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Declassified record · U.S. Department of Energy

Letter, Subject: Morning Briefing re Testing Conducted at the NTS Proposed Test Locations at Central Nevada and Amchitka in Alaska (Deleted)

Dated
Aug 26, 1969
Document type
Correspondence
Length
10 pages
Open the original scanArchive record OSTI ID 16381301 · public domain

Document text

Machine-read from the scan, so expect some errors. Lines that couldn’t be read are left out.

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testing. Although we have been preparing for tests - tests have b~en conducted at the Eniwetok Proving Ground, Bikini, Johnston Atoll, Christmas Island acd the Nevada T~st Site, EnLwetok, Bikini and Christmas Island are iT.OW,of course, denied to us for political reasons. Tests not conr,ected with weapon test proSram have been executed in New Mexico, the northern part of Nevada and one test is now in process of being readied in Colorado. A lot of locations are in s.pport of the Plc’.;shareProgram. This chart T\~e total n~-her of c’;ents as of .~l;ust 25, 1969 was 361. The split bctxzen atvcspheric tests and under~round execu~ions is s!l~wnhere. You will note from

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has supported this effort. Sext, let’s take a quick lock at the or~anizations primarily responsible for test plani~ing and the safe conduct of nuclear weapons tests. Programmatic direction is provided the ?fe’<adaOperations Office by the Assistant General Manager for Military Application, this is General Gille.r. This guidance is implemented by the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, L&wrence Radiation Laboratory and Sandia Laboratory. The Xevada Operations Office provides the logistical, operations and safety support to these pro,grams. The technical program is diagnostics and the requirements to support the program is the responsibility of the laboratories. Nvoo\ - satisfies these requirements within the’ limits of policies established by our Headq~arters, Standard operating Procedures, and the fanding ]i{.itation, of course, ixposed by higher authority, We’ll discuss operational safety later. The current testing areas, of course, primarily involved i6 the ~e~’ada Test Site. ‘This is a sch~matic of the ):evada Test Site. It consist of about 1500 square miles of real estate and is divided into operating ar~as for nuclear testing, lo~istical support area, and the nuclear reactor cl~’~elopmenttest station. The green area consisting of about 700 sq’.lare miles is wher * lost of the undergr ouri d testing is cosdccted. The red area to the right is Pal-.uteMesa ‘.oheretests of about 1 mt have been co!=.duc ted and T.J!1cr2sc:new~at higb,er tests are planned for next calecdar year. The blue area is noc suitable for normal underground tests but has been used for cratering experiments in ‘nard rock. This has been primarily in support of the Plowshare Program or the Isthmian Canal studies. Mercury, at the exc~~~e

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left is about 65 miles’ frcm Las ve;~s:an~ Pahute Mesa is abolut 60 -miles CO the north of )fercury, This is an aerial view of the YTS looking north into Frenc!zman a~.dylcca Flats, T}ie first tests were conducted here in 1’351as part of the Rac~er\Serieso It ~as been the site of o-~er 350 tests, including three tests for the United Kinsdom and Plowshare device de<ti’elopment tests as wdl as the first major cratering event of about 100 kt. Facilities supportir.g the test program of a capital value of about $200 million. Its ~eology and hydrology have prove exceptionally suitable although originally the size was picked for atmospheric test purposes. Approximately 10,000 people are employed here and its operating contractor is the largest single employer in the State. Yucca Flats, about 10 x 20 miles in size, north of the Control Point is the pri~.ary firing area for events of less than 500 kt. In 1963 a~ a~r~ement was reached with the Air Force to add about 103,000 acres .,Vhereci?ep hole construction was possible. This would afford us the c~pabilizy of +-,pldcin,sdevice in depths up to 5,000 feet with drilled di:~,eters of up to 120 inches. This tipperyield limit at Pahute has not been establish.edj typical emplacement facility. Itfs probably not completely accurate for a:~y is carefully designed for containment and the dia~nostic inforv’ation that is required. You will note the d~pth - the canister being at t!’,ebottom with various materials hing emplaced from a cow se backfill i.nterla:;ered‘ h~~;<fill and finally a grout fill at the top and, of course, a cap. ‘ \?e halve looked at a 171 tests perk rned from.Augast 5, 1963,when the

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nuclear tests except thoss which ,... were fired for cratering purpos2s. These tests which were examixed in depth ‘.Jer2f~red in vertical Jrillej at a later. 3y far the greatest nunber of tests have 5e2n fired in these vertical holes without pipes or other direct communications with the surface and stemmed with sand, gravel,and cement just above the test device to the ground surface. Considering all the tests in this general category and size, since the resumption of nuclear testing in 1961, only ten relzased radioactivity of any consequence. Of these only three released radioactivity that could be detected outside the controlled area of tl-LeTest Site. Of these ten, (300 ground fissures) commencing within a few min’~tes of the explosion, the other seven seeped radioactivity after cavity collapsed. Of the ten, seven were tests with yields of less than 5 kt. Me have never ~xperi~nced a venting in the upper or higher yield rsn~e. To give you some comparison, we also support the Department of Defense, particularly DASA, in its effects experiments. This illustrates a tunnel configuration izvolving a line of sight canister for the Minute Gun Series. I think it is very clear the extreme complexity of this t>pe of e~:ent. During tl’.ekalland Winter of 1965, a Sreat dsal of thought was being ~<~~en to site locations where higher y~elds would be acceptable. During the winter of 1966, several possible s’uppl?nental test ar~as were examinsd a:ld i.stiesand safety problems upon the proximity of the human population centers.

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suitable ground water and geologic cb.aracieriscics. It had no significant logistical problems. Becauss of the Area’s proximity to Salt Lake Cit>jwhich is about 250 miles, also about the sz~e distance to Las Vegas, it was felt that this site may not be adeq~ate for the very highest yield which we may be required to execute. The next site is the Island of Amc’nitka, located 1400 miles to the nearest largest population center, Anchorage, about 200 miles to the nearest per=anent settlement, that is Adak. St’Jdies show apparently quite - suitable geological and ground water characteristics. Let’s take a look at this site. The Island is about 35 miles long and we undertook an investigation of se-;eraldrilled sites. Our original plan was to be able to fire at one end of the Island with the Control Point located at the extreme end of the Island. For example, it mi~ht be possible to loca~ the CP near the wars’nouse and base camp area and fire at.drill Site H and finally at the conclusion of t~e series we might locate our Control Point at the aorthwest camp and actually emplace at drill Site A which probably have a severe effect on support construction. l;oting the map, it’s very clear that we have explored ths Island to depth and in particular with each ~nplacement hole that has been an exploratory hole to define \’erycaref~lly for us the geology and hydrolcgy. Our third alternative under ~~i~d~<~~~s,’ North Slope of the Brooks Range and the northern part of Alaska located ab~ut x’~.eremy finger is. We this area on two different occasiom ?r.d

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actually came up with a preliminary d~si~n as to how ‘we might support (c:irrentpro~ram we wo~ld probably rzquire some two year; and about an additional $300 T.illion to place us in the same opeta ting situation as we now find cursalves in preparation for Milrow. Letts come back and take another look at the Island of Amchitka. Executive Order 1733 which was issued in 1913 to reserve the Aleutian Islands for Fish & Wildlife purposes provides for the establishment of this reservation, however, we shall not interfere with the use of this Island for (light) houses, military or naval purposes. However, because - Amchitka has in its (power) to the national wildlife refuge, we have undertaken very special activities and initiated many studies to protect the ecolosy of the Island arid nearby waters. We have spent more than $3 million in the past 2-1/2 years in identifying the possible ecological effscts of WC activity on the Island and in devising means of measuring and minimizin~ th~se effects. The first test, Project Milrow, will be in the yield range of the largzr tests conducted at the Sevada Test Site - 1’11 discuss this yield problem in a minute, but it will be in the rar;ge The calibration test will be Located 4,000 feel below ground and is tei~tatively scheduled for the Fall of 1969. Specifically, we are attempti.~g to attain a readiness date of October L, 1969. The calibration test is to eval:ate the effscts of larger tests upon ecology of the Island and water surrounding tb.eIsland~ the possibility of inducing seismic afcers?locks of magnitude comparable to or ~reater than the shot itself. Ililoih?raspect of public safety. ,The size and depth of (burial) of shot

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Let’s take a look at the Xilrow chart. We find ourselves now generally at the end of Otto’oer and we are looking for authority to ship the d~vice along about that date; received executional authority about September date and be in position to execute about the October date. Going into more detail, as time permits, regarding the necessity for sow let’s take a look at operational safety. This is somewhat a bureaucratic approach to the problem, but I think it clearly illustrates the First, let’s start at the bottom. The effects area are divided into six scientific management centers, either the Geological Survey, the Sa~dia Laboratory, LASL, LRL, Environmental Sciences or Air Weather Bureau (Air Resources Laboratory), and the Battelle M,lmorial Institute. Specific effects of the program are assigned to the management center and the number of contractors are assi~ned to each of the scientific !ndnager,entce.lters fortechnical control purposes. An uncsual shot, suc’n as Milrow, results in the assignment of a scientific evaluation scientist who brings together the total effects picture. The effects evaluation scientist and its report are revie=ed by the scientific ~anagement center, by pan~ls of consultants, for example, in the case of ?4ilrow the seismic panel not directly reporting to the Atomic Ener~g Scientific Advisors r~view it and based upon this the Manager, Xe\;zda Operations Office is in position to make recommendation, to tb.eAssistant General Manaser for Military Application. A completely separate review, of caurse, is made by the Atomic Weapon Safety Advisory Board as to the h.ar,dlingand safety of the nuclear device itself. Once the effects

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evaluation report is cor.sidered acceptable and pressr?ted, the Test Manager proceeds to develop an operational plan to sup~>rt that. IrI addition, the Test N,~r.aSerhas reporting to him a Test Evaluation Panel <~hich ‘;ery closely examines the containment, c’naracteristics of the design, and safety hazards that are associated therewith. Safety programs designed to assign value effects ~lJaltlationscientists are implemented under the control of the Test MaGager. Of course, at the Washington level additional technical staff examinations are made and finally a recommendation is made through the C~neral Manager to is the present situation and a execution of Project Nlilrow. the Atomic Energy Commission. That recommendation has been submitted for Letfs take a look at some of the statistics in the case - while I ‘JErycarefully look through this, quickly rather. Since 1951 through 1965 you will notice that we have paid claims in the order of $50,000 - most of these were in the Ranger and Buster Jangle area for claims made during atmospheric tests. The Groom Mine shut clownwas an operational matter and we did have some unusual experiences of glass breakage in Rcco. The first Plowshare shot, Gnome, resulted in no claims being paid, nor for Shoal the shot fired in a higher seismic area in Northern Yevada, nor for Bilby. Our current experience since 1965 we had substantial claims as a result of the Dribble e:<periment in support of the Department of Defense. This resulted in claims in the amount of $650,200, It r~sulted from a situation, g,roundshock...—.— Thrse claims were architectural damage in nature and we paid them

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promptly and have since been welcomed back with so-me qualifications for the conduct of additional DOD experiments. You will note that while the complaint or claims received ‘nave been substantial, we vet-ypromptly investigate these axd OnlY on a Crosstie Series did we actually receive and pay any substantial claim. One was - the greater amount of that was for a private contractor’s equipment which was immediately adjacent to the shot point and was damaged. The more recent event in the Bowline Series, in particular the Benham Event, resulted in claims amounting to The last program I will very briefly touch on is maintenance and - readiness in th~ Pacific. We attained an airdrop capability in January 1, 1965. This capability afforded us the opportunity of conducting nuclear testing on a fast response time, like 60 days, using the KC-135 diagnostic flying laboratories supported by DOD. Of course, our efforts, particularly at the Xevada Operations Office, are in s’lpport of the Joint Task Force Eight technical programs. In this case, again, is the responsibility of the laboratories. Recently we have been in process of developing a high altitude capability for the constriction of some new facilities and the codification of ~quipnent oriented to high altitude capability with maintaining some capability in the airdrop program, I think that’s enough to say on that e:scept that program, of course, is in support of one ot- the

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Finally, with somewhat tor.sue-in-cheek, the general ‘“- h ffor this effort by years, n 67 you cafl see the primary effort has been 1968 and 1969, hopefully to execute our programs in 70 a.hd 71, including out in 72. The efforts for hVOO, which excludes the laboratory effort, which YOU can see vari~ from $~33 million to our largest Year, 68-69, as $232 million. We are operating at a level of about $180 million this year. Our estimate for next year based on current schedule And, in conclusion, our (picture possibly correctly reflects) the situation in a number of areas. We sort of feel that in today’s world the people in the (valley) environmental charging the Nation’s nuclear testing effort. Each one I suppose can associate themselves with the character in this picture.