Final Report, Operation Castle, Pacific Proving Ground, Spring 1954 (Deleted)

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FINAL REPORTBY TBE CMfABDER,JOINTTASE FORCESEVEN 1. To present a report of the activities of Joint Task Force SEVENduring Operation CASTLEto the Joint Chiefr of Staff in compliance with paragraph 7 of Enclosure "An to JCS 2l79/47, and to the Chairmen, Atomic Energy Commission. 3. The mission-of Joint Task Force SEVEN,as delineated in Enclosure “An to 4. The issuance of press releases prior to the beginning of the operation, again after several of the detonations and at the conclusion of the series proved to be sound procedure. 5. In view of the high Field of the devices and weapons tested, the danger area established prior to the operation proved to be too mall. The enlarged area adopted after the first detonation was adequate for the devices and weapon8 6. Information is needed aa to the possibility of a high Field detonation causing a tsunami under varied conditions of firing. 7. The designation of the task force commander an senior representative of the Atomic Energy comnission at the Pacific Proving Grounds facilitated overreas

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operations by establishing a single authority over all components, military and civilian, of the task force. 8. Military support force8 provided were adequate and eseentially in the 10. The emergency capability of high yield thermonuclear weapons in the mega11. The weather, primarily upper wind patterns, determines to a great extent the detonation schedule of weapon8 and device8 in the megaton range when they are fired from the ground or on barges over shallon water. 12. Realistic fallout predictions for high yield weapons wind forecasts for the first U, hour8 following a detonation. during CASTLE must be studied in order to develop dependable criteria for predicting fallout resulting from high yield detonations. A network of manned station8 equipped with appropriate instruments and radio facilities will provide a valuable safeguard for populated areas within five-hundred mile8 of ths shot site. 13. Fear of causing a tsunami of destructive proportion a8 a result of very high yield detonation8 will be present during future teat8 until thie question I&. That the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission note the above conclusions. 15. That, incident to future overseas teats, joint Atomic Energy Commi8sion - Department of Defense public statements be released prior to the start of the test aeriee, after each detonation snd at the conclusion of the test series. 16. That an adequate danger area around the Pacific Proving Grounds be established prior to future overseaa test series and that information concerning the establishment be given wide dissemination. 17. That tests be conducted prior to Operation RKD’WIX to determine the possibility of high yield detonations causing tsunamis. 18. That the Atomic Energy Comudesion and Department of Defense, utilizing

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the capabilltfes of the permanent joint task force, maintain a capability of testing one or more high ylsld devlcer or weapons at the Pacific Proving Grounds on short noticr, requiring mlnlmm buildup of forces.

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Clarkeon, U.S. Awy, ~08 foneerly Joint Task Force 132 end WAS redesignated AS JTF SEVENcm 1 February 1953. The Commender, Joint Task Force SEVEN (CJTF SEVEN), was designated by the Chairman, Atomic Energy Coeenieelon (AEC) AS the senior repreeentatiw of the ARC At the Pacific Proving Ground8 on 15 December 1953. The commend poet was opened on Perry Island, Enluetok Atoll, WArehAll Islands, At 1712002, Jenuarg 1954 And WAI closed At 17OOOl2, May 1954. 2. Seven detonations had been echeduled When the task force Arrived in the Pacific Proving Groundr. Piw of the original seven, plue one eubetitute, were acfmdly detonated. In conjunction with these detonations, scientific And weapons effects experimental programe were conducted. This report describes the weapons end devices And presents preliminary conclusions which ten be drawn from early A?‘IAlySiS of available dAtA, How definitive conclusions will appear in technical reports to be published At A later date. This report covers, in eumm~ry, the operational, security, CommunicAtiona, logistical And fiecel Aspects of JTP SEVEN. Detailed infon&ion regarding theee subjects will be included in the History of Operation CASPLG, to be completed by 31 July 1954. The CASTLEFilm Report will be completed And printi forwarded on or About 31 July 1954. 3. The planning date of 1 March 1954 WAS established for detonation of the tiecutive Agent dated 8 Jenuary 1954 stated that the task force WAS prepared to conduct its firet test on schedule, 1 March 1954. a. The shot ez of 1 H~rch 1954 YBE:

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b. Because of adverse weather,the effects of dual detonationdates were a8 follows: 4. The experiencegained in preriousoperationsby key military and civilian members of the task force made possibleaccurate,detailedplanning for the operation in advance of the movement from tha Zone of Interior (7.1).Therefore,the task force headquarterswas requiredto Issue only brief checklistdirectiveein advance of each detonation, WEAPONS AND DEVICESTESTED scientificobjectivesset forth for CASTLE can be briefly stated Achievementof emergencycapabilityon at least one weawn. future developaentsin the directionof weight reductionof thermonuclear (4) Obtain effects information.

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difference between the two being the types and amounts of materials in thenno-

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12. The preceding is a summary of the significant achievements of CASTLEin the light of the scientific objectives previously set forth. A 8urmnar-yof the features of the weapons and devices tested is presented in Appendix Si, It can be concluded that CASTIE achieved the following: 13. On l+ August 1952, CJTF SEVEN submitted a report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff outlining the military participation program for CASIO, then planned as a A-shot nuclear and thermonuclear test operation scheduled for September - October, 1953. On 20 October 1952# the Joint Chiefsof Staff made certain modifications to this report and approved the program for planning purposes only. Concurrently, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed the joint task force commander to revise the military force requirements on sn austere basis. Subsequently, the AEC and the thermonuclear) operat.ion and to postpone the tests until January - February of 1954. The progrsm was later increased to seven shots. The Commander, JTF SINEN, submitted modified support requirements, as directed, on 17 February 1953, having withheld action until the AEC could formally present a proposed revision of the CASTLE concept. Cn I.4 April 1953, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the modified support requirements and authorized CJTP SEVENto further modify the military requirements as changes vere made in the operational concept of the tests. The conssander of the joint task force was further authorieed direct communications with the three military Setices to effect further modifications. The Joint Chiefs of Staff instructed each military Service to establish suitable priorities to insure timely msnn!.ng and equipping of the task force and to provide additional forces and services as necessary. Military forces provided are reflected in

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AppendicesC throughG. The task force received full cooperationfrom all three U. ORGANIZATIONAND COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS a0 The tank fores was organieedinto a headquartersand five functional teak groups designatedas: (4) Tank Group 7.4 (Air Force) (5) Task Group 7.5 (AEC Base Facilities) b. Forces were drawn from the AEC and Its contractorsand the three militaryServices. Appendix A depicts the general organizationfor CASTLE. co Organization,mission and major equipmentof the varioustask groups 15. ________PLANNINGANDTRAINING. As the mission and concept of CASl'LGbecame known, OperationOrder No. 1-53 was issued to cover the activiier of the task force during the buildup phase. As the concept became more firm, OperationPlan No. 3-53 wae issuedto cover the period of operationsfrom the time major elements of the task force w&e deployed in the forward area until completionof on-site operations. OperationPlan No. 3-53 became effectiveas an order on 17 January 1954. These publicationsdefined in detail the missionsforvarious subordinate units and, althoughclosely monitoredby task force headquarters,training prior to the on-site phase was the responsibilityof the various units. The highlight of training prior to the on-site phase occurred in October 1953, when the Air Force Task Group and Navy Task Group conducted a rehearsalin the Pacific Ocean near San Diego, California. co-d pests in the forward area forward area was phased to CASI'U commencedwith the establishmentof coincidewith the insnediatroperationalneeds.

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Meanwhile, conetructlon of test facilities progressed substantially as planned. b. By 1 February 1954 all task force elements had arrived in the forward area and preparations usrs begun for the conduct of the flret full scale rehearsal. !Zxtenelve preliminary communications checks wem made and asl 23 February the rehearsal for the first ehot wae eucceesfully carried out. Thle wae the only full scale reheareal conducted. Since all shote were statically detonated and operations were similar, each detonation served as a reheareel for the one to follou. c*‘1 as detonated at 0645 local time on 1 March 1954. Prior to this shot all personnel were evacuated from Blkinl Atoll, except for A xoa.Ll firing party which remained in A bunker on Enyu Ieland, approximately twenty mile0 from zero point. At the time of the detcnation all task force ehlpe in the Bikini area were located southeast of the atoll at least thirty miles from zero point. After the shot it became necessary to close the camps on Bikini Atoll because of the radiological contamination and blast damage. Subsequent operations at Bikini were conducted principally from afloat. d. Because of unfavarable weather conditions at Bikini, it was not untU 27 March tha e detonated. The concept of the shot schedule wae reviewed and revised to indorporate more flexibility. s rescheduled to be fired L At Eniwetok Atoll. On 7 April, was detonated at Bikini, on Kninman On lJ+ May, the Eniwetok weather became favorable anPs detonated. Except for rollup and redeployment, the on-site pbaee wa8 essentWy completed with the last shot. e. As tasks were completed, unite of the task force were redeployed and individuals were returned to parent organisatlone or were reaeelgned. In accordance with preriouely prepared plans, reduced planniq etaffe and certain troop elements were reformed ae componenta of the taek force in order to provlde for

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continuity of operations and for economical, expeditious support of Operation RFWING, scheduled for the Spring of 1956. some concern was voiced as to the possibilitp of causing a dertruetive tsunami (tidal wave) of dangerous proportion8 since the device was positioned on the edge of the reef. This same question arose prior to firing MIKE during Operation ITT. In both cases it was disconcerting to the commander to have this question raised by scientists just prior to shot time. In both cases after study, the task force scientific director assured the commander that under the specific conditions of the particular test involved a tsunami would not occur. This question will continue to arise with certain high yield detonations until suitable tests are conducted to resolve the problem. 17. As in previous operations, weather was a major problem, particularly with regard to winds aloft for fallout considerations. Delays were experienced because of unacceptable fallout patterns. The tests were carried out during a period of the year uhen the weather in the Marshall Islands area uas reasonably favorable; it was not an unusual season from a climatologieal point of view. Future tests must expect similar delays due to weather unless firing techniques such as firing on bages in the open ocean or air drops are developed which will minimize the amount and the activity of fallout e 18, During CASTLE it was more important than on previous tests to make certain that populated islands and transient shipping were not contaminated since the detonation of six weapons and devices were planned with yields expected to be in the megaton range* The lack of fallout information from previous shots of megaton radioactive debris was carried up and diff’used over a much larger area than was thought possible. emonstrated that the origin of the fallout pattern is a large area up to fifty miles in diameter, varying according to the yield. The radioactive intensity of the debris, likewise, varies with the yield.

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which n8csssitat8dthe bvaeuationof groups of Marshall Islands natives end certain US. military personnel. The sxperlsncegained f s valuablein rvaluating radiologicalsafety eonditionson subsequentshots so that no additional significanteontsminatlonof populatedareas occurred. 20. The primary mans of rapidly detemining the relation of forecastto actual particletrajectorynas the use of aerial cloud tracking flights. Infonaation obtained from these flights,combinedvith reports from ground monitoring stations,made possible rapid determinationof fallout patterns after each shot. 21. The planned maximum permissibleexposure (WE) of personnelwas 3.9 roentgens. However, it was anticipatedthat this limit was too low considering the number and expseted fields of the weapons and devices to be tested. Therefore, the provfsfonof waiver of this WE by the task force commanderwas bstablished. The Surgeon9 General of the three militaryServices and the Director, Division of Biology and Medicine,AEC, approvedthe granting of waivers as neesssary, Only in relatively few cases vas it necessary to do so. PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION 22. Af'tsrOperation IVY, tables of personneldistributionuem revised snd new requirembntsset up for CASILEL The Army, Navy and Air Force filled the joint task force requirementfor both officer and enlisted personnel. During the operation additionalpersonnelwere found to be required, These were obtainedon temporaryduty status and sent to the forward area, 23. The decision of the Secretaryof Defense to reduce surplusmilitary manpower in the military Ssmicss during 1953 resultedin the appointmentof a DOD joint manpower survey board under the aonitorshipof G-l, DepaPtmbntof the Army, to study the personnelrequirementsof JTF SEV5Nand to recommendan interim table of distribution. The Commandsr,JTP SEVEN, concurredwith the report of the board and the proposedtab18 of distrfbution,uhichclosely approximatedthe figures previouslyestimatedby CJTF SEVEN, was adopted. 2!+. The official observer program for CASTLE, as approvedby the AEC and DOD, provided for a total of twenty observersfor each detonation. Space allocations were distributedsqually betnen the ARC and DOD. Military Air TransportService (MTS) arranged special adz mieeion flightsin conformitywith the scheduleof

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detcnations. The first group of observersmade the trip to the fornard area, observed-and returned in seven days, As a result of unfavorableueather conditionsthe next two shots were delayed,resultingin many of the most importantobserversbeing forced to return without witnessingdetonations. To precludethese undesirabledelays and to insure a fixed schedulefor future flights,CJTF SEVEN, with the approval of the AEC and DOD, arranged for the cancellationof the four remaining special air mission flights and the substitutionof two observer flightsto depart and return on specifieddates without regard to the and DOD regulationsand directives. Headquarters,JTF SEVEN, publishedsecurity memorandato provide specific instructionsfor the task groups in such matters as couriers, These memoranda were further augmentedby posters displayed in offices and public places, A movie program consistingof securitytalks by senior commanders and securityshorts was presented in conjuntionwith the recreationalmovie b, By decision of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on ll+April 1954, the provisions for CJTF S!3VEN to report to the Commanderin Chief, Pacific (CINCPA~)for movement controland general securitywith respect.to the task foree and Eniwetok tions was closed to all vessels, aireraft end personae1except those participating in the operationand aooess to the area was controlledby the provisionsof CINCPAC letter, Serial 020, dated 1 April 1952. o. Coordinationwas maintainedwith the Federal Bureau of Investigation Office of Naval fntdligence(ONI),U.S. Navy, in sll weas in wfiichelementsof the task force operated, Security aspects for such activitiesas the shipmentof weapons and device componentsto and from the fonrardarea required close

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coordinationwith the above agenrriesau well as military …