Note by the Secretary, Subject: Use of the Nevada Proving Grounds (Encl; Report to General Manager, re Same)

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ATOMIC ENERGY CCMKSSION USE OF THE NEVADA PROVING GROUNDS IL Xote by the Secretary The General Manager has requested by the Director of Military Application sideration by the Commission during tine be circulated for cmweek of June 28. DISTRIHJTION NO.COPY CONFJRMED TO BE UNCUSSIFIED BY AUTHORITY OF Military Application osures

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This document_. conslsta of 10 pages Copy No, .'-" of 22 Series A ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION USE OF THE NEVADA PROVING GROUNDS = Report to the GeneralManager by the 1. To consider continueduse of the Nevada Proving GrcuxIs for atomic testing activitiesin the light of comments from the GeneralAdvisory Committeeand the Advisory Committee on Biology 2. The operatingcriteriafor the Nevada Proving Grounds consideredby the Commission‘atMeeting 962 on February 17, 1954 (AEC 141/22), has been revised in light of comments from the GeneralAdvisory Committeeand the Advisory Committee on Biolcg-: and Medicine. The recommendedcriteriaare similar to those previouslyccnsideredin AEC 141/22 except that the new criteria (1) include a statementto the effect that prior to detonatinga 50 KT weapon ?rom a 500 foot tower the safety factor calculated for such a shot should be confirmedby detonatinga shot& lesser magnitude from.a 500 foot tower, (2) exclude the statement that the number of apparentlymarginal shots per year should be limited to a minimum, and (3) do not place any arbitrary limit to the number of shots that may be fired in a given year. ’ 3. The Division of Biology and Medicine and the Division of Information Services concur in the recomendation 6f this paper

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4. The General Manager recommendsthat the Atomic Energy b. Vote comments of the Advisory Committee on Biology C. Approve the continueduse of the Nevada Proving Grounds for atomic test activities,subject to ccnduct of test activities in accordancewith the criteria set forth in parawaph 6 of Appendix "A"; > d. Note that the Joint Committeeon Atomic Energy and the Military Liaison Committeewill be notified of this action by appropriateletter. LIST OF ENCLOSURES Background and Discussion

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BACKBOUND AND DISCUSSION 1, At Keeting 962 on February 17, 1954, the sldered “The Report of the Committee to Study the Grounds” and (a) approved planning and general test preparations for conduct of tests at the Nevada Proving Grounds in 1954-1955, (b) approved release of $460,000 for capital constructton items, and (c) requested that the General Advisory Committee and the Advisory Committee on Biology and Medicine be asked to report their views on the proposed policy for the use of the Nevada Proving Grounds as set forth in AEC 141/22, Specific approval for continued use of the Nevada Proving Grounds was withheld ‘pending consideration of the General Advisory Committee and the Advisory Committee on Biology and Medicine comments. Based on the Commissicz~ request, the Advisory Committee on Biology anal Medicine met cn March 13, 1954 and the General Advisory Committee met on April 1, 1954 to consider this matter. 2. The vie7rpoints of the Advisory Committee on Biology and IJedicine are contained in their letter dated Karch 25, 1954 (Appendix “C”). Those of the General Advisory Committee are . contained in letter dated April 9, 1954 (Appendix “B”). Ejriefly .stated both committees recognized the paramount importance of the continued use of the Nevada Provtig Grounds and ameed, except for minor excsptions, with the operrtq-ng criteria enumerated In paragraph 4 of AEC 141/22, previously considered by the Commission. The General Advisory Committee strongly endorsed the recommendatioDa of AEC 141/22 and went beyond those recommendations in regard to the number of shots to be fired at the Nevada Proving Grounds in any given yeer. They recommended that the number of shots be

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limited only by requirements as determined by the laboratories and the Division of Military Application. The Advisory Committee _f on Biology and Medicine felt that the number of shots should be f -: limited to ten per year with no more than three high yield detona- . tions Included in that number, : 3. In agreement with the General Advisory Committee, the Advisory Committee on Biology and Medicine stressed the necessity for measures to minimize, on a local and on a national scale, the risks involved in testing at the Nevada Proving Grounds. The Advisory Committee on Biology and Medicine also recommended thst prior to detonation of a 50 KT weapon the safety factor calculated for detonations of 50 KT weapons from 500 foot towers should be verified by detonation of a smaller yield weapon from that height. 4. The Advisory Committee on Biology and Medicine recommended deletion as meaningless the criterion of subparagraph 4.(f) cf AEC 141122, namely, “The number of apparently marginal shots in any year should be limited to a minimum.” The Advisory Cor;mittee on Biology and Medicine recommendation has been incorporated in Paragraph 6, Appendix “A” of this paper since the ,sense of the deleted statement is contained in other criteria particularly 5. In view of the importance of the neapons development program to the naticnal defense it is considered that the r:eapons test progrem should be meintained as flexible as possible to assure accomplishment of military requirements. It would be unwise, therefore, to place an arbitrary limitation on the number of shots to be fired in a given period at the Nevada Proving Grounds. However, the Importance of evaluating each shot and ascertaining that acceptable weather conditions exist prio_S__to detonation cannot be over-emphasized.

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6. Based on the comments received from the General Advisory Prior to detonating a 50 KT weapon from a 500 foot safety factor calculated for such a shottower the confirmed by detonating a shot of lesser from a 500 foot tower. Committee and those from the Advisory Committee on Biology and 5 Medicine the original operating criteria submitted by the Committee ' 'to Study the Nevada Proving Grounds have been revised slightly a. The number of nuclear shots at the Nevada Proving Grounds in one year should be determined by laboratory requirements as reviewed by the Division of Military Application in the light of other pertinent consideraticns and approved by the Commission. b. Each nuclear shot programmed whether AEC, military or civil defense should be justified individually and the number involved should be held to the minimum ccnsistent with technical requirements. c. Each potentially hazardous shot should be separately identified and justification for such a shot ehor5l.dinclude plans for controlling or reducing fall-out from it, d. Shots should be scheduled with more elasticity, so that non-critical shots may be fired when conditions are not right for more critical or marginal shots. Such elasticity will benefit from addition-of new firing areas. factory weather conditions that have a high degree of predictable stability. ’ The possibility of continuing postponements and of resulting extension of series duration should be accepted. Participating organizations and units should be advised that they must accept the possibility of postponements on such shots. f, Any air drop of more than 1 KT projected yield should be shceduled only after thorough evaluation of the reliebility of its fuzing system, g. Shots should be limited as follows with regard to yield and burst altitude, with maximum yield to incorporate a reascnsble allowance for error: Surface and subsurface, 1 KT Air drop, 83 KT (Fireball not to touch

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GENERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE This letter is the’first section of the usual report of tF,e Chairman of the General Advisory Committee to the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission which follows a meeting of the GAC. This letter covers the discussion of the GAC at its meetings on March 31, April 1 and 2, 1954, of the staff papers and recommendaticns with'respect to the Nevada Proving Grounds (AEC 141/22 and 141/23; Report of the Committee to Study the NPG, dated Feb. 1, 1 s54; Report of the Advisory Committee for Biology and Medicine,, The General Advisory Committee has already made its viexs Cn the subject of weapon testing known to the AEC in the repcrt of the Chairmar, of the GAC dated February 10, 1953. The relevant paragraph reads as follows: “The level of effort in test programs has been increased greatly in recent years; this has undoubtedly been a very simificant factor in the weapon progress which has been achieved. We feel that the test programs are technically very desirable and are extremely useful in the Com?ission’s program of weapon develcpment. There are indications that, even in its present advanced status, our actual test capability may not be adequate for 211 of the experiments which it would be valuable to carry out; and, hence, we have considered whether this capability should be increased. Since the results of the test programs 2re certain to affect the optimux composition of the stockpile with respect to xeapcn types, and since the information will be most useful before tion becomes an unmanageable task, vie 2re led to favor an Increase in the weapon testing capabilities in the near The GAC wishes to reaffirm the views previously expressed with respect to the importance of tests of nuclear weapon design as a necessary means of progress. The GAC further strongly endorses the recommendations in the staff papers with respect to the However, the GAC does not believe that the number of tests should be ltiited to 10 per year as suggested, but that the number

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should, be determined by the needs of the weapon laboratories and the Division of Military Application. The. GAC fully endorses the recommendation that each proposal .! for a test should be scrutinized with the utmost care as to need, . 1 and that no effort should be spared to exercise the greatest We- : cautions to safeguard the surrounding communities and the test personnel with respect to fall-out, blast, and blast damage. Vith the increased understanding of these proposals, precautionary measures become more effective. .- The GAC knows of no substitute for tests on the continental site to maintain our lead in the field of atomic weapons. Ve have seen no suggestion for another site which has the advantages The GAC therefore ‘recommends that the use of the NPG be continued, and that no arbitrary limitation should be f&.posed 03 the n.umber of tests .in any given period. At the same time the * GAC recognizes that unless the greatest precautions are taken, a certain element of danger will altiays attend tests of nuclear

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ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION United States Atomic Energy Commission Transmitted herewith are the comments and recommendations of the Advisory Committee for Biology and Medicine on the "Report of the Committee to Study the Nevada Proving Ground;'as requesterdby the Commission in a memorandum dated February 19,.195:"to Dr. Cohn C. Bugher, Director, Division of Biology and Medicine, from the Division of Military Application. The Advisory Committee held a special meeting to consider this report at the Atomic Energy Commission in Washington, D. C., on Saturday, March 13, 1954. Paraphrasing General Forrest's famous saying, "Victory goes to the nation that glts there fustest with the-mostest and be3';cst weapons". This is no less true in the atomic age. It is therefor essential to continue the Nevada Proving Grounds in order to achieve maximum speed in the development of weapons. Speed is essential tonational survival. In emergencies such as this some risks, Immediate and long term, must be accepted. These risks should be frankly and publicly acknowledged. Ho&ever, the policy of minimizing these risksmust be continued In both the locai and nationai interest. Our recommendations relat:ve to the criteria beginning on Page 2 of wE:c 141/22 are as follows: a. The number of nuclear shots at the ?!evada Prcvicg Crounds in one year should be held to a planned maxim:;~mof ten. The nu;r,berof three high yield tower shots shculd no??- ncrmally be exmd. b. 84 c. Each nuclear shot programmed, whether for AEC, military or clvll defense, should be justified individually evaluated as to probable off-site hazard, and should

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t!. Marginal shots shbuld be fired only under satisfactory weather concilticns that have a high degree of p~~dlctable stability. The possibility of continuing pcstponements and perhaps of resulting extension of series duration should be accepted, Participating organizations and units should be advised that they must accept the possibilLty of postponements on such shots, We suggest that approval of the 50KT yield for a 500-foot tower be withheld until experimental detonation at a lower KT Deleted as meaningless Shots should be limited as folio:% with regard to yiz3.d and burst cltitude, with maximum yield to incorporate a reasonable allowance for error: level has proved that the safety factor Indicated here actually In addrtlon to the recommendation on the criteria g-tven above, there are cerC,ain other general comments which we desire (1) G!e commend the use by the Test Director cf an adviso?.y panel which has been customary at NPG and recommend that this practice be ext ended to the operations In the The Ccmmittee noted that the first announcement cf the recent incident in the Pacific came 2s 2 result cf tti le t’ier a Karlne wrote to his mother, The Commlttee considers it highly desirable that ‘;here should be an early offlclal release of authentic information to avoid permitting unreliable ardinaccurate reports tc become Tte Advisory Committee for Biology and Kedicine r_otes with apprcval the studies now being carried oaf. It f-zther urges that: (a) all feasible emphasis be piaccd on the extension end zcceieration of t’ze c,tud.les on the diztrlbution ad effects of radioactive msterial fro.m tests; (b) the Gabriel and Sunshine studies be expanded to Include other elements than those now regarded as being controlling (Ru, I, Pu, for example). The expertiental evieence obtained by the staff of the Division of Biology and Medicine indicates that the biological food chains must be considered broecily and not only alcng convention21 agricultural lines. The Coralttee considers of utmost lnportance the provision of adequate support for extensive and intensive studies cn these phases of the problem.

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As cf possible interest to the Commission we are sending you a complete transcript, classified SECRET, of the discussions at the recent meeting of the Comml%tee. Advisory Committee for Biology