Note by the Secretary, Subject: Joint AEC-DOD Operation Hardtack Public Information Plan

Page 1

April 15, 1958 COPY NO. &z* Note by the Secretary 1, The attached report fiythe Mrector of Information Services is circulated for re;iew by the Commission. The General Manager intends to apfirovethe recommendations of the attached report subject>to comments by the Commissioners prior -2 to the close of business on Thursday, April 17, 1958. Comments \ may be sent to the Secretary. $ 2. The Director of Infotiation Services has advised that the brief approval ttie interval in this case has been necessitated by extensive coor~nation with the Department of Secretary 1 Congr. Relations 16 General Manager 7 Inspection ;{ b Deputy Gen. Mgr. Intelligence Asst. Gen. Mgr. : Military Application 25 Asst. Gen. Mgr. IA 10 Security 26 Asst. Gen. Mgr. Adm. Albuquerque Oprns. 27-29 General Counsel 12;~3 San Francisco Oprns. Biology & Medicine Secretariat 31%6 When separated from enclosures, handle this document as ....... This material contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage lawsj Title 18$ U.S.C.Z Sec. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation > of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law. $

Page 2

JOINT AEC-QOD OPERATION HARDTACK Report to the General Manager by the Director of the Invision or Information Services 1. To consider the public Information Plan. on November 6, 1957= the Commission considered AEC 952/19 which stated that, “A separate public information plan for Operation HAR~ACK till be submitted to the Commission for considera@on as early as possible.” The attached as Appendix “A”, is &bmitted pursuant to the above 3. The Divisions of Military Application. Biology and Medicine, Security and Classification concur in the recommendation of this paper. The HARDTAW Information Plan also has been reviewed by the Commander, Joint Task Force Seven3 and the Office of the Assistant Secretary (Public Affairs) of the Department of Defense and the attached draft reflects their comments and has their approval. This material contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the Sec. 793 and 7942 the transmission Or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

Page 3

4. The Director of Information Services recommends that the General Manager: a. Approve the Joint AEC-LOD Operation HARIYPACK b. Note that the Joint Office of Test Information authorized under the Plan will issue announcanents of all HARDTACK test detonations having predicted yield Of 200 kilotons or higher. (Specifications for aIUIOUnCeITEn~S are given in Paragraph 6, PaGe 5, of Appendix “A” and rationale of the yield criterion is diacus~ed in Amex “A” c. Note that the projected News Media Observer activity at the Pacific Proving Ground in connection with the UN observers will be covered by a speciaX program which will be submitted separately for Corrunission d. Note that a letter will be transmitted notifying the JCAE of the Operation HHACK public Information e. Note that an opportunity to comment upon the Plan, particularly with respect to b. above will be afforded the Operations Coordinating Board.

Page 4

Public Information Plan ...........***. 4 APPENDIX “A” - Rationale of detonation announcement APPENDIX “A” - Understandings apd Specifications re Data in CJTF-7 Operational Reports for Public Reporting .................. 14

Page 5

JOINT AEC-DOD OPERATION HARDTACK 1. Consistent with national policy and security requirements of the U. S. Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Defense, to establish policies and procedures for the compi.lati.on,control, review and issuance of public informati-on:” related to Operation HARIYI’ACKat the Commissionfs Pacific Proving Ground scheduled to begin about April 15, 1958. 2. These policies and procedures, based on experience gained in previous test series and public reaction which occurred during and after preVious tests~.are designed: a. To provide the public promptly with such useful information regarding Operation HARIYPACKas may be issued with due regard for security. b. To provide for expedited issuance of official facts on emergency situations, should any arise> when such actton is necessary to dispel rumor or speculation harmful to the success of the operation. Medici,nea system for fast compilation in Washington for public release, if needed, of fallout data in the Pacific area and, in cooperation with the United States Public Health Service, in the United States. 3. A special public information plan for the news media observer program for Operation HARDTACK will be separately submitted for Commission consideration. 4. The responsibility for the preparation and issuance of all public information materials on Operation HARDTACK rests with the U.S. Atomic Energy .coRRIIi.ssi.on and the Department of

Page 6

JTF-7 will issue public announcements. issue from the Task Force would require the AEC and the DOD. However, any that might prior approval from ~. As necessary, the AEC and the EOD will consult with the Department of State, United States Information Agency and appropriate government coordinating bodies on the M_ming and of official information concerning Operation HARIYPACK. Determining which HAFUYPACKdetonations are to be announced Is the responsibility jointly of the AEC and the EOD, and announcements will issue from the AEC-IYIDJoint Office of Test Information described in Paragraph 11 below. The criterion controlling whether a detonation is to be announced is the size of yield. Detonations of 200 kilotons yield or higher are to be announced by the JOTI as soon as the requisite facts for an announcement are available. Such statements will be limited to the fact of occurrence of a detonation; the time of detonation to the nearest minute; and a general statement as to the place of detonation, e.g., on Eniwetok Atoll or Bikint Atoll. The announcements will make no reference to yield.* The rationale underlying the announcement criterion is attached 7. Statements approved by the AEC and the LODmay be issued by Che Commander, JTF-7, simultaneously with release in Washington. * An except~on will be the detonation for the UN Observer event. — It is expected that the predicted and actual yield of this shot, precise time of detonation and a full description of placement for detonation will be among the information approved for public issuance. A separate information plan will be submitted covering this event.

Page 7

8. The Commander, Joint Task I?orceSeven, is responsible a. The inclusion in operational reports of sufficient data and descriptive mat’erialto permit the compilation in VJashington of fully adequate public announcements b. The implementing within JTF-7 of public information policies consistent with this Infomnati.onPlan. c. The support of any special information activities that may be authorized by the AEC and the EOD with respect to Operation HARIYI!ACKand for recommending wuch other information activity as will assist him in Carrying out his duties. 9. Within the Atomic Energy Commission, the Ditislon of Information Services will be responsible for coordinating review of HARDTACK public information material. All public information material originatingin or coming first to the AEC will be submitted to the EOD for review prior to issuance. 10. Within the Department of Defense, the Office of the Assistant Secretam of Defense, Public Affairs, will be responsible for coordination and review of HARDTACK public information matters. All public information material originating in or coming first the EOD will be submitted for AEC review prior to issuance. ORGANIZATION AND PROCEDURES 11. !lDcarry out this Information Plan, there shall be set in Washington, as soon as possible, a Joint Office of Test Information (JOTI) headed by a Director designated by the AEC and a Deputy Director designated by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, public Affairs. a. The JOTI shall be under the direct supervision of the General Manager of the AEC and all public information announcements, after coordination as provided in this Plan, shall be issued by this Office through AEC and DOD channels except as the Commission and the Department of Defense may direct.

Page 8

b. The AEC Director of the Mvic,lon of Information Services and the ,’lssistantSecretary of Defense, Public Affairs, will assLgn such additional personnel to the JOTI in Washington as may be required. 12. In order to have available the material that may be needed for official issuance: a. The Commander, JTF-7, will include in his operational reports the datiadetailed in Annex “B”. b. The Division of Biology and Medicine, AEC, will compile readings of fallout in the U.S. from reports received from 11 AEC installations and from about 40 U.S. Public Health Service stations which are cooperating in this project. These installations and stations will give, upon inquiry, fallout readings,for their respective localities from day to day. C. The New York Operations Office will compile data resulting from the information collected by its monitoring d. The JOTI will evaluate the inf~ation arising from the actions under ~ > and q and recommend the character of public information action to be taken if any is indicated. 13. With the aim of countering, if necessary, adverse reaction abroad before and during Operation HARDTACK: a, The United States Information Agency will be requested to prepare for AEC and EOD weekly surveys of foreign reaction relating to Operation HARDTACK. b. The JOTI, the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Fublic Affairs~ and the Public Information Service, AEC, will orginate or accept from others and evaluate requests for issuance of information relating to Operation HA~ACK. The JOTI will coordinate preparation of such statements as are issued. c. The JOTI wI1l have under constant consideration whether any information action not scheduled in this Plan is warranted. Recommendations for such action will be made to reporting as may from news media, the appropriate authorities. interest of accomplishing as complete official be practicable for meeting expected requests and to aid in combating possible unfavorable reaction in the U.S and elsewhere> the JOTI will prepare for Joint AEC-DOD issuance, such textual informational material as:

Page 9

a. Background information on previous overscac and contlnentcl test series; JTF firing criteria, controls and operation procedures; discussion of radiation effects; material on monitoring and fallout reporting; details of improved weather forecasting; weapons with reduced fallout; methods of dissemination of radiation warnings, etc. (Where possible, material for visual media would be prepared along with that fO?? 15. Operational information in the expedited report madeby the Commander, JTF-7, subsequent’to each detonation, will be the basis for consideration whether special circumstances Indicate the need for any public information issuance. Such Information might include, for example, the type of burst (air or ground), generalized description of explos~ve force as Bikini) and statement on safety or casualties. AnY such special statement would be by the AEC and the EQD. 16. Prior to release subject to pre-issuance approval of public information issuances, other tha.n detonation announcements in accordance with the critirionof this Plan, the AEC and the IX)Dwill, unless there is overriding urgency, notify the Commanderj JTF-7, of the time and date of issuance and the text of the material. 17. Unle~s variances are specifically approved by the Commission and the Department of Defense, material publlcly issued shall conform to the appropriate Classification Guides. 18. The Joint Task Force may disseminate to all individuals in the Joint T~sk Force the publicly issued official statments relating to the test series for guidance with the caution that NO information beyond the content of the official statements is to be made public by statement, letter, interview or conversation

Page 10

except thoze topics listed under Pararmph 12 > J~-7 or superseding memoranda. E. ISSUANCE OF PUBLIC INFORMATION AT CONCLUSION OF TEST AND 19. The Joint Office of Test Information will prepare an announcement of the conclusion of the HARDTACK series for AEC-DOD approval and issuance in Washington and Honolulu. will consult with the appropriate coor~nating bodies of the Government to determine whether further public reporting on the operation is In the national interest. The AEC and the DOD will jointilyapprove whatever public reporting program is agreed 21.Information proposed ~or public issuance by individuals or organizations after completion of the operational period for Operation HARDTACK will be submitted for review and coordination by AEC and D3D as follcws: a. All AEC units, contractors and official observers will submit any proposed informational material to the Division of Information Services through normal administrative b. Military and civilian units, organizations and individuals responsible to the military services wII1 submit their material through their normal organizational channels to the Office of ti,heAssistant Secretary of Defense, Public Affairs, for review by AEC and DOD, F. POSSIBLE EMERGENCY ANNOUNCEMENTS 22. The Commander, JTF-7, will recommend to the AEC and the DOD announcements he deems necessary to serve the public interest and operating requirements of JTF-7 in the event of emergencies such as dangerous fallout on a populated area;

Page 11

evacuation of personnel or native: or lnusua.1or ;‘;crc accidents to JTF-7 personnel. a. Casualties to military personnel may be reported by the Service concerned in accordance with Department of Defense Directive No. 5410.1, dated 22 October 1952~ and may be announced only after approval by the Office of ?ublic Information, EOD

Page 12

RATIONALE OF DETONATION ANNOUNC~MEkT CRITERIOIJ 1. According to experts, i.tis possible that all detonations of the HARDTACK series might be detected outside of the Pa@ific Proving Ground. Therefore, the first reaction of those considering what our policy should be with respect to public announcement of detonations was ‘cofavor announcementof all, This course, announcedat the start of the series, would add to whatever credit might accrue to the U,S, for candor in conduct of its tests, It would eliminate the necessity for measures to keep secure the total number of detonationsin the seriesj a task of considerabledimensionsin view of the large number of persons having knowledge of the number (around10$000 in the task force). would eliminate the possitiilltythat any U.S, detonations announced first by other nations, such as Japan. On the other hand counter-propagandaconsiderations suggestedthat in view of the probable considerablenumber of HARDTACK detonations,announcementof only about half of the total would prevent two importantdevelopments- (a) the effect on world public opinion of the U.S. methodically ticking off announcements of the detonations as frequently as they occurreds sometimes possible two, or even three, per day, and (b) the explo3.tationby Russian propaganda of the fact of issuance of U.S. official announcementsof the detonations, In the absent@ of forced, if it wished to attempt to capitalizeupon the number, approximatenumber of detonations,to speculaterather than to rely upon the officialU,S. reports. This difference,in terms

Page 13

Hardtack detonationannouncernentcwould require $hat not all detonationsbe announcei and, In fact, cmly about ~ne-half be announced, Accordingly,it was determined that for this purpose, announcementshould be made of detonationshaving yi:ld hi@er than 200 kilotons, On the basis of predicted yield for individual detonationsin the series, this would result in announcementof about 15 of the projected 28, 4. It is of interest to note that there is possibly a small factor favoring counter-intelligenceof a desirable characterin a policy resulting in announcementof only about half the detonations, If any of the detonationswere not detected outside the proving ground the intelligenceof unfriendlynations would be, to that extent left guessing as to the total number of detonations,a problem they would not have if we stated we would announce all detonationsand then did so. 5, In reaching the conclusions in 3. above, a wide range of formulaewas examined, Among these were (a) announcementof no shots other than the UN Observer …