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Declassified record · U.S. Department of Energy

Tumbler-Snapper Information Plan

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Book
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7 pages
Open the original scanArchive record OSTI ID 16126004 · public domain

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Machine-read from the scan, so expect some errors. Lines that couldn’t be read are left out.

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Albuquerque, Sen Mxico To establish the broad principles, procedures, limitations, and summarized field pl.an constituting the Test Planagerv s Information Directive governing the Tuiibler-Snapper joint agency information activity. The test program as now planned 2resents no foreseeable situations - - from the viewpoint of test operations--which have not pre-Tiously been experienced and handled satisfactorily, in the public information field do, however, require new approaches, which are provided in this plm. New and sensitive areas The primary objective of the test information activity is to help the test organization-including participating agencies--with regard t o the major operating considerations of public safety, 02 physical and information security, and of human relationships,primarily in the Site region but t o soue extent in more distant areas. isto remove the ~ 0 ~ 3i bil it yof unreasoning public reaction from operations deterininations, and t o permit continued use of a continental Each participating agency, including the Commission, has a direct interest in release of other info mi ation for such purposes as: Public ac cow tz bil it y ; - recognition of achievement by the participant, its csn tractors, and its units or individuals ; training,etc. These interests have been recognized only partially inactivity at previous The Nevada and West Coast press represented at Las Vegas during test3, including Site region weeklies, consti.tutes a primary communicatj.ons channel between test management and the public immediately interested in tests. The full cooperation of these media is required. The Test to satisfy to the extent possible legitimate national public interest as expressed through public media. deports through media will to a major extent affect the public ra interpretation of the Commission*s performance of its weapons mission, A good working relationship is essential. The press holds the hn mission responsible for information and security policies and for service provided by all test proposed limited on-Site press observation and actions to "improve before the Commission as a partial solution. cies,attitudes, and procedures of the major participants--&C and Armed Forces. The Duster-Jangle solution looked good on paper but didn vt succeed. The West Coast press, proposal (copy available in Division of Information Services) mentioned divergences i n AEC and DeptAr approaches.and suggested a more unified approach with a single responsible information organization, t o answer this to the advantage of all agencies concerned. --____ The continuing goal As a result of Buster-Juigle observation the press has A plan for press observation is now Proposals now made are intended

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7 . Primary Responsibility and a Unified Activity: a. Last January the CG, Armed Forces Special bveapons Project, met with the Nanager, SFO, to discuss Tumbler-Snapper responsibilities. Inthe fSSlP-prepared agenda it was noted: "7. Public Informati-on is primarily a fu c tion of the part ici2ating D3D personnel without the concurrence of the Test Commander or his duly appointed represent a - Public releases will not be made by b. SFO presented the following proposal,basing it on developin;: pJ.ans fora more uni fi od AEC-DOD continental test activity and on requirements made obvious for information during Buster-Jangle: IfIncorporation of the following into agreements, plans and a at hori zat ions.,.is strongly recomicnded. (1) "The Commissioiiqs Test Commander has full resp on si - bil it y for pi anning and conducting the field inforiiiation operation including final determination of there leas ability of information related to utilization of Nevada Test Site. t ation with participating agencies and will be fully coosd in a ted before its activation, s in z le poverning policy,a unified operation,a fully - int,egrated or ka niz ation, and an activity broad enough t o match the policy and operating obj cc t ives of the joint test orz miz ation. rhe plan will reflect the policies,objectives, requirements, and procedures of participating a zen cie s, and will include provisions for such agencies ' continuing re pre - sent ation in information decisions or actions at staff and at operating office levels, plan in consultation with the primary participants...,in - clu ding AVSW and SIJC. nate d in Idashington with the Commission, the Department of Defense, and other interested agencies. pat in b military agencies will assign qualified Information Officers for duty with the information organization, and will make available additional resources as required,in clu dj ng photographers, transportation, and security advice. The Commission and its contractors will supply infomation and security personnel and other ser vj ces .fl ffThe field In for nation Plan will be drawn i n consulIt will provide fora "The Test Information Director will draw a preliminary The prcli,d nary plan will be coordiC. AFS.JP subsequently noted i n minutes of agreements reached: 1'9, Public Information. This item is also primarily a function of the Test Commander, I n view of the DO DPs desire t o remain as nearly anonymous as possible on this subject, it i s proposed that all public relations matter be handled at the site through the proper representative of the NE. Such arrangements would not apply to non-technical part ic ipa - tion such as Operation desert 'iock. character of such participation separate public information arrangements for each test would appear necessary.ft The AFSW notation is interpreted locally by AFSJP Test command officers,with regard to the information office activity as meaning that military personnel will not be assigned and will not participate directly in the information activity(i.e,,this is fully an AEC matter), and with regard to Desert Rock that separate arrangements must be worked out at the Washinzton level, Eecause of the varied

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contacted here recognize that military participants and military s9r vices represented by MSWP have sizable bulk in activities affecting iriformatinn and that an officer could well be assigned to the in for nation activity to represent the Armed Forces and t o participate in the total activity. There are daily questions of accidents to military personnel, aircraft, names and handling understanding with DOD and/or DeptAr i s urgeiit1.y suggested t o avoid situations which developed last September essentially as a result of delayed coordination and agreement. There i s apparent no real reason for special, new arrangenicnts concerning Desert simply bring the Aruied Forces into a Join tTc st setup as part ici - pants sharing the same policy, procedures, staff, and operating responsibility to make the activity work successfully. px mc sed subsequently, during the period of any Desert Rock rrnneu-Jer the Army Commander would be adequately represented at tlie policy and at thc action Levels. Joint Test Organization information policies and procedures, and particularly the assignment by Amy of an officer who i s not only fully qualified but whc is fully - authorized by delegation of aut Lori ty to represent it are the requirements basic to Army assurance that its information goals will be met, A new Desert Rock i s noli projected and an early The unified activity proposed i n January t o ARSWP will Full Arny understanding of 8 . Information Attitudes Required: a,, It i s accepted that the past year ts developments have dissipated the aura of ’‘secrecy i n tlie national interest ” which the press itself erected as a shield around atomic weapons programs and which act cd to restrain the persistence and prying which are normal to the press. !fit11 specific re card to conti ii en tal tests,the press of fi cid reaction,that much of the work even in technical areas i s done by uncleared persons, that there is a large volunie of information which can be made Icnown t o them without in f ring in a, on or too ht a in unofficially much administrative and technical in for - mation--not made known officially. opinion that data basic to accurate predictions refused to those covering tests,will becoineknoim throuqh New York and Vashington colwnning and rc porting. and partially by observation th cy moved during Buster Operation t o criticism of test information and security policies, and particularly criticized the policy of encouraging un-informed speculation which results in confusing the American public. observe tests from on-Site and t o accompany troops ; it has aslied for backqroiind briefings leading to informed speculation, Unexpressed but the press,actual,final goal is to be told why, what, and whithcr concerning general weapons and developrr.ent goals. The press q interest can never be fully satisfied. the public--which the press represents-woitld not approve any considerable release of weapons informatioil. compromise than the past formal policy of releasing the absolute mini i mim of test information-whether sensitive or fully in the open --is possible and i s indicatell. (Throughoiit this paper, reference isto any and all test information, administrative, cm i struct ion, radiation,etc. If technical weapons in for nation,or sensitive - area but declassified information is intended, it is specified). It i s now accepted that the press can view selected continental tests from on-Site and report without censorship and not endanger security any mcre than it i s endangered by off - Site observation. probably acceptable to the press, can be made for keeping some tests clos cd,particularly if official observers and troops are not involved i n tlie same tests. admit press to selected shots. They have also found ways t o observe for thcrnselves They have expressed their and eva lu at i as, Partially by intuition The press has asked t o It i s probable that Cut, a more satisfactory The Conqission i s now considering a plan to If the press is admitted once, it

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must be accepted that 'ihe press will not quiet1.y go along with a policy of not permitting them o n - site for a majority of subsequent curiosity ;nd satisfy the press that week; it will not cf itself Stop press criticism of information and security poli cim. The field solution is t:, adrrit the press in 'very limited numbers to selected additional shots. Also projected are: )!ore adequate briefings, include official release of material wit!iheld easily available to the press unofficially, such as post-fact con fir nation of Shct delivery or placeirent and of general firing area, the presecce of ai.rcra.Ft, VIPs, etc,,aid items normal t o teots which were discussed fully at Bikini but have been avoided by field iiEC information. carefully phmsj.ng w.d limiting a subjpict, is better protection for sec ii rit y than t o pernut unlimited, unofficial rcp or tiu g. with more adequate briefing in the reasons for ;rrllthholding other information--to satisfy the press v lez it iiii ate desires, and sinnltanooiisly to help attain domndssion, DOD, and test organization The Las VeKa.s Information O f f i c e will be opened about one week before April. 1. The wcrking press corps i & l l be i n Las Vegas by the time of Able shot arid for each detonation thereafter. It i s projected that principles and activities reoommendecl will be initiated with the start of the seri.es--not, of course, including press on-Site cbs cr v ation in advance of the project now baing In other words, a one-shot observation will answer some in the past but It i s bel.i.eved that an official.release, 9. Admission to Site of Large Group of Unclsared Observers. a. The princip1.e ~a i d procedures recommended here as applicable to all of Turn\]-er-Snapper apply equally to tile special project being considered for admission of Civil Defense, press, and public offic i al observers to the third or fourth shot,either to observe from an area near the Control Pc into r an area nearer to the troop maneuver. This will be handled as a special project within the information plan for the series, and will require n!ore extensive and intensive this project has been distributed within &:he AEC and to military field units in New Mexico. a. Delegation of full responsibility and full authority for conducting the continental test information activity during the operational period tothe Conunissionqs Test Plauager under the following limit a - (1) Operating within the policy and procedural framework here es tabl idled,including the concey?t of a single information and information release policy xi pli cable to all and of the Armed Forces participating fully in an integrated organization. Providing that participants be represented i n information dec is ions and actions at the s tz ff and at the operating levels. Performing final determination of there leas ability of all information related to util iz atl bn of Nevada Proving Grounds.

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(4) I(eepj.ng the Conuni.ssion and participating agencies informed of illformation activity ; tothe Ccmnlission through Oi vision of lli lita ry ApplicatLon, and to other agencies through their Joint Test Staff representatives. Seeking prior concurrence in the event of any major deviation from t h e approved Plan, Rctiq on his own judgment with the advice of the Joint Test Staff in the event of operational emergencj,es which do not perttiit advnnco conccrrence, informing the Goo:Nnission and other agencies as soon as possible, (1) The test organization will ~ on d ric ta l l phases of activity in the general iievada Proving rounds reZion, including radiation - related phases up t o 200 miles dh tnn t, perfocning the activity through a Joint Test Inforn?ation Office in Las Vegas, Operating resp on sibi l.it y will be delegated to the Director of ATest Information Coard icLll ' advise the Test Manager 011 major questions of in fc rm ation policy and will on occasion evaluate and review the j.riformation activity for him. )Ii lita ry Participation and Supyor t ; the Deputy for Scientific Rock (dur iq the Je sert Rock operational period) ; and the Tes tIn formatian Director. D3D will assign for duty with .the Joint Test Information 0E.Cice i n Las Vcgas ;I fully - q iial if i ed officer with authority t o act for the Armed F'orCes o!i information niatters. He will serve as Deputy t o thc Test Inforination Director. Army will assign €01. duty with the Las Vegns office an officer of siliiilzr qual.i.fications and 1.ike authority to serve during the desert lioclc ;>eriad as Assistant to the Director. will have full or eilicrgericp Q clearances. The Air Force will Force Base t o conduct related information activity there, and a Special Iireapons Conunand appointee is sugges'ted. probably will require an in for nation office at Desert Itoclc for preparation of materials, Ifliile aircraft accidents within the Site region will. be announced o r confirmed in general ternis by the test organization, the information responsibility will be shifted immediately t o the Special Iv'eapons Conunand and lis Air Force installations. New Pork Operations Office will conduct a distant fallon t inPormation program generally confoming with the Duster- Jangle activity and working in close coord in at i ot ~with the test in - The Test Flaiager*s Classification Advisor wills ene additionally as classification and de classification assistant in the Joint Test Information Office. within the framework riortnally established by AEC Office of b e deterinincd by joint action with military representatives and units …

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