th aalloloue intent J etbera were alleg1anoe eould be properly queationed. the true obaraoter or eamplalata wae aot aelf-evldeat at the tt..e of preaentatlon, how- -al'\"8 oaaea be intelligently evaluated. te enu or aore or auob or,._nlaatlcma, a acaplete lnwat1pt1• ot

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wall augr,e~tiw that, in the opinion of the peraons concerned, auoh orr:aniaatione, if known, would worlr &"'r..1nst their olesranoes tor full aignltloanoe of auoh oontaota, ad they were eozrtlmaec! until about whom there wu aom.e doubt •• to loyalty. But 'bhe rigbta ot the indi Tidual to .,,,.,.k had to be aonaldered •• wll a• the aeed or •~· Manhattan lllatrlot tw the 1nd1T1dual' a aenloea, and poaalble jeopardy ot thla OOUlltry' I lntereeta waa the CU1d1n{" prlnolple ln .aklar, auob deo1a1~. Where an ampl.,.e eould be tranaterred to nen though ecne doubt 11ay haw exlated aa to hie adherence to

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oaoea included the apr reheneion of an 1ndiT1t1ual 'Who atole f·6 1 000 reaulted in the indtctaent or tlftJ-aeven peraone. Counter-Intelltr,anee Corpa Data~ of the Otatrtot baa handled peraona 1 apprextately 100 ••••• tn …