Supplement to Manhattan District History; Book I -- General; Volume 14 - Intelligence & Security

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MANHATTAN DISTRICT HISTORY VOLUME 14 - INTELLIGENCE te SECURITY TO N FIR MED TO BE UNC LASSIFIE D For The Atomic Energy Commission Chief, Declassificotran drunch ^-Vv^

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MANHATTAN DISTRICT HISTORY TABLE OF CORTOTS SUPPLEMENT TO SBCTICK 1 - INTRODUCTION SUPPLEMENT TO SECTIOK 5 - PERSONNEL AND COMPANY CLEARANCE Hanford Engineer Works (Washington) Madison Square Area (New York) Schenectady Area (New York) SUPPLEMENT TO SECTION 4 - PLANT PROTECTION b. Security Completion Surveys SUPPLEMENT TO SECTION 6 - SHIPMENT SECURITY For Information on this Section, see Top Seoret Appendix to SCPPLESIENT TO SECTION 6 - SECURITY OF INFORMATION Control of Top Seoret Ooouaents Declassification of Information b. Press and Publications

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*• Introduction. * ¥h« principal coneideration to be borne in mind in order to obtain * clear orerail comprehension of the statue of Cl strict Intelligence and Security activities during 1946 is to reamber that effec tive 7 March 1946 responsibility for such activities was plaoed upon the various Area Engineer*. This resulted in each Area establishing its own Intelligence and Security program with help and advloe being furnished by district Headquarters whenever necessary. It may bo statsd generally that operations wore continued in all Sections as they existed in the past with the exception that considerable improvement has boon noted as the result of the establishment of now policies and procedures designed to effectuate a more efficient Security and Intelligence program. Agents from the service resulted in curtailment of activities and concentra tion on oases of major importance, protection of teOhnleal information and processes at the various installations, transfer of investigative activi ties to the Federal Bureau of Investigation by the Atcmio Energy Act caused a question to bo raised as to the jurisdictional status of the CounterIntelligence Corps but counter-intelligence activities wore continued* S. Personnel and Company Clearance. Various Aroae conducted their own personnel investigations when loads were within the Area eonocrned. Interim eloaranoc was denied new cm* ployees when the security risk was determined to be too great. Tieitors to installations were to be granted acoess to classified information and permanent lnter-area transferees were oloarod only by Washington Intelligence

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Office. FBI field offices furnished inf oraction direot to Area offices, The ©raploirraant of aliens was discontinued * However, alien-employees were permitted to remain. The P-S Project, Trail, British Columbia was plaoed under the jurisdiction of Hanford Engineer Works. 4. Plant Proteotion. - In absence of recorded history of practices and policies, new standard operation procedures were published. The responsibi lity was assumed by the Plant Seourity Seotion for “Security Completion Surveys" of facilities terminating District contracts. The list of facili ties surveyed by the Plant Seourity Section increased from 800 to TOO. Routine Inspections at Project plants and Areas totaled ever 1000. Ad ditional pre-eontraotual surveys were made on new contractors and consul tants. Continuous training program and on-the-job training were Instituted for new Security personnel. Ho known compromise of classified information or damage to equipment was noted during 1946. Recommendations for improve ment of Seourity involving expenditure of funds and changes In personnel were approved by contractors. Public Proclamation No. 26 was Issued by Commanding General Sixth Army, to supersede Public Proclamation No. 18. This Procla mation pertained to trespassing, contraband, etc., on military reservations within the Sixth Army.Area and especially the Hanford Engineer Works, 6. Shipment Security. - A new method of shipment of final products from Sites W and X was inaugurated (See separate Top Secret Appendix to this 8» Seourity of Information. - Contract completion security assigned to Plant Protection Section. Use of Polyograph in one of restricted areas

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developed security violations. Comprehensive method of accounting for fop Seoret documents adopted, Problems related to declassification of teohnieal and sclentifio information assigned to Declasslfication and Publications Branch, Researoh Division. Washington and Distriot Publio Relations Offices cleared advertising by industrial concerns of use by Manhattan District of their products. State and Federal Agencies granted access to Restricted information. Central office established for handling of foreign inquiries, purchases and equipment. Instructions pertaining to photographing, sketching, mapping, etc., revised. 7, Organisation. - Seven jurisdictional areas of responsibility for general security and intelligence matters established. Separation of army personnel from service eaused changes in policy and administration. Opera tions CROSSROADS office set up in Berkeley Area. Brookhaven National Lab oratory and Brookhaven Area activated officially In July and August 1946, respectively. Argonne National Laboratory succeeded the Metallurgical Labora tory on 1 July 1946 as the prime contractor in the Chicago Area. General Electric Company assumed responsibility from B. I, du Pont de Nemours on 1 September 1946 for operation of the Hanford Engineer Works. Los Angeles Area retained identity as sole entity separate from Santa Fe Branch Office. )<. Sandia Base separated from Site Y on 1 November 1846. Sohenectady Area activated on 1 July 1946. General Elsetrio Company became prime contractor of that Area on 1 September 1846. Atomic Energy Act passed 1 August 1946, Commission named on 28 Ootober 1946. First meeting on 13 November 1946. Oper ation of Manhattan Distriot transferred from War Department to Atomic Energy Committee on SI December 1946.

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security tp jorma ti ok MANHATTAN DISTRICT HISTORY VOLUME 14 - ISTSLLIGEHCE AHD SECURITY to 8potion I for poricd ondlng 81 Poo— bor 1946

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S2-4. General.- During the period covered by this Supplement, there was little ohange in the Counter-Intelligence activities of the Intelligence Section. Generally speaking, the Counter-Intelligenoe program was slowly revised and aimed mere directly at the protection of technical information smd processes at the various installations. This change was necessitated by the gradual release of information that had previously been classified. All leads, developed locally and through constant liaison with other inves tigative and law enforcement agencies, which related to espionage, sabotage, •edition, treason, disaffeotion, subversion, eto., were carefully followed and reported. Throughout this period, a constant effort was made to strength en the liaison and contacts of the Intelligence Section throughout its general juriediotive areas. The Army disolrsrge polioy, the subsequent loss of trained and highly experienced CIC Agents, and the deorease in the volume of oases under inves tigation, considerably ourtailed the activities of the Intelligenoe Seotion. Nevertheless, counter-intelligence activities were executed efficiently and were processed to completion. A strong and suooessful effort was aw.de to rebuild the oounter-intelligence seotion by the employment of additional in Sane confusion existed as to the status of the oounter-intelligenoe seotion following passage of the Atomlo Energy Act, which deore d that all investigative and intelligence work would be performed by the Fed ral Bureau of Investigation. This situation existed for some months, during which this

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functions werr combined in March, 1846, the Fersonnel Clearance program con tinued tc rely almost completely upon investigations conducted by Military Intelligence; investigators assigned to the Army area*. Soon it war apparent that budget ourtailraert and the manpower shortage were seriously delaying, the investigation*. Action was therefore taken by the Chicago Seourity Offioe to conduct its own’ personnel investigations, If the loads were in greater Chicago or in areas to whioh other seourity business .took the Offioe's personnel. From March to December, the Chioago Security Office handled an average of 160 Personnel Clearanoe investigations (speoial, routine, or agenoy) per month. One of the important changes in Personnel Clearance which resulted fro® the delays mentioned was that, instead of granting Interim clearance to apj11oantc who had minor derogatory facts In their backgrounds and then keeping those employeer under surveillance, the Chicago Seourity Office placed great emphasis on the security risk in hiring the ap}lioants and denied clearances whenever the risk appeared too great. This was an abrupt about-faoe In the Personnel Clearanoe policy followed during the War years. 83-5. Clinton Engineer Works (Tennessee) - The Personnel Security Branch of the Seourity Division continued to function during 1946 as In previous years exoept for the following changes: (l) Or. 10 May 1946, an administrative claaranoe procedure was estab lished which directed clcaranoe by Washington Intelligence Office of all visitors to an installation who were expected tc have access to highly classified information and all pemu.nent transfers between areas of persons

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• wto um nui m doing highly classified work. Explanation of the administrative details neoeteury tc plaoe the prooedure into effect and « further clarification (2) The Federal Bureau of Investigation or October 16, 1948, autho rised it6 field offices to furnish information direct to Are* Security offioes. This prooedure greatly expedited the completion of preliminary investigations neoessary for the granting of interim clearances. (3) On October 24, 1946, instruction* were issued to all offioes to discontinue the employment of aliens pending a decision by the Atomic Energy Commission. Aliens already employed were permitted tc remain. sonnel Clearance prooedure at the Heavy Water (P-9) Project at Trail, British Columbia, was revised by the Intelligence and Seourity Division. Formerly the cleurano* of P-9 employees had been entirely the responsibility of the Canadian Mining and Smelting Company of Canadt. Limited. Onder the provisions of the ohange, all personnel employed at the P-9 Projeot were subjected to background investigation by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, and elaaranoe data oards forwarded to the Intelligence and Security Division at the Hanford Engineer Works. Investigative reports were retained by the Royal Canadian liounted Police . Clearance records were reviewed by personnel of the Intelligence and Seourity Division at Hanford Engineer Works. S3-7. Madisor Square Area (Mew York) - Personnel and company olearanoes increased because of the fact that there was a resurgence in aotivity on the part of the Isanhattan District, particularly in Madison Square Area, Such clearance became increasingly large in scops with the advent of the "Interim

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Clea.rano«", or preliminary ehecV of federal agencies before prospective em ployees were put to wort within the furious Distriot facilities. £5-8. Schenectady Aret. (be* York).- When the contractor first bepan to eubmit the names of employeee for clearanoe in Kay 1&46, Personnel Security Questionnaires wore forwarded to the iSaiisoo Square Area office for loyalty and ehuraoter investigations by Headquarters First Army, Governor's Island, Sew Yorle. It was found after submission of 81 names that these investigations took too long. Therefore, after 10 Jun- 1946, all background and loyalty in vestigations were carried on by the Are- 6#ourity Office. In all oases where derogatory information was developed, speoial investigation ensued to determine whether olearance ehould be granted or denied. Beoause of a strong local branch of the Communist Party,A a union which is believed tc be badly infiltrated, end beoause this area also was the scene of much Bund activity, it was deoided that interim clearanoe would be granted only after a eheok of locel investi gative agendas revealed that there was nothing derogatory in their files.

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SUPPLEMENT TO SECTION 4 - PLANT PROTECTION 64-9. Diet riot Program. - The year 1948 brought no appreciable change in the objeotive of Plant Protection. Although interruption of operations lost its war time importance, physical protection of the wealth of information and Material represented by the researeh and production facilities of the Manhattan Distriot justified a physical seourity program at least equivalent to that con a. Plant Protection. During the first few months of 1946, the Plant Protection personnel underwent an almost complete turnover, from military to civilian, both in the District Office and the Area Offices. The inooming or ganisation found that much of the history of practices and policies had not been recorded and consequently wae lost with the departing military personnel. Standard operating procedures were, therefore, developed as interpretation of the existing Seourity Manual and were directed to all organisations concerned. (See Appendix C S-8). These resulted in a broader definition of faoility, a more definite assignment of responsibility and a far more thorough supervision of the minor contractors who had access to olassified information but who, through for mer administrative policies, were frequently not reported to appropriate security b. Security Completion Surveys. In addition to inspections of active facilities, the Plant Protection organisation assumed responsibility for "Securi ty Completion Surveys" of facilities which had terminated their ecntraots with the District. Through these surveys the contractors were assisted in disposing of classified documents and material, to relieve themselves of the responsibi lity of further safeguarding olassified matter, and where possible to eliminate the need for further seourity supervision on the part of the Manhattan District*

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To Impress each terminating contreotor with the continuing importance of security, an acknowledging certificate to that effect was obtained from the responsible representative of his organisation. Since the Distriot Records Administrator likewise has the problem of record dieposition, he and the Chief of Plant Protection more olosoly coordinated their aetivltles, ss origi nally directed in the Security Manual (See Appendix AS-5). The list of facilities being surveyed increased from less than 800 to more than 700 during the year« Routine inspections totaled over 1000. In addition, faoility olearanos of many new contractors and consultants prior to their being furnished elassifled data required additional pre-eontraotual surveys* An estimated £00 of these were conducted. To undertake this load of field work with new personnel required a eontlnuous training program whioh was accomplished by frequent visits by Seourity Agents of the Distriot Offioe to the various Area Offioes where they conducted informal conferences and joint inspections. Similar method was followed to educate contractor's securi ty agents with revised Manhattan District policies. Apparent success of the programs Is indicated by several results« damage to buildings, equipment, or material whioh oould be attributed to a failure of plant protection measures. for improvement of seourity whioh involved expenditure of funds, changes In established policies, and inconvenience to personnel. However, eontraoting offloers and contractor’s representatives almost invariably agreed that the First, there was no known compromise of elassifled information or Seoond, the plant inspectors continuously submitted recommendations improvemer cost and complied willingly*

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Third, the plant protection program in its entirety hat been critically reviewed for the purpose of recoaraendlng to what extent it be continued by the Atomic Energy Commission. No change of oonsequence has o. Hanford Engineer Works (Washington) • On 12 November 1948, the Com manding General, Sixth A m y issued Publio Proclamation Ho. 26 to supersede Proclamation No. 18. Authority for enforcement of Public Proclamation So. 28 continued to be vested in the Distriot Engineer, Manhattan Distriot. Al though the Proclamation was not invoked during this period,of the terms and con dition* set out in the Proclamation regarding trespassing, possession of contraband, etc., armed seourity was the most effective legal weapon and served as a deterrent against trespassing. The lack of concurrent or exclu sive jurisdiction, and the handling of 14,000 or more population plus oasuals and itinerants on the reservation created law enforcement problems on which state jurisdiction, would have been somewhat clouded (See Appendix CS-9).

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SUPPLEMENT TO SECTION S - SHIPMENT SECURITY For #ie information developed for this Section on the new method of shipment of final product, cee the eep&rate Top Secret Appendix to thie

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SUPPLEWEST TO SECTION 6 - SECURITY OP INFORMATION S6-6. general - The activities of the Seourity of Information Seotion continued as reported at the end of 1945. …