Operation Castle, Final Report, Task Group 7.4, July 1953 - June 1954

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At the outset of the ~1annhz stage of this office to the effect that all units and activities of Air Task Group 7.4 would cooperate in the preparation of a detailed narrative history of Air Task Group participation. Accordingly, a series of month by month accounts of the procedures and the reasoning leading to their adoption, the problems and solutions and the operational concepts of this organization was prepared. The narrative for each month is fully supported by appropriate documents containing background material or describing factors behind policy determinations and by photographs depicting all important stages of each of the numerous functions pursued by the Air Task Group. In view of the exjstence of this voluminous accumulation of facts, it was decided that this Final Report should not be a historical resume but rather should center upon a discussion of areas in which, in later tests, improvement could be effected in the Air Task. Group operation or in which increases could be realized in the value of resultant test information made available to the United States Air Force. Rrorn the discussion of these topics should stem conclusions and recommendations for action by various agencies concerned with support or direction of future Air Task Group formation, training and execution. The reader may assume that any facet of the operation not specifically mentioned in this Final Report proved eminently satisfactory during CASTLZ and therefore issr=ded for use in dmiliar future nuConsequently, those interested in the details of the operation, in the methods and proations involved in the making of various decisions, or in statistical information, beyond that contained in the Chart Section included herein, must refer to the History of Air Task Group 7.4 rather than to this Final Re#ort It is not intended that the discussions in thii Final Report be construed as criticism of any agency directly involved in or supporting CASTLEL The magnificent support rendered to Air Task Group 7.4 by every agency contacted and the superb cooperation of evtion are fully appreciated and acknowledged as prime determinants in the successful accomplishment of the assigned mission by the Air Task Group. Nonetheless,..where, in the opinion of this Headquarters, room for improvement ap peared, the facts have been stated bluntly in the sin@~ hope that the guidance thus positively offered will assist planners and executors toward greater efficiency, economy and mission success in Air Fort! participation in nutdear tests to come.

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Security Classification Statement __.___.__._____.........._.._.._..__.__..._________..._._.._.___.____._.._.~._...._..._....... i Mission and Organization __________________.._._._..___..__._.__.________.____..__..._..____.__.._.____________._.___.__._________. 1 Assignment of and Organization for Overseas Test Responsibilities __,.__._____.__._._____ Effects Aircraft Mission ._______.____.___.__________.____.__.___..___.________.._.______.__________________._.._____ 13 The Air Conlrol Sfltem _______._____.________.______________._..._.________.._____________ Search and Rescue ___________._________________..~____________~____.___________.__._.____ Establishment and Support of the Weather Islands _.......~.._......._~__.___.__.__~___._.______ Personnel Manning and Augmentation ________.______.____..___..____________________.._______._.._.__.__ Assignment of and Organization for Overseas Test Responsibiities __,._ ________________ Effects Aircraft Mission _____________._________________.____._______________-_____-____-~_______-______ Search and Rescue ______________________________._________________~___._.___________-___ Establishment and Support of the Weather IsIands ________________________-________-_____ Manning and Augmentation ______________________-_-__________-_______._______

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Shipment to Forward Area, Water ________..._________._._.__.._.______._.__.___.____._.__....____ Shipment to Forward Area, Air ._..___.__.._..______.._..._.._.___...__._________.__...___.._______.. Excess Supplies; Shipped by Air and Water to 2X ._._____.___.__.____.__._________.......__. Consumption of Fuel ..___._._____._.__...__..._._._._...__._..__._...__________._____.______________.__.____ Consumption of Gil _._____.______.__.._____.______._.._.._.._.___...._.._._._._...___.______._____._Aircraft in vs out of Commission (Test Services Unit) _...__________._____..________. Aircraft in vs out of Co mmission (Test Aircmft Unit) _._._____.______.___.____.___.. Aircraft in vs out of Commission (Test Support Unit) _........~........._...._.___. qrcraft in vs out of Commission (Test Support Unit) __._..__.________..______..-__.__ Air Force Cost _.__.__..._._____._.____.___..._..._._................__..__._______.._____.___..._..__._._..~......_101

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--- Operation CASTILE was the Department deflections on various portions of the air- (AEC) program for the conduct of six nuclear test detonations at the Pacific Proving Ground in the spring alf 1954. Responsibility for the execution of this complex scientific test program was centered in Joint Task Force SEXEN, which contained five task groups consisting of Scientific, Army, Navy, Air Force and AEZ l?acilities elements. The United States Air Force contributed the vital air capability which, in combination with the many special diversified functions and skips furnished by the other task participants, achieved notable success in completing a project of the utmost importance to this Air Task Group 7.4 Provisional, was established as the Air Force component of Joint Task Force SEVEN to provide air support for Operation CASTLES From this broad concept of the air objective, the mission of the Air Task Group was evolved as a fourfold task consisting ojf three primary aerial functions and one maj,or integrating support function, as follows: 2. Nuclear test effects. 3. Nuclear test technical and documen4. Specialized support activities and facilities required for successful achievement of the primary aerial objectives. Nuclear test sampling was the task of locating and obtaining, for radiochemical analysis, the best possible representative samp les of radioactive particles available throughout the nuclear cloud which ensued from each detonation. For this purpose, I.5 F-34G fighter-type samplers and two featherweight in conjunction with an RB-36 ah-craft from which a scientific team exercised control and direction of the sampling operation. The nuclear test effects program was conducted to determine the relative safety with which current operational types of delivery aircraft could withstand hazards associated with detonations of weapons in the range of multi-megaton yield. A B-36D and B-47 aircraft were used for this purpose. These aircraft were :positioned in space at points for which the anticipated levels of sure and the related gusts previously had been calculated. Special instrumentation on the aircraft measured the actual input levels and recorded the resultant skin temperature rises, together with structural stresses and Nuclear test photography preserved on still and motion picture fib the seouence of important eventi as they took place on Op _ eration CASTLE. This same means was employed to record essential scientific and technical data to be used in the post-mission analysis of phenomena associated with each test ‘formed the primary mission of documentary and nuclear cloud growth and measurement photography. The FLB-36 sampler control aircraft assisted in the documentary portion of the filmlng task. Strategic Air Command B-50 aircraft, after completing their indirect bomb damage assessment mission, took pictures of the crater created by the nuclear detonation on selected occasions Successful achievement of the primary aerial objectives depended upon some cohesive force to weld the many facets of the air mission into a single, concerted effort.rThis integrating element was furnished by an extensive system of support activities, services and facilities, to which every echelon contributed in accordance with the special capabiities which its task components were selected to provide. The support system included logistics for ground and air operations; communications; flight safety; maintenance control; radiological safety; personnel and aircraft decontamination; personnel dosimetry and ground and auborne radiation instrumentation; air base operations and airlift support; indirect bomb damage asseq;ment; search and rescue; and weather reporting, weather reconmussance and weather forecasting sex-vices, Air Task Group 7.4 consisted of a Test Aircraft, a Test Services and a Test Support Unit, under supervision and direction of the Commander, Air Task Group 7.4, who was assigned from the Strategic Air Command by Command of the Test .Aircraft Unit was exercised by the Commander of the 4926th Test Squadron (Sampling) of the Air Force search and Development Command. The 4926th personnel supervised the xadiological safety, decontamination, and the dosimetxy and radiation instrumentation tasks, in addition to furnishing the 15 F-84 aircraft for cloud sampling. The Strategic Air Command control aircraft, the two featherweight EL 36H sampling aircraft and the three B-50

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indirect bomb damage assessment aircraft. A SAC crew flew the B-36D effects aircraft ’ The Test Support Unit was manned, which was assigned to the Wright Air De- equipped and commanded by AFSWC. Its primary areas of responsibility included the on ENIWEIOK and BIKINI ISLANDS: ad-the B-47 effects &craft- and its crew. The control RB-36 was utilized by a scientific and control team consisting of a representative from the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, the Director of Operations! Headquarters, Air Task Group 7.4, the Chief, Human Factors Division, Headquarters, AFSWC, and a Senior Airborne Controller from the Test ministrative and proficiency flying for all’rated personnel of Joint Task Force SEVEN and airlift, employing four C-47, ten lL13, seven the airborne relay of VHF communications between the BIKINI operational area and the The Test Services Unit was comma&d by an Air Force officer .of the Military Air formed the primary air photographic mission; conducted weather and typhoon reconnaissance and post-mission nuclear cloud craft; established, operated and maintained four weather reporting stations on outlying islands in the Pacific area; manned and operated the Joint Task Force Weather Centrai; provided airways and air communications services, including point-to-point and air-ground communications and navigational aid facilities; furnished search and rescue facilities, consisting of three SA-16 aircraft and personnel; and operated air terminal facilities for normal MATS transport operations on ENIWEXOK ISLAND. Personnel and equipment of the Test Services Unit were supplled by MATS, except forthe 1110th Air mand,, U. S. Air Force, which was attached to the unit.for certain logistical support. In addition to its normal staff functions, Headquarters Task Group 7.4 provided supervisory personnel for the ENIWEXOK AOC which was manned by personnel from the Air Defense Command and the Air Traiiing Command; a senior air controller who supervised the operation of back-up control facilities aboard a Navy control destroyer during actual missions; and senior air controllers to supervise and control all air operations in the target area from the Combat Information Center (CIC) aboard the Command Ship, . the USS ESTES. Staff members of the headquarters directed the operation of the Task Group aircraft maintenance control system and the flying safety program for CASTLE. During each test detonation, the Commander, Task Group 7.4, personally directed the operation of all aircraft in the target area by means of radar and air-ground communication facilities in the Combat ‘Information Center aboard the USS ESI’ES.

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BRIGADIER GENERAL HOWELL M. ESTES, JR., USAF, COMMANDER COLONEL EARL W. KESLING, USAF, DEPUTY COMMANbER COLONEL HERSCHEL D. MAHON, USAF, CHIEF OF STAFF COLONEL PAUL H. FACKLER, USAF, OPERATIONS COLONEL RAY M. HAWLEY, USAF, MATERIEL LT COLONEL BIRDENE E. FORREST, USAF, PERSONNEL LT COLONEL WILLIAM R. HANNA, USAF, SECURITY MAJOR HAROLD R. MEADOWS, USAF, CQMPTROLLER COLONEL JAMES F. STARKLEY, USAF, TEST SUPPORT UNIT LT COLONEL JAMES A. WATKINS, USAF, TEST AIRCRAFT UNIT LT COLONEL MAHLON B. HAMMOND, USAF, TEST SERVICES UNIT

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ASSIGNMENT OF AND ORGANIZATION For each of the overseas nucIear tests prior to Operation IVY, the Air Task Group was formed by selecting personnel and orI ganizations from various commands throughout the Air Force. The Headquarters of the Air Task Group, after activation, operated to all intents and purposes directly from Headquarters, USAF’. In Operation IVY, this procedure was modified to some extent in that the Air Force S:pecial Weapons Command was given certain responsibilities in assiding in the formation of the Headquarters of the Air Task Group and in providing necessary support to the Headquarters after activation. Essentially, however, the Air Task Group Headquarters in IVY was required to obtain the majority of its major decisions regardiig logistical support, Air Task Group manning and strength from Headquarters, Since no firm program of future overseas nuclear tests had been announced, the numerous major disadvantages resulting from thus forming the organization which would fulfii USAF rel;ponsibilities in nuclear tests were accepted as unavoidable; Briefly these disadvantages may be stated as fol1. No continuity existed from test to test. 2. No agency wias responsible for planning for more economical and more efficient Air Task Group operations in succeeding tests.3. Arrangements for logistical support had to be made through other than established command channelk, thus creating arguments concerning supply priorities, supply requirements and supply transport. 4. The Headquarters of the Air Task Group, being -activated only shortly before the operational period, had relatively little opportunity to become thoroughly acquainted with the scope and details of the various problems faced and, consequently, planning for the operation could not be expected to be realistically based on the true operational requirements nor could thii planning be anticipated to produce abptimumresults in terms of efficiency and economy. 5. Preparation for each test required a certain degree of disruption in every major air command in order to obtain capable personnel for the Headquarters and for the various units. Consequently the mission of each major command suffered to some extent to provide the resources necessary to carry out Air Force responsibihties in the test The Air Task Group <Commander for Operation CASTLE was appointed in October 1952 on the assumption that the operational period of CASTLE would occur in the spring or fall of 1953. The Commander participated in Operation IVY as an observer and discussed at length with the Commander of Air Task Group 132.4 the above major deficiencies as well as many of a minor nature. It is important to note that by ,this time an announcement had been made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff that overseas nuclear tests would continue in the future for at least the next five years and that in order to provide for continuous planning for these tests, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had established the Headquarters of the Joint Task Force as a permanent organization. In view of thismew concept concerning overseas testing, the Air Task Group Commander designee discussed the disadvantages mentioned above with the Commander, Air Force !Qecial Weapons Center; the Vice Commander, Strategic Air Command; the Director and Chief of the Test Division, Los Alamos Scientific Laboratories; the Commander, .Joint Task Force 132 and members of the Atomic Energy Commission. As a result of these discussions, the Commander designee decided to recommend to Headquarters, USAF that the responsibility for forming and trainiig the entire Air Task Group for Operation CASTLEI should be placed under a major- air command with other major air commands providing support as required. In order to convert this decision into action the Commander designee prepared a proposed electrical message to be transmitted by Headquarters, USAF to all major air commands announcing thii policy and the major details under which it would be effected. This message was hand carried by the Commander designee through the headquarters of each major air command and that of the Joint Task Force for coordination and then to Headquarters, USAF for approval and publication. This message was issued in December 1952, placing these responsibilities under Headquarters, Air Research and Development Command. Headquarters. Air Research and Development Command subseFGns$sAes to the Air Force Special WeapDuring this same period other Air Force

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agencies had acted upon the announcement of the Joint Chiefs of Staff mentioned above. Headquarters, Air Force Special Weapons Tliii squadron was activated in early 1953. It is to be seen, therefore, that the history of Air Force participation in overseas nuclear testing has undergone a slow but sure evolubon toward some tvoe of wrmanent un- __tiding a manned nuclear cloud sampling effort in continental aa well as overseas tests. it to discharge Air Fort% responsibilities for NUCLEAR TEST ORGANIZATION The air operations of the Air Task Group in nuclear tests are not similar to any normal Air Force operations. Regardless of any simplified statement of the mission, the actual task is to obtain, through airborne effort, within the maximum performance charmum quantity and …