Health and Medical History (Hanford Engineer Works) - Introduction

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Hads peculiar t o the processes, itsolation of' the site, aad military secrecy ccabined t o create great demands far adequate health d medical facilities and rervicea a t the Hanford Engineer Uorka, Process h a d 8 of an anusual. nature are tho88 mlatlng t o iaassociated with W o r d operatiom exceed by enommu8 amount8 any tbat hsr been experienced previously, but the nature and dirt rib ation pwsented new problems. I n addition t o beta and gamma radiations previously experienced in relatively small amount8, neutrons are enemtored f o r the first time in enormots concentrations. Hot only does the overall intensity Oi rr dio a at iri ty Information concerning the physiological effects of neutrons and their effect8 on the materials of comt rw tion ma entirely Incomplete eman a t the the that the Word Engineer Uorb wa6 The health and medical problems arising fPoa t h i s intense radioactivity are concerned with predicting, detecting, measuring, and controlling the radiations encountered i n the many process steps and throughout the plant ~ i t eand neighbouring areas; personnel to euch radioactivity; t o which each individual has been subjected; persons who may hare become overexposed inadvertently, the prevention of overexposure of the recording of the degree of expoam and the care and treatment of Frequent physical examinations and permanent records are required t o 888ure adequate knowledge at a l l times of the condition of any persons

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subject t o such exposure. viduals as w e l l as for the protection of the Government in the defense of possible future lamuits . This is demanded for the protection of indiIn addition t o the special hasarda at Word requiring competent health and medical personnel and facilities, the broad scope of the work at Ward introduces almost every other type of industrial had encountmod in any large industrial plant. The extFeme isolation of the Word site dodad that the large nmjority of workers engaged in plant comt rw tion and in plant operatiom be haused in quartere provided at the site. approximately 51,000 persons, comprising workers and BOW families, lived at the Mord Construction Camp in barracks and in trailer camps. peak of operations when manufacturing processes -re being started, more than 15,000 persons resided inthe Richland Village. morale of these persons together with the v i t a l need of keeping the laaxiaum possible number a t work dictated that facilities and services commemurate with the induetrial and living requirement8 be constructed with respect t o pledical, dental, and hospital care sinoe no other facilities were available. A t the peak of construction, The health and Military secrecy decreed that the nature of the attendant b a d s of the Word process group other than those and the Government. be die closed to the public or t o any individual ar under the complete jurisdiction of the Contractor The radioactivity which accompanies the formation of plutonium i n the Word process is so great that the energy of radiation ri th ln each

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manufacturing p i l e is equivalent t o that from about 1700 tons of radium. Thia is more than one million times as much radium as was known t o haw been produced since the discovery of radium radiation demands that each pile be confined behind massive shielding of iron, steel, and special masonite- t o absorb the radiatione for the protection of operating personnel. radiation from em operating pile for evem a few second6 would be fatal. Since the radioactivity cannot be detected by the seme8, injury t o the personnel can be minimized only by elaborate precaution8 lrvcluding s m y a with delicate and ingenious instrument& The pesonee of large amount8 of highly radioactive material represents an ever present h a d t o personnel h surrounding areas should the control of' the prmess f a i l or be This enornou8 amount of Without suah shielding, eapo8u-e t o the The enormow amount of heat generated in each Hanford p i l e is carried away by the large amounts of cooling water which are drawn From the Columbia R i v e r followed by appropriate treatment and conditioning and flow through the piles. The water becomes highly radioactive i n flowing through the piles and is unsafe for inmediate discharge back i n t o the river because of the danger to fish and community water supply. The radioactivity induced in the cooling water, however, decay8 t o safe levels in relatively short periods and adequate time is aseured by retention basins which hold the rater befare discharge t o the river. the radioactivity of the water leaving the p i l e s and leaving the retention basins are continuous prwiding a permanent recard. Once operated, a pile will not become safely inactive until

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have passed even though all of its uranium has been discharged, ?, Radioactivity rill have been induced i n the graphite, aluminum, iron, and steel in the p i l e and ehieldhg. Maintenance work can be perform2 on the pile, ahieldhg, or the connecting piping only aFter careful. BUTvey of the associated radioactivity and with per80nnel performing the work under hiph'ly competent and technical eupemieion, The water flowing through each pile suppresses the reaction through which the plutonium is Illanufactured due t o its inhibiting effect and, consequently, may be pesent in the pile only i n a limited amount in order that the reaction may take place at all. Should the aupply of cool hg water be interrupted for even a very fer ~econds, the inhibiting effect of the water is lost and it is quickly converted t o eteam. the event of failure of automatic aafety devices, the p i l e reaction m y then accelerate itself so rapidly that disaster of catastrophic proportiona may result almost immediately. violence t o break open the pile and scatter its radioactive contents over t h e area surroundhg evacuated of personnel, and casualties would have been caused by flying fragments or by exposure t o radioactivity from the Fragmenta or from the radioactive dust which would be the f a c t o r moat bportant in extending the area affected by the explaeion. The explosion could be of sufficient The pile,in this event, would necessarily be abandoned, The W o r d process for the manufacture of plutonium results In the formation of some Ounces of plutonium intimately Plixed w i t h each ton of uranium and with a total of about 25 fission product elements the total weight of which is substantially the same aa the plutonium. the radioactivity, t h e mixture cannot be touched or closely approached with

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s a f e t y except when eeperated f'rom observers by the equivalent of about 16 feet of water. and must be stored in isolated basins under nater f o r a period of m o m than one month before the radioactivity will have diminished t o the extent that the plutonium recovery may be accaanpliehed behiad massive conorete It must be handled mechanically and by remote control The mixture of plutonium, uranium, and fission products 00x1tinuously releases heat and m u s t be cooled during bandling d atorage in order that it nay not melt and burn t o radioactive rnoke, it must ba tranapceted i n adequately shielded and cooled apparatus t o the separations plants. I n these plant8 the plutonium is reoovered &on the uranium and firrsion produota and purified by chemical mans wing diarolving, precipitating, separating, a& filtering equipnent which is operated w e e n and by remote oontrol fiom behind the massive comrete shielding designed t o afford personnel with adequate protection. When the ntiaure of plutonium, uranium, and fission prodwte i6 dissolved at the beginning of recovery operations, radioactive gases are separations plants with sufficient dilution with atmospheric air so that radioactivity f'rom it may not injw operating personnel dua t o insuffi oie nt distance from the point of diecharge t o the ground or by being carried back t o ground level in harmful concentration by air currents. Badloactive xenon, the principal radioactive gas 80 evolved, is 80 tacit that one cubic foot of it must be diluted in a cube of air two miles on each edge before it can be breathed safely; These gases must be vented t o the atmosphere well above the i n round numbers, this is one

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trillion cubic feet of air for each cubic foot of xenon. tions must be limited t o relatively smallbatchee t o avoid heat and explosion hazards from the plutonium. The plutonium emits alpha radiation and the inhalation or ingestion of minute quantities of' plutonium containing materials f'rom any stage of the recovery process constitutes a parPurification of plutonium mrret be asrried a t least t o the extent that radioactivity is reduced t o proportions requiring only n o m precautiom in whg and shipping. , Purification t o this degree mqulms removal of radioactive impurities so that the f i n a l product contain8 only one tend lli on th aa much radioactivity aa the mixture of plutonim, uranium, and fiseion products entering the recovery process af'ter the period of deoay starage. A l l waste solutions resulting from the recovary process aontain uranium or radioactive by-products m both, These wastes a r e corrosive, evolve heat over long periods and, because of t h e i r radioactivity may not be discharged either into the river or the ground, uranium t o the Gmernment and the potential value of the fission products demand that they be stored indefinitely u n t i l such time a8 a pmgram of recovery of such materials#haabsen initiated. are provided in each separations plant adequate t o accommodate the requirements for about one year of full scale operations, The valus of the The precautions taken t o cope with perils such as the explosion or burning of a pile, the burning of uranium during transport or etorage, and the radiation within piles, recovery Units, and storage facilities

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complicated and delayed design, construction, and operation, and greatly the procesaes presented the possibility of unforeseen hazards. fore, it was necessary to limit the effect of possible disasters by locating the plant on a vezy large, isolated site; t o spread the plant units widely ov8r that s i t e adversely affecting design d conetruction t i o n of the site made it difficult t o prooure and hold a sufficient fop'ce of trustworthy and capable persons. large amounts of electric puwer and coal and wry large amounts of pure No precautions could have guaranteed safety because Operation of the plant require8 a moderately large force of operators; a lare number of superpisorg personnel i.lrcluaing an M u 8 d Froportion of technically trained men; and continual medical watch over personnel exposed t o radioThe conduct and control of the transmutation and recovery processes; the de tem bati on of radiation levelr In and araaad aY operating equipnent throughout the plant site and sdjolning area far protection of operating personnel and inhabitants of a considerable adjoining area cumbined t o demand large numbers of electronic and other inetruwnta of diverse types and 8ensitivitie8. of nece ~ sit yduring the course of the work. instruments and the traf.niHn, of personnel competent t o use and t o mintain them were major requirements in m e t i n g SuaCOSSfUlly the problem of plant operation and safeguarding of the health of personnel. ldany of these iriE3trumentS mre developed The proourelaent of these The health and medical facilities and services described i n the remainder of this history illustrate the su ccea ~which this part of the work has attained.