History - Task Group 132.1 TG 132.1 Participation in Mike Shot (Ivy Operation)

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Schedule ixf Evenfe Prior to h‘iie Shot Mike Shot Detonation Reo idual Contrmimtion Rely Reeulfe of BEST AVAILABLE COPY

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HISTORY - TASK GROUP A comprehenelve rehearsalvae echedulsd by the tZomzmder, Ulke Shot. The bay of the reheareal tFnw the detonation vaa 0715. The dress rehearsalforthe Mike eventbeepnatl'?Won 27 October and was concluded at about H plus 8 houra on 28 October. Task Group 132.1 partlcil#ted in the dreee rehearsal to the maximum degree practicablewithoutinterferencevith aeceesaay electroniceand commnicstlonacheckwas conductedto insurethat actually operated ia order that poesible Interference with critical rcientiflc Fastrumentationcouldbe discovered. These checks and the reheoreal of To 132.1actlvitieewere ruccerofully carried out and ao cleriouedeficieaciee4 vere no-d. The Pwadinese of the 6clentlficTask Group UM afflnmd st the BEST AVAILABLE COPY

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After the ComlKmdere( conference which Included dbcu86lon of beadin*r of we tadt &ldpa, the rebcarml critiqus, and order for Mike shot.(lb Prior to l&O on M - 6 days, Task Unite 3 end 4 bad ccmpletedprepar&oryoperatloxw for the final fillingoperationa. Cambridge Corporation had two f llled hydrogen deyare, one partially fffled deuterium dewur, end one mergemy mtanbby &war in the cab area. At about 2200 on M - 6 the cryogenicsffflhg operations aonltored and topped-offappmxlnstely eight timce prior to for analyeie. Prior to ehot tire the Uborotory had analyzed the sampleand reported the& it was entirely emtisfactory. BEST AVAILABLE COPY

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At Ogoo on M - 3 the Firing Party Cmmaa&F memmd operationalcontrol of the #hot ieland group. The miaelon of directed by the Cammndtr, X7 1%. The FirIn@ Pity cormirted an Arains Ttaa, 6 Fir* Tam, and 6 RoJtct tad Monitor Tecllp. The nleclion of tbc w Tcaal ww to axm the Mike device, calibrations ntceasory ty ,ln6urt 8 flucctsefq dttamtion at and (6) security section. The missionoftht FirlxqTtamvaa tooptrttttht tirlq Controlaboard the camand shipand to dttanatt'thtdtvlctat The adamion of the RoJect and Konitor Tt+n w~8 to monitor txperlmental tguipmcnt aad ncctemry facilltits. Thie ttsn wat colllpostdof clixrtctiona: (1) m Bectlon, (2) Cambridge BEST AVAILABLE COPY y

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ganatsboutl~. The nuclearlaeertionwas nadeat out of the cabwaa co@etedan&theAmingTeamthendeparted for the Uss Letee aboardthe AVR. readinersbzla veather conditionswere discuwed. The execute order vaa conflmed at each conference. a I4 - 1 the TMk Fbrce notified the Ahalc Enagg Coamiesion aad the Departant of the for the open sea. The USS CurtW~ and the USS E8t40, bowever, BEST AVAILABLE COPY

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and techniciana who tmre required to mlmln at tb8lr ports until th8 early monling of M-Bay. Piml muter repotk w2-e nnde and all prron+l were pruentaboard ship8 of the lb&. Th8 USS Curt188 after departing th8 Shot frland anchored off parry to take off ,rcmai.nlng twwlcal per8onn81 of n; 132.1 aad The final conflmation of veather forecast ua8 made a8 o? 0300 on M-Daywith a very favorable outlook. The aircraft veather nrecp plane In the vicinity of the Shot Irrland va8 mde at BEST ANE COPY

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the time broadcast ecrlpt were provided each rhlp in order that the time broadcamt could be given on each chip even ii the official voice broadcast ~68 lost due to trazmmlrrion difficulties. This rebmadcsat wa8 mde on a freqwncy of 24.8 mc and had a w Mike Shot was firedat 0714: 59.4 1 IWember 1952 at Elugelab Island of of approx~~~~tely0.6 tsec wae due to a t 0.2 local time on Enivetok Atoll. The emr power failure aboard tbt USS Eetee a few minute8 prior to the 8hot. In the transfer to the alternate power eyetem thle error was Introduced. The rhot aa witnessed aboard variow veeclels of the Task Force at meet inpreesive sight. At didances of 30 to 35 miles, vithln which most of the verse18 were posltloned, f&8 vas innacasakly perceptible. The tremmdou8 fireball to expand and appeared to be approximately a mile In diameter before the cloud-chamber cfTect and Her cloude vlrible 8hortly after the bur8t. T&s explorlon man fonmd a have a wide dirty &em and a large billowy white dcmm. Apparently vhich vere eucked up high Into t&e air. About the rkm there BEST AVAILABLE COPY

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appeared to be a cu&ain of water whichfellbacklntothe ocean In the vicinity of the Shot frland. The shock wave and muad am$vtd at the mriow shipa b followed by a broken rumbling aouad ww beard by most o+erver8. The preseure pulse and the reduced premure period w felt by w It wcended to a great height and spreadout of the Task Force the reddish-brown color could over the rcesele upper cloud ~8 approximately 60 milee in diameter with a stem The Juncturt of the atemwiththe upper cloudwar,at an altitude to be present in t&t ntlghborhoodof tht Junctureof the stem and the uppercloud. The prellminmy cloud x-let fgr the top of rhortly after the The cloudappearedto be atMllzed at l25,ooO it afterappwcinntely

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that the phemmenonJuatwitneered- Mike povexful device than any other detonated to date. IUmring the vlaiblesize or the ball of flre tendLhe cloudeffects,it Shortlyafter the detomtion the Tads Force vesclelsgot 8 vam alohafor a job exceedlngly veil dome. Tbs detonation hl@y c4uccarr8fulIn every xmpect, and the ecientliicmrveye BEST AVAILABLE COPY

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Enlwetok,and all lagoon vater trafficrout&of Japtxm. The will open on Parry at Building 57 cmtro~ pointfor all trafficnorth took,offfrom the USS Rendovato go dlmxtly to &rry Ieland. This bellcopterthenflev at an altitudeof 25 ft and at a the chab b the dlrectloa of the Shotlelan~~ 'Whileflying BEST AVAILABLE COPY

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diepatched to Harry to reCOvef data at the photo tower and In orderto assistin permnnel was takento ParryIelaad. coqpletiradlologic8l8afc4yeurveyuasmade at the ramtimc. more takenatthe snchorageroff Perry and Enluetok.These mnplee were estlefahry aad the ,radlologicalsafetyepw;rp recommnded that re-entry begin on 2 bvember. Minor reporte ahlpain the lagoonwere mrde to the RadiologicalSafetyCenter.

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pointfor recovery bperatlone, Recoveries on M + 1 m vere nsde both from’the Readova and F&ray Island. The priority of re-entry of TG 132.1 personnel was bwed upon the need of w%entlfic personnel fo complete recovery operations and to prepare for w 6hot. Sopac10 132.1 personnel remained afloat for several daye rince the HoIuse 8ad Namer support fscllitlee were not adequate to provide for all pereomel during the flmt two or three &qr after in the following or&r: (1) all’ divlalon hesde and dcktor, opera& the power, water, and tilephone systew3, (4) camplete mtee hall complement, and (5) maintenance crew .aa needed. pzwl&d with lunchecl for the noon meal. l!he ‘Rnlarg and lhmer olcma hall was open for the even* meal. Gradual& ‘tbc amber of personnel ashore was lncreased aa Holmes and lkrver vaa to provide support facllltler. All personnel of M 132.1

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ship then departed to Ihm,jaleln where Its mlselon warnto provide e&p facllltlee and berthing facllltleswithin capeclty for TG 132.1 operationa and persoarrel in e~upportof preparations for the m event. The USS Curtisa arrived at KwaJaleln the afternoon of These pereonnel Included arenibereof Tads Units whose work In the ForwardArea was complebd. to the 21 for thle group was arrangedat lWa,jaleln. After3 November,613 olrcrait were authorized to proceed northof Runlt withouta radlologlcal8sictymoaltorprovided theydldnotland andflew at a minlmmr altitude of 650 ft directly over the edge of tb reef on the ocean eldeof the Atoll. Thereturnflightwae tobemadebyturnlaglnthearea of Bogallua and follows the rame or hl&heraltitudeaad the same coume to base. Film badge6 wre required on all ouch BEST AVAILABLE COPY

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flights l Uareetrictecl re-entry v~8 declared on 3 bvember for Anlyaanlfand Japtan Includinglagoon trafmc to these lrlaade. Smnllb0at8werefbrther authorized to travel In tJlHlOrthfEtnbalfOfth8l8gOOXll? they cleared with the radiological eaiety control unit and were accompanied by a monitor from Task Unit 7. Boat crews could go ashore provided protective clothing end film badges were worn. Similar imtxuctions were issued as radiological erriety ,$onditions permittid for en&y into other northern Ielands. Work at Runlt was authorized on M + 2 days ti order that preparations for King shot could begin. Cloud sampling by the F-8& Jet aircraft began at appmximakly H + 1 hour and ~08 completed at rrpproximately H+ 5bours. A total of 12 soznples were obtained by the F-8& aircraft, Including the two used for early ~connalmmce. and 14,000 it in the region oi the Juncture between the upper luu8hroooland the stem. In general, theee eamples were copeidered to be aa representative of the cloud as poertble. A prearranged system for reporting operational data to the control B-36 alrcmft was used and included such iafozmtion radiation Intensity la the cloud in roentgens per hour, emd whether snap eamples were taken.

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TWO of the rraaiplingaircraft ran low on fuel aad attempted to land at Bnlvetok Irltmd. QH of the plane8 landed safely at Enlvet& and the aaatph was recovered. The other aircraft crcuhed off &&mtok and neither pllot nor plane could be recovwed. Test eamp!.eaof the Mike cloud were returned to laboraioaiee vlthln the United Statee by means of epecial numberedU through 4E. Joint Task Force 132 provided couriei: pereonnel fez each fllght. AFQAT-1and Anq Chemical Center, @JO ebared the mqjorlty of the aamplecl beIn& trrraeportcd, provided couriers at the point of f lrrt 1andS.n~in the US for the remainder .of the flight. Plight 1s Geparted’IWa@leln within appxmlmately 3 hours after Hike Shot and srr1m.d at Hickam Air Porte Ease. at houre aad wde almilar rtope. rampler collected by the reply alrcraft. ?light 3s departed de-d for Travir Air Force Base after a little over an curbed at Eickm at 040837% Aa extra illat 4E left Enivetok on 5 Hovem~r and completed the aanple return p-am ior

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fPomMike Shotexceptae notedbelow. Of intereetare the the openvlthmtdamge, amovie ecrecnwasleftup,and el6ewIme of waterwave actionor ground ie no evidence collotructionwith hingepointaatthe bottomand top center.

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The main door8 bad been iert open and it ww or*inally intended that large portlon8 of the IBihefIbett* would be removed. Tble wa8 not done because in the fen -8 prior to rhot timt tbt reasonable risk did not appear to Juetify the nanpower reqdred. of the -e w- 8-d dovmard about 6 inchee front and =BT. The front arch vaa disgonal to the blast and appears to be out of mund with its cloeeat corner hackled down and its far corxx bwkled up. !l%e large eliding hangw doors cannot be closed on either end; they are out of their tracke on fhe upltid front corner end elm&me t&y could be clorqd about half wa,, until prevented by roof aa&. Tt?e dwvg and roof eeg are evidently due to the peak preen impulse. The fill the of the building mat have been about 100 nUlirrecondf3, because of the large tr$xe. iiere and there, corrughed Iron ehectlng has been buckled a Pew Inches by multiple the center preh. mflectioru, on the interior. can probably be corrected by *king up Place vith hydraulic JWka on poles under BEST AVAILABLE COPY

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Tent fllea vere tom on mdal tenta on the ride frontor axpoeed row. These team occurmd et the Beam. Ua4au.plper were broken at the elbov Just beyond of Lhe built. Of tvo caeea, one use 8 plaatic houses on the back ride f’rom the bloat at the probsbly due to multiple reflection on the inkriot At the QIR building a Iarge rfack of radiatm co5la, about l2 ft rquare, ww pushed b about 3 lncher, A heavy cablnet near the iaterlor u&w& ha&ted were out of roUaaabout3ln~hee. This merymthwe been due to the blest, but possibly to we on

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Watcruavte were lesr thanlitabove hi&tide line. was no theraul charring. the saadia group VW 1.3 Raft8 vom uprightand lmortd. mm trees were rrtandirrg and not rcorched. chwrin& of leaves. Damge frwn the blsat. Tknwwrlight at the baee,but the upperpartwas scorched.

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The i&md appcare aa if it had been vashed by vater carry the burnt debrlrway, but thla lmprerrionnay be due sly to the blut vlnd follamd by eemre rrinn. There lslande and the At of the chein dam ta were wept clean. There 18 a tine deposit of coral ov& the reef rock. Bothibg was left of the l&awe which suggeste a jet vhich explpdcd it, and v$olent action to weep away the tlebrlrr. The odor of dead ii.ah extend8 fmntheveetcnd of Teitzirlpucchl The depth Is difficult to Judge because of turbidity. The water 18 men In the crater andmaybe ar rhallov aa 10 meters and probably aotover2OPreters. The reef 18 contiauou8 on the ocean ride but &a 8a& deporrita of coral sand piled up M ln the lip ai a crater. ft ti cs8cntlally a different reef surfam. turgidrtgionvhich rhouldhme diffwedbynov, eftm

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numbek iadlcote the lntenslty in mllliroeatgens per hour at a 25 it altitudeualese otheruiee rprciiled. The lnteneity on tih ground VW roughly row thee the air reS. Thelld numbersshouldbe consideredwith caukidnrlbae thry (B)Readirgs taken on the ground, fC)Readirrgs taken at 1,500 it altitude.

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order to give an early over-allpicture of the recovery and data rituation after Mike Shot, The data vhich have ken extracted from there preliminaryrtporta must be treatedwith a Jaundiced eye, since moatof them have been determined by very cursory invertigation of the rtcorda. Eovwtr, 8omt of the numbtrc3 - for instance the ball-of-fire yield and the xarmay mute only etattrpenttabout cloet to the final valut6. recovery can be made, 1.1 and 1.2 utrt coactrrwd with tht aalyeis of rtdiochtmical. .: : eautpltt yd Rogtct 1..3vith the collectionof thoseaamplte. BEST AVAILABLE copy

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RoJect 1.3 - Cloud Sample on Mike Shot lncludirrg the two ueed for etu9.y reconwlmance. Samples obtained by Red Flight (l&f, 224, jM), aa well ae one saziqle from White FlQht (W), were each apprdximrrtely the site pkedicted and vere eatlefactory for yield determination. of Blue Right were approximately one-third the 6ize of the beet four and were satisfactmy fiir the pwpoee of ratio and detector etudlce. These 8afnp&eowere fxWn five to ten tlmee emalieF thah they should have been because of unforeseen operational limitations beyond the control of thie proact. The two reconnalmance aircraft gwe very small ramplee (19 and l6M) which would be useful for ratio checks. Sample quality ie governed by the capability of penetrating the main body of the cloud. In general, ell samples except l& EM, 15M, and 16~1,which were taken at todically different altitude8 or sectlone of the cloud, e coneldered to be ae~

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mly Red Fu@lt aircrait cxpoeurw3. Failure to attain other fll@dxt ia reflected la eve about a four - to five-foldreductionIn radlatlonexporurte.

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vaa galnedfromanomly~le of the decay rate of rsdiotion lnteaoitite tn the cloud. collararoundthe etem. ft had 8 diameter aboutthe mme aa but Erring the count Of the Qy8ppcwdt0 eubeide$o.about atighborhood of the Juncture of the rtem a+ upper clouda thle region. Under theet clrcttnstancta the altitude performance of the aircraftwaclsatl8f~tO~. The nmcirmrmaltitudeattaiwd byanysircrdt#w~5,OOOtt indicated. When ouchaircraft tuturt to have about 5,000 it additiooal ceill~ capabilityin orderto omplt veil intothe malabody of the cloud.

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ill&t time ctapbilltylongenoughto petit radlatlonexposure to limitthe dumtion of fbt mlerlon. This coadlt10awas true directed to fly fartherfromtbemaIncloudmsse thanltohould havebeen. E-n-, the detailsof the claudvere loet to fly excer~ivelylon&.distancesto reachthe cloudvicinity. They thenhadto conduct a cloudsearchaswell.crcra ecrmpliag dietancetotherefueliagarea. fnvlewoftbcre cmalderatlom,

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The data.0~ here preeented nuutbe conaldered aa tentative and rather crude elnce they are the remlf of a very haafy . The folloving table llsto the results ea well as GUI ertlmste of the errors Involved, The error Ime …