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Machine-read from the scan, so expect some errors. Lines that couldn’t be read are left out.
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Note by the Secretary The attached report by the Director of Military Application :- is circulated by request of the General Manager for consideration by the Commission at the meeting scheduled for 2:3O porn?,Monday, San Francisco Oprns, ;413 tlhen separated from enclosures handle this document as ....*.
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This document consists of 8 pages - Copy No, 28 of 18 herlea A ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION THE THERMONUCLEAR WEAPON TEST PROGRAM Report by the Director of Military Application Q .- 1. To consider the timing of Operation CASTLE. Q 2. The annual weapon program submissions of the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory and the University of California Radia- . - tlon Laboratory (Livermore) are in process of preparation and review and will be submitted for Commission review and approval early in calendar year 1953. As a result of the extremely success- _ ful behavior of the Mike 'Shot of the IVY operation, from the standpoint of yield, these programs will propose a considerable expansion and a broader research and development in thermonuclear weapons than envisioned six months ago. This comes about because of the important possibilities revealed for employment of the principle of radiation implosion and the practical fact that \ cyrogenic thermonuclear system Works.
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3. In a letter of June 13, ,lg52, clrcuiated previously _as AEC 493/b, the Military Liaison Committee transmitted a Joint ._. Chiefs of Staff requirement for the development of thermonuclear weapons which follows In part: "a. A military requirement exists for the d uclear weapons giving yields of a military requirement exists uch weapons provided they are c in size, shape and weight with delivery systems that that prior production of a deliverable thermonuclear weapon by the USSR would serve to reduce the present U.S. preponderance in atomic weapons, and that such Soviet policy decisions. This factor, when taken together with the promise of U.S. thermonuclear programs, is considered to provide adequate justification for an approach which may represent considerable technical risk and large expenditure of funds." 4 . Eeceuse of the urgency of the thermonuclear weapon development as expressed In the above paragraph the reorientation of the thermonuclear program must obviously be related to such policy considerations as well as to technical considerations. Since the production of a proven weapon invblves full-scale testing, the date to be set for the CASTLE operation will be an important determinant of the scope and emphasis of the development,. program and the time at which operational capability will be realized. There Is need for the earliest possible decision on this date. This paper discusses the main Issues pertinent to timing of Qeration CASTLE on the kESiS that the finally a;?roved programs of I;4SL and UCRL will Include projects Indicated In letters from Drs. Bradbury and York circulated in AEC 59712, and recommends a date for the test program Which should satisfy the technical requirements as well as the DOD requirements,
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5. Dr. Bradbury of LASL, Dr. York of UCRL, and Mr. Tyler of SF0 have recommended (see AEC 597/z) that CASTLE, now scheduled for fall of 1953, be rescheduled to spring 1954. In summary, Dr. Braduryls reasons are: a. Information derived from Operation UPSHOT can then be used to assist in designing and selecting the best of the several competing models now being hium-6 would be available for has been problematical for some hat there is a real question whether a date earlier than spring 1954 Would be possible in any event for devices requiring this substance. ely that an operational could be ready before the ment of military logistic support of this system even by that time is a ques-
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12. The LASL proposes development of three possible thermo- . ’ nuclear weapon models which uld be ready for test by spring test is necessary before any.of these models can be accepted as an emergency weapon. Sele&ion and design of these models for test at CASTLE will be critically influenced by the results I- ; of UPSHOT in spring 1953. 13. In conformity with ,order to permit inclusion of these recommendations and in UPSHOT data in the design of CASTLE devices, the Commission should postpone CASTL;Euntil the spring of 1954. This will allow the weapon or weapons selected for test then to be the best from the develo$ment point of view, and offers the better possibility of attaining the desired thermo- . nuclear capability by 1954. 14. The AEC should propose to the DOD the action outlined in paragraph ‘13 above, and request their comments. 15. Th&-t the Atomic Energy Commission: 1g& ADprove holding Operation CASTLE in early b. A&rove dispatch of a letter such as that in__the Appendix to the IGC advising of the proposed schedule for CASTLE, and req.Jesting their cozzents; C. f;ote that possible CASTLE test items included in the L4SL and UCRL developmental programs are described in the letters from Drs. Bradbury and York circulated in AEC 597/2 (see paragraph 3a-3d, page 2,
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DRAFT LETTER TO THE CHAIRMAN, MLC 1. The results of the IVY thermofiuclear experiment indicate certain reorientation of the thermonuclear weapons program In order to insure broad and rapid progress In this activity. The revised program and its bearing on the timing of the CASTI operation are discussed below. _
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: We believe, however, that at least one, and probably both, of them will emerge as possible for test and emergency capability early in 1954. 5. Based on our understanding of the Department of Defense requirements for thermonucle weapons, we believe that the 'CASTLE operation, should be scheduled to be held as early in ogress permits; that supporting operations should be phased to permit this in January of 1954. We believe that such course is indicated in view of its increased promise for obtaining a capability in thermonuclear weapons in early 1954. 6. We realize that the above suggested plan has a major impact on military planning, as well as on the supporting Task Force. With respect to the latter, it would be desirable from our standpoint If at least the principal staff of the present Task Force cculd be held intact. 7. In view of the importance of this program, your early