Operation Castle - Radiological Safety, Final Report - Volume I (Deleted) (Volume II Is Cic 0051072)

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Joint Task Force Seven Technical Branch, J-3 Division This is an extract of Operation CASTLE, Radiological Safety, Final Repofi, Volume 1. . distribution is unlimited. Extracted vemion prepared for DEFENSE NUCLEAR AGENCY

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Destroy this r.port when it is no longer needed. Da not return PLEASE NOTIFY THE OEFENSE NUCLEAR AGENCY, ADORESS IS INCORRECT, IF YOU WISH IT OELETED FROM THE DISTRIBUTION LIST, OR IF THE ADDRESSEE IS NO LONGER EMPLOYEO SY YOUR ORGANIZATION.

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Clas8ifi@l metetial has boon rmoved in ordw to make tho information lvailable on ln unclassified~ opw publication basis, to lny intmeatod pertias. Tho lffort to declassifythis rsport has Mm lccoaplishad specifically to support tim D@peraaent of Defam Nuc20arTest Pocsonml Review (NTPR) Program. The objective is to facilitatestudi~s of th~ low lmrels of radiation recoivod by 8-. individual during the l-spheric nuclear t@st progres by aeking ls much informationls Possiblo lvailablo to Th. meterial which has b-n doloted is lithez currently classified ls been dotormined to bQ c~itical 8Uitary information which could rwoal system or equipaent vulnorabilities end is~ thaoforo? not lppropriate for opon T!w Defww Nuclear Agency (DNA) boliwos that though lll classified meterial has been delgtd? tho report accurately portrays the contmts of the original. DNA llso bellov8s that t.h daloted mtorial is of little or no significance to studiesintoth amounts,or types~of radiation received by any individuals during the ltmepheric nuclear testprogrea.

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Operation of a new teahniquo of forwwting aad spaac ohangu ia the W pattern and for For the dmlo~at ad us. durhg the CASI’U Opemtioa of a mu teehnlq,ue of forma8thg tfibutim lpproaoh te the problaa and for tha prepamtioa of the deouaha oa We mt~d attaahed ae Lneloawe 3 to 7ab DO For the pr9paratioa of the waathet mmsartoa, for a eonsiderahle amxzt d pmof-rwMag ti b Radeafety operatkme- CASES, for tho pattwn, for the ~tion of the to reoa8t for a considerable wmmt of proof-reading and to tho iaediaal aspeeta of Rads=f*Y d- ?or wggest$one oa the dmolopmazt of the CLOU traekhg pun, tG? mordtorhg tha elcud tracb for the dMu8aLoM and anelyeos of these NOW York opemtione Qfficeg A,E.

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dowripttcu Of the rq)ort. Part M is a discussion Of the r@iolO@Cd safety problems created by tho CASTU missica of tho task SOrCC, and their soluticu 88 planned and saacuted durUg tho shot phase of the .p.ratime Part mREE is a dlseussiai et fe+at forecasting twhxliquose 2. 7he mpoti is dssignsd to coww tho over-aU CASTLEradiological safety mttws from the tiewpoiat d those issues of direct concern to Healers, JointTask Foroo SEVEN. S-. each task group was responsible for its Om iratmlal radiolo~cal safety ls gmemlly doftied h CJTFSEVEN tho details of the operations of tho task groups or dlmctly support, the responsibilit$os of the ii~, due to the basic rellanee of task force IA. hereti to aqWy except as they pex%+ain task force as a whole. operations on floating facilities in tho test uea, tha radLole@eal safety pafica Of the m ? l3 final rspofi has bean aracted and appended hereto. TIMradtologiti iaclude fuU dettis on photodoshstry, rxlietied=l work shot atoll radsiUe wwrcys and recovory operations. 3. ‘his repofi has been witten for the express purpose of ?.ssisting discus elms of the probloms and solutionstis~ durtng CASTLE. .~s SUC~,

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faats Of W radiologicallffocta of the CA9TLE events, the need for a cwwege Of tho operational fiep3at appeam tital for coattity ad d~z of batter oporaticW cwas of c- with the probleas. Operatioa*S pmeentcd *S backgroula for Parts TWO, THPm, m and FIVE. l. Seven detonation had been echedukd when the task force arrived h the PaeUic Proving G-s. Five of tho o- seven, plus (1) me orA@ml @i@ schedule, probable field and premced

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WCTAR 1.7 + 0.3 &ugo hum C?ator IA w 1954 cowents b tha Somard area -S phmed to cticUe with tha Qaac&to b the fornwl area & praparatiow were begux for the etict of the full ltst%cally detanated and operations uare simikr, each detomtbn swved aa a mhearad for tha au to foUw~ d. BLVO was datonatad on 1 Hareh 195&, Prior to this shot Q

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operations at Bikhi were conducted priactpally from aflwt. E-w Of unfawrable wathw conditions h BUdd, it MM not uatil 27 !4srchthat Island. Becauso of tho peer results of KOON,WHOU- -cUed. -t abmt tho sarm Was, tho oAghal YW7SE was canc@Xhd and l mdified version of was tho first Uwtanm of such flexhility in U. S. test* Metov, However, wather co@ltions wre unfavorable, ad it was not usittl 26 t,pril that UNION readied M@detonated. OnIA May, the Wnetok wathcr bacem favorsble and NECTAwas detonated Except for rollup ad redeploynmt, tho on-site phase tasks uwre ca!@etod, units of tho tssk force wera redeployxi uwe returned to pamat organizations or were reas si yed. In troop elemorits tfom reforned as conpmentsof provLde for cont~ty of operations, MA for of future operations tho task force W otier to

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mather WMa major probleu, unacceptable f U-out patt e ma. ?’he testsworn of the year when the weather in the UarshaU favorable; it was not an unusual season fm= a to weather unless fleadble firtng techniques such as firing on barges in the open ocean or %i.r drops are developed which till ~za the anount ad the h the ciegaton range were scheduled for the of definitive data on the effects of wry Ma field (mgaton) detic?s. consequencemlsleadhgin manyrespectsl In particular, early C.SI’XS wcpex%eacoindkated that fall-at pe~ods on the order of six to twdve houm WC adequate for fidds obtained prtor to IVY, were inadequate for C.&U. in odor to lcieurcthat the sigtiflcant f~ll-cut would t$Jce place in %cceptreqyird wini forecasting tor several diffsrent tL3e,s and my :eogr%phi-1

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tlae ad cloud dhplacermt factors on ties of the (2) ierial cloud tracidng wind system tithin the effacts of relation between forecast %d actual Islamls wore wpportod for stud$eebeingconducted by the New abls mxtaulad tixmlyadvtuttsgc & tho task forocand tivasla emluatb; the faU4ut patterns on populatad were used to conalderislands ad, by the for tlwe areas. . Houavw, it was aat~dpated that this MAt would be too low considering tho mmbar ti expected fields of tho wapme ard dtices to be tested. Comeaqum~, tho Mufo PIM, with WC cawirreacoof tho Argeons General $wtlficztim therefor. This atihority, exeroised for a relativeQ few XNXbW of Indivldu.als, was adequate for the cqlction of essentialC..STE

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ejqosure in exeess Of tho QtiabMh@i ME Of 3.9 mmtgens 8 in exeoss of 600mmtgens. generalml., tiw windsin the MarshellIalanda areaare last northeasterly to easterlyin the lowar, or trad~d, levals(up to about 20,0CQ feet), and In tho general discussion of _ patterns for lach ehot below, the aldThe trades were ehallobf feet arid the ~h Wmls were nore east northeasterly ELJ?Oua8 detouated as a lcxl eurface shoton a of - aero at Hwur, and steamd further south upon rece%vin= early hid ~ ** spread in a eantiat unitorn e~pticd pattern to the ezet. ..t

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predicted valueOrd tulce the predicted Upper wt. radioactive debfis was caticd up awl d$ffuced ovor a tima the nest probablo was expected. EWO dmmstra: A that the origia of the falA+ pzttcrn is ~at.ly to tho east of the test mite uh$ch nocossltatd the cm.cu?.tionof 131enmts of tho task force fleet md personnelwere involvodin larly fU-out which nocussitated full use of nawl aton$c eountensemires ad rotireaent betwoa the obse~ ad forocast utnds for shot t-. The net result was an

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2. The Utirik natives -x’s returned tu their hoacs I.a occupya now teuporary~gc ccmstmctedwith task force faclUtlcs, tion trtpa U be cud. to ilorqelap ,.toll by spoeinl surwy part~eato detmzine the progmssivw cont~tion status~d the eaact date of mtum of the Mtivwo area reportod ~ tiao Japanooc to be approxinate~ 80 to 90 dlos east northla8t of BLkisi. m. reported position of this vessel was within the pattern of the Sea?chdrcraft as shot day. Ftiure to eoatsct thd Japanese w ssel Uaa-duatowvaroia’ial caitazzlastbti of the searchaircraft when VW=Iclose-k areadsti by the ori~nal aircrsftduo to the soae ?adi~lo;icQ

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factora, are presented k Tab IL tops of those 10W1S (50,000 to 60,co0 feet) ware uaster~ at shot tke, beomdag southerly by H plus 2 hdkra. Th8 trad~s were easterly at shot tine Ath a layur of muthurlLes betneen 68- ti M,WQ feet. %;: entire tially to a fM,tt of radbaot%titytouaA tho fluahiag alouly out tho nastem chemnala. south along tho tmatern redfs,

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day. Effeeta of the clod wre ~so recotiedst M at lla-t H plus 42 hours d at Znluetok at about H plus Skhwaa Intantit~e8at - reachedvaluesof 15 to 81+cir/hr.Intensitiesat Ea$wetokranged from zbout g, To evaluate the lff4ets of tho trwiewinds on EniwtOk, one Sdditiom cloud tracker WLSplaced to the west of grouad zero at 5,000 foot to qent the xuutfietrackerat LO,~ feet l 4tial tit cnsitlesb the roentemnrange padsed to the north. The gener?~ results of XXIEU, ard atier water surface shots, Iadicate that, had feet In depthdurin&the f~st three hours after the shot. ~. ~~tl uas a land surface slmt detmated on the wcstern

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lssentMAy to the shot island, t~ hla@ fmnndiatoly to the wat of grcusd zmo, the anchorages $Ist off the shot island, axl acsosm the Mgoon on tha groud zeroand ths task fome fleet. No radiolo@cal daaage resulted to #a fleetduo to eulfloient distame betw= the tips awl the sto= & A maU amuit of cmtadaatt- waa depositedoa out from app~taly the 25,% foot 10TW1S,or dua to a relatimly efficiant transport of mot of tho deb~s to the aast and subsequent subsidence ad scan- by rah ehouers lmow to be b the general area.

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shot, the IICWO faU-out e~rienco was used tith conaidwable cautiGn h the UNIOliWade phi. Subsequent e-ts, however, inticated charactetistica CATZE was flret used for this shot, and cent-ed for all subsequent shots. west. Tradtis wsre shallow(10,~ feetdeep) with Ught northcrl.y ta & y;- was a baWS (water wrface) shot in the lagoorz app~tely 30 dlcs cast southeast of - awo for oporatioralreasons,

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~. YJ_ charactwistlca wars eomplotdy within tho war lIAWMS TAE ad b the ~oneral vlcinltyof ZangalAp,however, no appreciable ground deposition was assGctatodwiththosoobsemations. forthis ahct by the ;=’s NewYork Operations Office progras (use aerial surfacewatersampWigtechniques). In addltbn to ths documentation at T-, Wit wo* was axtrezmly usefulin orgsniaingthe planusedby theco ilongelap in c~wn tith RW&O, and, although aarialintensitiesin the 20 hours, no sL@fieant incraus b the grouad readhgs (extrapalat ed fron aeriai ~ at abaxt H plus 36 hwrs) were noted at this atoll. & ~o isohtd incident of interest involvedtwo LST’s

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~. IWTLR dd-lwel idnis wwre southwesterlyto south swthwesterly to 45,000 feet - wwster& to 60, ~ feet. The tradetis eaat muthoasterlyto 20,~ feet. crater (appro~tely 100 feet of water) oft Toiter%pucM at Zniwetck. fleet was wuth of the atoll at shot the HECT.ii shot. tit H-houra largemlnstom =a aver the ligwn between Islsrdswexw mlat%wly clear below the bases of the low wwatherclouds(1,e. char fromthe surfaa up to about2,CC0feet). SO,(X9feet pedkted for at least the firststi hsurs after shct tine. Z. Moderate cont~uous rti occurred thrcughxt the allot day. A cf the weather obsemed m shot day was atisbut.%bleto the

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the de8troyer was osioxd to return to baae. fali4ut pattern along the Me 9 of siallar work ione an Y-. faotorsare presentedin Tab P.

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field range. AS plans pmgresmdt the schedule uw increased to s-xi eventsj Plan for the operation required dot ailed re+mluation to deterr&e the practloalit~ of tious asaunptions and plandag lach extm went (insofar as perwmnd radiation additiw, the pemdssible qosura per Went for faetora. Ptifily, since nwsber of events at the PacificP- Grourd(PPC)WM fow on %erattm P- W ha= to be built arowmi tho aaaa persoanol toaage Ucmamoe. aa uaod on theeeoper~tionareg@css of tho mmber ad fields of the events fw CA3’X’U. There uas an obdous need for ways @ mcm to cut icm m ruaber of factors u9ra involved. ment; howwver, it appeuod to be of evants for parEiOipa&n nould to cut dotmon personnelexponmes, a Lncraase. Xt was also assuned thct the to ~ the petiseible c!asage over a sufflciant nuzborof Participatet~ affectan ovsr-all average dcae wtthin acceptable Uts l Xt was 31sz Clem of norkb contmlnatctarczswith the ~ efficiencyin orderth:: the

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:cr tiha retireopmst~onand the greateramouat of work to be acc:qllshed % ir .:oa~+ cd lreas,it was okbus that som fomm of relaution of Agid .wes two such quartms, giving a total of 7.$r for the firstsix montksof w L- MO objection to such l generalizedsolutionlLes in the fact+.nat, gressivelyon the basisof 0.3r per week. S~lS, l flat WE of, for muons ad becuieo of l gwioral of dosages at lven the currentlyacceptable prmim avenueof rehxation appeared to la QionU cua where the technical inrprt ard tha modlod Wects ~f ‘ necessity for cumpletloaof specificdsdonse P&sion for wdver of the mol.-.ti MAMXW, AX. The w4vor protisim was used to m amr:cxahle

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ma$er Zactorz lesdlag to tho $octsioaz to lthorizo l deptiw froa thns and generalresults ef the CifSIUahota. Detailed zhot results are ENXWTCK. All zhets wore to be surface wents, s+.atico4 dot-ted. m shots wwra h K s M@ meld range except tho =. at SEliEXX. AS that Wu feature h tho fau-out ph~ lss-ted with the detonatim of

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mlatima high radiationtitonsitiescan occurin timasdMction8. For T ~eratlonCASTLE,it w as- that tho pmbloms raised by this phenomena tionsalongtho aetiom rest,WA fieldsax tho oxdor of MXKEd ftied This could msaa a dolq of tmm on. to conAdorabQ bettsr dua to tho gzwater distaaess ha sem poiats and its re2ativwXy up-dad psltiah For *8 viclai~ of YUR~, it MM qocted that Uis NAM shotshould glvu the most troubh sins its f= edtims umM q awly apprtite thoee rssultins b considerable f~ b the atoll araa uros~ d ing actionin tho atoll cmter, it was expected that Uttlo coral or battom mgion ma asqectad to ba greatlylossaned. It malsa be notedthat the coalitions for a hl.ghly radiaictiv9 Mse surgewdA

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h Nevada, haa baa Iittlc rdiytitit~ to b pmnat in the reeultirq it ad probable that l phondena wuld eocura the -o shots Uhich (dw to largo quastitioa of uatw clo~o$tamp eito (EUMWJ), ad tho ~o thots clam, bat loss Ukmly to CY8cwtd (&ss thou parsuzs idicatod in d boleu) for the XAW and tho return izh- tg Euluetokjn the ewnt extemhd

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numbers could be owuuatd tithia l roaswbls length of t- ad tit& petips ~ratioas by using up for l ~ aumbus of per80aasl m ew shot mat, If Wld structuN) tho asslmpt%oas were Sufftomztly u to predietthe d

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dcsc (taken omr ahofi Qsterrala) were aa (tdth the e “awurmaca lf the Susgems Generallf the tbreo

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Y by wz+.vw b indlvlctudy designated oasoo nhen ciroumstaneea lndAcatod tho ICE ‘f ?Oc- em did not apply to the lpeoialWE agreemnata tith the mthorLtir~-A ),h~fj.‘~, Ibmrsr, due to tho spac~al nature of field tests such 8“C.e-m exceasl~3 radiological preoautione. In an lffofi to se$ up practical cfiteria ad lvaluatim for waiver lf WE to

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foraign imtamatioa or em~enqr taaticaldoe. as a guido was -) adverse ef f ecr.c of the possible tis of actioah tacticalor e!mrgeney and tmger aas lrmolti b the tefia ad approprhta precautions …