History of Operation Castle - Pacific Proving Ground (Extracted Version) (Deleted)

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HISTORY OF OPERATION CASTLE Pacific Proving Ground Joint Task Force Seven United States Army This is an extract of History of Operation CASTLE, which remains classified SECRET/ RESTRICTED DATA, CRITICAL NUCLEAR WEAPON DESIGN INFORMATION as of this date. Extract version prepared for: DEFENSE NUCLEAR AGENCY

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HISTORY OF OPERATION CASTLE Joint Task Force Seven 1. CONTROLLIRG OFFICE NAME AND ADD~~LsS 4. YONITORING AGENCY NAME 6 AODRESL(f1 diffrronl Imm Controllln6 Oftic.) 6. MSTRIBUTIOR STATEYENT (01 fhlm Ropeff) Approved for public release; unlimited distribution. S. TYPE OF REPORT 6 PERIOD COVEREt 6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER 6. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(a) 10. PROGRAM ELEMENT. PROJECT, TASK AREA 6 WORK UNIT NUYOERS This report has had the classified information removed and has been republished in unclassified form for public release. This work was performed by Kaman Tempo under contract DNAOOl-79-C-0455 with the close cooperation of the Classification Management Division of the 'DefenseNuclear Agency.

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This report has had classified material removed in order to make the information available on an unclassified, open publication basis, to any interested parties. This effort to declassify this report has been accomplished specifically to support the Department of Defense Nuclear Test Personnel Review (NTPR) Program. The objective is to facilitate studies of the low levels of radiation received by some individuals during the atmospheric nuclear test program by making as much information as possible available to all interested parties. The material which has been deleted is all currently classified as Restricted Data or Formerly Restricted Data under the provision of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, (as amended) or is National Security Information. This report has been reproduced directly from available copies of the original material. The locations from which material has been deleted is generally obvious by the spacings and "holes" in the text. Thus the context of the material deleted is identified to assist the reader in the determination of whether the deleted information is germane to his study. It is the belief of the individuals who have participated in preparing this report by deleting the classified material and of the Defense Nuclear Agency that the report accurately portrays the contents of the original and that the deleted material is of little or no significance to studies into the amounts or types of radiation received by any individuals during the atmospheric nuclear test program.

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Operation CASTLF:was, in almost every sense of the word, an extension of Operation IVY. Except for the establishment of Joint Task Force SL!XENas a permanent organization and the formation of a fifth task group, very few changes occurred between the two tests wiiichwere separated only by a period of about fourteen months. The cut-off date for IVY and the beginning date for CASTLE were the matter, so to speak, of settling.on an arbitrary date of 1 January 1953. Since an extensive and detailed history of Operation IVY had been written and published, it was decided early in CASTLE planning that the CASTLE history would follow a different orientation. Joint task forces have been conducting atomic tests in the Pacific since the end of World War II. By the time of C.~S'i'L-Z,these successive operations had been rather thoroughly documented by the individual histories which had been written. Enough experience and a wide eno=lghvariation of operational contingencies had been encountered to suggest certain major problems common to all atomic task forces. With this in mind, the CAYTIEhistory is for the most part an attempt to point up broadiy those general problems which any task force may anticipate. In addition, t'noughnot in the detailed narrative form of previous histories, a treatment of the major difficulties encountered during CASTLE is included. For these reasons, any detailed study of this effort should be made in conjunction with those of previous overseas tests, particularly GREENHOUSE and IVy.

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Once again, and as stated in connection with the History of ODeration In, it is hoped that this voliunewill serve as a testament to the outstanding joint effort of those cabined agencies and personnel, both within and without Joint Task Force SEVEN, who worked together to achieve the great success of Operation CASTLE. Major General, United Sta,tesArmy Commander, Joint Task Force SEVEN

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TABLE OF CONTENTS List of Illustrations, Maps, and Charts Ch. I The Origins of Operation CASTLE Ch. II Planning on the Task Force Level Ch. III Planning on the Task Group Level

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LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS, MAPS, AND CHARTS Major General P. hi, Clarkson, USA, CJTF SEVEN. Organization for Operation CASTLE (chart). Major General Eugene McGinley, USA, C/S, Headquarters, Rear Admiral Henry C. Bruton, USN, Deputy Commander,, Navy and Commander, Task Group 7.j0 28 Colonel Murray A. w ater, USAF, Deputy Commander, Air. 28 Island, Enixetok Atoil, 53 and Assembly Area, Parry Island, Eniwetok

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H. Lahti, USA, Commander, Task Group 7.2. 64 Mr. James E. Reeves, Cbmander, Task Group 7.5. Task Group 7.5 Organization (chart). Pipes, Namu Island, bikini Atoll. 31. iz_r/ o X March, Bikini Atoll. Namu Island, Bikini 33. Examination of Native Evacuees, Post$_SH4? / \-- 2 14 May, Eniaetok Atoll.

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AACS - Airways and Air Communications Service AEC i Atomic Energy Commission AIRCOMNET - Air Communications Net AFB - Air Force Base Air Force Office of Atomic Energy . AFSWC - Air Force Special Weapons Center AFSWP- Armed Forces Special Weapons Project AOC - Air Operations Center ATCOM - Atoll Commander CIC - Combat Informaticn Center - Commander, Naval Station, Kwajalein - Commander, Amphibious Training Command, United States Pacific Fleet COMSERVPAC - Commander, SeTrice Force, United States Pacific Fleet c/s, USA - Chief of Staff, United States Army

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CTU - Commader, Task Unit DESDIV - Destroyer Division DMA - Director of Military Application, AEC EC&G - Edgerton, Germezhausen, and Grier, Inc. FAPUSJCEC - Frequency Allocation Panel, United States Joint Communications - Electronics Committee FECOM - Far East Command FY - Fiscal Year HASL - Health and Safety Laboratory IBDA - Indirect Bomb Damage Assessment LASL - Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory MRAN - Long Range Aids to Navigation

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MATS - Military Air Transportation Semite MINDIV - Mine Divisicn MPE - Maximum Permissible Exposure NAVSTAKWAJ- Naval Station, Kwajalein NSA - National Security Agency NYKOPO - New York Operations Office OCSigO - Office of the Chief Signal Officer PACDIVMATS - Pacific Division, Military Air Transportation Service POL - Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants RACON - Radar Beacon

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SAC - Strategic Air Corxnand SACCONNET - Strategic Air Command Ccmmunication Net SAR - Search and Rescue SHOMN - Short Range Navigational Aids sigo - Signal Officer TAD - Temporary Additional Duty UCRL - University of California Radiation Laboratory USARPAC - United States Army, Pacific

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THE ORIGINS OF OPERATION CASTLE The roll-up and redeployment of Joint Task Force 132 (JTF 132) after-Operation IVY marked the successful conclusion of the fourth series of atomic tests to be conducted in the Marshall Islands, . Each of these series-CROSSROADS, SANDSTONE, GREENHOUSE, and IVY-- has generated valuable data from which significant progress in the military application of atomic energy has been possible. The latter of these tests--Operation IVY--witnessed the detonation of a device which marked the furthest advance as of that date (Fall, 1952) in a relatively new direction for military uses of atomic energy. With the large amounts of data acquired during this test, the scientists at Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory as well as those of the newer University of California Radiation Laboratory (UCRL) at Livermore, California, continued in the urgent efforts to perfect the plans and designs of those weapons and devices scheduled for experimental testing in the soon forthcaning CASTLE operation. Organizationally, the Task Force which had conducted Operation IVY was typical of those conducting earlier overseas atomic operations in that it had been administered from a joint headquarters and was composed not only of military personnel but of personnel from the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and its varied contractors. Specifically, JTF 132 was organized internally into

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a Headquarters and four subordinate task,groups--a Scientific Task Group, an Army Task Group, a Navy Task Group, and an Air Force Task Group. The EScecutiveAgent for the Task Force had been the Chief United States Army, had served as the Commander. IVY, itself, Gtnessed two large yield detonations--the MIKE device and the KING weapon in that order-and by the time of the KING detonation in mid-Ncvember, the broad planning for a subsequent overseas test, to be 'knownas Operation CASTLE, wa~already seven months advanced. As early as mid-April, 1952, informal knowledge had been received in the Task Force Washington Headquarters indicating that the next overseas test would occur about ten months after the ccmpleticn of Operation IVY, i. e., on or about 1 September, 1953. This development immediately altered the complexion of IVY roll-up pla_nn%xgand stimulated thought with regard to efficient and economical continuity in Department of Defense (DOD) participation in overseas tests. Because of the impact on IVY of the prsximity of the CASTLE date, CJTF 13s had sent a letter on the matter to the Executive Agent on 12 May. This letter was followed within a few days with a Pentagon briefing of Setice and AArmedForces Special Weapons Project (AFSWP) representatives by General Clarkson and his staff operations officer. This letter and the briefing outlined the major factors which would influence the nature of IVY roll-up and noted the implications for CASTLE planning carried by these same factors. At

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that time the salient elements of the thinking which seemed to necessitate early and broad consideration of the problem were as craft, and much of the equipxnentused during IVY which, in turn, would mean saving considerable amounts of effort and 2, The early designation of a CASTLE task force commander in order that he could familiarize himself with the problems and processes of IVY roll-up and the relation of these to the planning and mounting of the CASTLE operation. 3. The need for a briefing of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) so that directives could be promulgated to insure efficient and economical transition from the current Task Force to The Pentagon briefing emphasized the importance of,the earliest possible action on behalf of broad CASTLE planning. Because the relatively short, it was ning of Operation CASTLE date to exist between IVY and CASTLEi was important in every sense to begin the planseveral months before the comp'letionof IVY. The interim period was to be long enough to deciandTask Force redeployment but not long enough to allow complete roll-up as had been characteristic of previous operations. This condition was to make CASTLE preparations unique when compared with those of preceding op

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V-Y shortly after this Pentagon meeting, the C/S, USA, as Executive Agent for IVYp placed before the JCS the matters of determining the Executive Agent and of designating a Task Force Commander for CASTLE. At the same time he pointed out that CJTF 132 was desirous of having his successor nominated as soon as possible in order that he could participate in IVY and in the planning of IVY roll-up-thus avoiding a situation where the new commander would be pre-_pommitted to a course of action over which he had had JCS policy for overseas atomic tests called for the rotation of the executorship and command of atomic task forces between the three Setices. Under this policy, CASTLE would normally have become a Navy responsibility; however, because of the existing plans for an underwater operation, it was felt that the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) might well prefer the executorship of that operation to CASTLE. For this reason and because of the closeness between the two operational dates, a JCS decision was soon reached to extend the JTF 132 mission to include CASTJX and retain General Clarkson as the Task Force Commander. Following the JCS decision General Clarkson briefed the Chairman, AEC, and certain AEC staff members on these preliminary plans and decisions relative to CASTLE. In short, the JCS had approved recommendations which would; the C/S, USA, as Executive Agent, General Clarkson as Task Force Commander,

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retain the IVY Headquarters and Task Group staffs in being for the planning and execution of CASTLE, designate for CASTLE the ships and aircraft which were already activated and modified for IVY, retain in the forward area appropriate troops and equipment for the short garrison phase, and, return critical_personnel and equipment to hcme stations and custody with a proviso that they be earmarked for CASTLE. As a result of these JCS decisions great economy in personnel and materiel accrued to the DOD and the initial firm planning of CASTLEwas accomplished with a minimum of interruption in IIVYprogress. As a consequence, the period between June and November, 1952, witnessed few additional major decisions with regard to CASTLE, and fVY-roll-up was planned in detail and executed with the best interests of CASTLE in mind. The transition between the two was unusually smooth. During the summer months prior to movement of the JTF 132 Headquarters to Eniwetok for IVY operations, studies were initiated in order to determine more specifically the nature of military support required for CASTLE. Elyearly August this effort had resulted in the consolidation of findings and the publication of a paper entitled, Reoort by CJTF 132 to the JCS on Armed ForcesParticioation in the 1953 Experimental Nuclear and Thermonuclear Tests at Eniwetok - Bikini, Though the complete approval of this paper by the JCS was not feasible until such time as more precise information on the scientific

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aspects of CASTLE would be known, a go-ahead for planning purposes was soon forthcoming, Modificaticns in the stated military support reqairsments were to be -madeas late as February, 1953. One of the basic considerations in early CASTLE planning was the stringent one of insufficient land area for foreseeable future developmen$s. With the advancement into the thermonuclear era, "real estate" at Eniwetok Sesame a ccgent consideration, The complete eiimination of Elugelab Island at the time of the MINE detonat.ionmore than justified the earlier concern expressed on behalf cf this problem. As eariy as June, 1952, correspondence from Dr. Alvin C, Graves, J-Ditision leader at Los Alamos and Scientific Deputy to the Task Fo-+-,,e Commander, pointed up the necessity for expioring all possibilities of expnding the Pacific Proving Ground (PPG), As the matter was further studied, it also became more and more apparent that expansion for operational and logistical advantages would automatically follow any expansion which might occur for scientific and technical advantages. In August, studies by Dr. Graves and Holmes and Narver, Inc, (H&N), Los Angeles, concurred on the choice of Bikini Atoll as the best site for an auxiliary proving ground. Bikini was close enough to Eniwetok (180 nautical miles to the east) to take advantage of the base facilities there and it did not require evacuation of natives since this had already been accomplished during Operation CHOSSROCDS in 1946. Cver and above the single matter of Rreal-estate", certain op erational and logistical considerations necessarily were included

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in the early thinking with regard to Proving Ground expansion. Because an increased number of high-yield detonations was contemplated for CASTLE,thought was prominent from the beginning with reference-to the blast risks to base facilities investment on Eniwetok and radiation risks to …