Operation Castle, Operation Order Task Group 7.4, Number 1-53, 15 August 1953

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Enter number and date of correctionsas indicated Deted Effective Date Kade Signature

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Kirtland Air Force Base, New &xi00 Test Support Unit Colonel JamaqF. Starkey Test Services Unit Lt. Colonel Mahlon B. Hammond The Department of Defense, in collaborationwith the Atomic Energy Commission,will teat experimentaldevicee at ENIWETOK and BIKINI ATOLLS United States Army, will conduct the operation,which has been assigned the coda name of CASTLE @XiTRICTED, Sf). See Annex B, Organizationand Command Relationships. a. The ultimate mission of TG 7.4 is to conduct the following operations and services in the'forwardarea in direct sqpport of scientific Effects test aircraft operation.

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arrival cf elements to the Task Group through liaison with Integrate reporting elements into the Task &soup and conduct Provide, through liaison with the Scientific Task Group, for the necessary modificationof aircraft and handling equipment to assure that technicalrequirements in support of the scientificprogram are met. Gthe Army Tcsk Group Commander in the 3. TASKS FOB SUBOBDINATEUNITS: (1) Maintain and operate the following aircraft:. . _ ; and additional aircraft as directed provide forces to operate an inter-islandand an inter-a&311_ ai~l~~lssstcmfoithe_~r~_~ask_~~_Commander in the forward Operate an inter-islandand inter-atollairlift system in the forward area during the ouerationa&..phase.(See Annex E.) flights as direoted by Comdr TO 7?4. Provide facilities for maintenanceof flying proficiencyof approximatelyeighty (89) assigned and attached rated Joint Task Force personnel and insure that required minimums are met. Operate all facilities on ENIWETOK ISUED and BIKINI airstrip as relate to the-operationof aircraft, except POB.storage Provide limited photographicservices for documenting Task With augmentation from the Test Aircraft and Test Services Units, conduct field.maintenancema support services for all TO 7.4 aircraft, transientaircraft and other aircraf’t as Provide Air Force te&nical supply support for all Joint Task Prepare the Air Operations Center at ENIWETOK for full scale

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FM-Safety within areas of ENIWETOK ISLAN.iu which personnel of TG 7.4 are assigned, provide for $11~1badge issue and control for TG 7.4 personnel, and provide other radiologicalsafety One (1) m-36 Primary Control andDocumentary Photographic (b) One (1) m-36 Control and photo 8 hours _1 (a) One (1) .B-3Q Effects 5 houra flight. --- hez and coordinated IPR rocedures for all TG 7 Control all'EJIwETOK takeoffsand landings during rehearzale ana actual shot operations,under zuperv{.eionof the Air Augment the field maintenauiefacilities of the Test Support (1) Operate end provide organizationalmaintenancefor the foliowing afrcraft upon arrival In the forward area: (See Annex C.)

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Assure that no personnel are based in the forvard area longer than the operationalmission necessitates. Adhere to security proceduresas outlined in Annex 0. Emphasize the Flight Safety pr'ogramoutlined in Annex L. Augment existing SAR facilitiesin eq,ergencies. LOGISTICALHATTERS: See Annex C, Administration. (1) Electrical communications- use Zone "Z" Time. (2) Operations in the Zone of Interior - use Local Standard Time. (3) Operations in the forward area - use Zone *MA Time. (1) Task Group 7.4 ZI KirtlandAir Force Base, Bev Herico (2) Test Support Unit OS ENIWETOK ISLAND, MARSHJ&L~ISLANDS. (3) Test Aircraft Unit OS ENIWTOK ISLQD, MAR!%AU ISLLNDS. (4) Test Services Unit OS ENIWETOK ISUlilD,MARSHALL ISLAND& 1 -. See Pages 7 and 8.. .

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COPIES COPY NO. AIR FORCE AGENCIES Director of Plans, Hq USAF, Washington 25, D.C= Director of Communicatione,Hq USAF, Washington 25, DC. Director of Operations,Hq USAF, Washington 25, D.C. Comdr, SAC, Offutt AFBo Nebraska i Comdr, AMC, Wright-PattersonAFB, Ohio Comdr, WADC, Wright-PattersonAFB, Ohio Corn&, HATS. Andrews AFB, Washington 25, D.C. 2 Corn&, AFSWC, Kirtland AFB, New Mexico Comdr, AACS, Andrews AFB, Washington 25, D.C. Squadron (Sampling),Kirtlsnd AFB, New Mexico Comdr, 8th Air Force, Carswell AFB, Texas Comdr, llth Air Rescue Conrlr,Parks Air Force Base, Calif. Comdr, 2349th'Pers Proc Gp, Parks AFB, Calif. Comdr, Air Defense'Command,Ent AFB, Colorado Comdr, Mobile Air Materiel Area, Alabama Con&, Air Proving Ground Command, Eglin AFB, Florida San Francisco, California JOINT TASK FORCE S&EN AGENCIES Comb, !l’G 7.1 Box 1663, Los Alamos, New Mexico , OPRS ORJIIB NO. l-53

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JTF 7, LNO, Travis AFB, California San Francisco, California . CO, AFSWP, SandisBase,Wew Mexico 101 Chief of Staff

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shovee generalpictureof wfdes@ead political GMneee and the UN foroeshas endedsincethe / oentlntigwlth the Red Chinesegov&nment. aSe processof exchangingprisonersof warp for a long time the stumblingblock for a peaoe se%tlqment,has commenced. Sincethe death Ihe government in Iranhae continuedwitha and showsless abilityto cope with~the.situation. This countryia suaoeptibleto furtherin-

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wit and a united army continuewith uncertain St&ctgy speaking, the world is at peace but'it is. actualliy in an indefinablestate known as "cold warn in whic:h the forces of the Fast (Communists)are lined uzp against those of the West (anti-Communist) and opI;soseeach other openly w every means short.of cold v~lr the scientific discovery and application of atomic energy has played an importantpart in restraintig the USSR. The fear of the destructive force caf atomic weapons has undoubtedlyproved a = deterrent to the aggressive attitude of the Soviet -- M._-L--_---..--- means t;o increase their technicalknowledge and applicaMon_of atomic energy and thereby increase their potential military force0 'IhepoEicy of the Communists (and the USSR) is well known ti continuing their efforts for world domination, pressure against all non-eommunistiegovernments, relaxinrgonly when the attack is futile and trans- * ferring the pres.s_upe_toanother area. t JTF SEVER should encounter no open enemy in carrying o&-its mission, Overt action could take place only in case of: (a) A sudden declaration of war and attack in force w an enemy power. (b) Hostile action by air or sea on.8 small scale fczr the purpose of interferingwith the exp&i.ment or to gain technicalknowledge. make a determiued and continuingeffort to.gain knowledge of Cperation CASTLE (Restricted,SI) them by every means possible, short of operations which would precipitate open hostilities. In addition to the dan er from espionage, Operation ' SIf is subject to the leak of sensitive information w careless and thoughtless personnel and to leaks through the press and through lhe nonexistence of an open enemy precludes the need of activity for the purpose of gaining information of the activity of the en-. At the same time it emphasises the need for the maximum effort to maintain . security. _&y effort of the en- to reoonnoiter

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all means at the disposal of the Joint Task Force and by requests for informationfrom neighboring commands in Japan (8)_ The principal intelligenoeeffort must be concentrated in maintaining security, The measures to insure security oonsist of security drill and training to prevent inadvertentdisclosure of informationand in preventingunauthorized persons having access to the area as well as the supervisionof information which is released to the press* a. It is consideredthat interferencewith the mission or ‘penetrationof personnel into the Task Force or In addition, espionage could be aecoriplishedb ._~iii=-:__x photographicmeans from ship0 airoraft or submarine with the latter two being most plausible. Submarine approach within 1,500 yards or less of importantislands of the atoll or overflightby enemy airoraft are possible. By such means periodiq photographyand observation could record and in- .__~__ portant operations from the activities within the ,_ _,__ _’ the defection of personnel within the Task Force or9 more remotely, by a raiding party landed frcm - the sea0 Subversive action by these means could run along the lines of the destructionof communicationsand technical installationfacilities Overt Action bv Vessel or Aircraft4 Overt actfon by vessel or aircraft could t&e the form of attack by bomb, gunfire or assault., I &&&r Raids could be oonductad by aggressive or. surreptiousmethods under the cover of darkness from combatant ships and submarines. The landing and recovery of raiders by submarine could be accomplishedunder the conditfons of darkness and the confusionresulting from their activities. in the area from a vessel immedfately outside the three (3) mile limft, a determined ship commander could, in part, compramfse the operatfons. Unauthorizedfnstrumentatfant Interferencewith the mission could be accomplished by electronic coimtermeasures by a vessel or aircraft operating some

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landing party and recovered in the same mqiner after (7_) Failure of JTF SEVER Personnel to Observe Seetiits observe securityprecautions could easily compromise the mission by their talking or writing indiscriminately about alassifliedinformation during the planning and operationalstages0 A lapse in communicationsecurity could also reveal vital personnel securityregulations could ultimately cause physioal penetrationwithin the Joint Task b, It is also consideredthat interference with the mission would becaused by the declarationOF outbreak of war. In this event theYpositionand security of-the missioncould become untenable co It Is considered that an unfriendly power having.an interestin the JTF SEVEN mission would more probably manifest such interestin a covert manner by attemptingpersonnel infiltration or personnel corruption for espionageor sabotage purposes, or by submarineobservation for the purpose of obtaining information. It is believed that information-& to the operations of JTF SEVER and the results thereof would he of more practioal value to an unfriendlypower than hindering OP impeding the operation. Cvert action ina poiat uell in the lkmger Area would involve risk of eonsequence out of proportion to the value of the results to be obtained from (1) Ihe country having the greatesteapability of executing the above actions, its apparent unfriendly attitude and its interest in the atomic program of the United ~%ates Is the SOVIET BBICEJ. of JTF SEVlR4are contained in Appendix 1 to this Terrftopg of.the‘PaeifieIslands, placed under the Bnited States as Rations. ‘Ihey are, therefore, subject to the full powers of !@e trusteeshipagreement for the aslet Territory permits the hited States to close any of the areas for security reasons0 I the U;S. olosed the area of the ent%reDIWETOE ATOLL and the tspritorial vaters adjacent thereto.. (h 2 April '1953,BIKINIATOLL was alao closed by notification to the UnIted Natdana. ~T&dhdl I water8 are defined as those within a three (3) mile limit on the

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diminishingdtiing the next of tension existing between-theU;S.-and its satellites stands little~6hannee"of~ result of possible further SovietXiispi+ed ._ a0 lhe armed forces of the USSR are maintained inan advanced -. state of military readines% As a result, the Soviets can undertake . militaryaggressionwith little or no advance warning. Ocean sea,. Eqcause of endurance limitationsof the medium range-type, it is believed that the.ocean patrol type would be the better for operationsin the ENIWETOK and BIKINI areas0 It is estimated that at least four (4) to 8% (6) ocean patrol submarinescould be maintained periods this number could be increased, (1) Aerial photo and radiologicalreconnaissanceof the or the Kuriles) is within Soviet capabilities, _Withoutrefueling, the !PU-& modified for long range . remnnaissanoe, could remain in the target area for only a brief period, making necessary prior Soviet access to CASTLE (Restricted,SI) plans to permit proper timing of reconnaissanceflights:, Assuming that the Soviets have developed techniques'equal the time over the targetareato over four (4) _Soviets have developed refueling capabilities. The Third Long Range Air Force, stationedin the F&q is estfmated that its current TO/b stren TU-4*s is appraximatelycme huedred (2) lhe only Soviet aircraft known to have greater . range potentialities than the TU-4 is the lope 31. . prototype heavy bomber which was observed in flight for the first and only time to.date in the ,July1951 Aviation byair showin Moscow0 Ifequippedwiththe

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fbornbatradius of about ;SOO xiautiealmiles and considerablyin excess of this if the combat load are in series production and present-estim+tes._ are that a heavy bomber will.not appear in Sdviet operationalunits prior to 1953. It is entirely possible, however, that the Soviets might equip an early model of the Type 31 for photo and radiological reconnaissanceif a sufficientlyhigh priority exists for this requirement. a. The capabilitieslisted in paragraph 3 above make it possible for the Soviets to'take the following action against ENIWKTOK (3) Oround reconnaissanceor sabotage by landing parties (4) Raids from submarines or surface ships. under conditionsexisting today. Capability (2) is a possibilitybut. is less likely and capabilities (3), (4)and (5) could possibly take place in the event of open hostilities between the U. .S.and the

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VUDIVOSTOK w JY PACIFIC OCEAN Interfereme with Jotit Task Force SERB? EmwEmK Means Avaflableto the Mets F’ifty eight (58) oceangoing submarines operating fpom CHINAand SIIBRIA

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In 2 Pages w/2 Appendices Consisting of 2 Pages ORGBKIZATION AND COMMAND l&TIOmHIpS OPES orma EO. l-53

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ORGANIZATIONAND COWAND RELATIONSHIPS Kirtland Air Force Base, Bew Mexico a. See Appendix 1 for organizationprior to on-sitephase. b. Pee Appendix 2 for organizationduring on-site phase. (3) Kaval Task Group Naval Gun Factory (4) Air yc, p Group Kirtland Air Force Base, S&iilZi Fe qieitions Office Task Group Albuquerque, New Mexico a. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and HeadquartersUnited.StatesAir Force have instructed certain major commands to participate in the exeoution of the TG 7.4 CASTM (RESTRICTED,SI) mission as follows: (Reference m's AFODC 55253, 24 Dee 52 and AFQDc 5991, 23 May 53.) (1) Air Research and Development Ccmmand: (a) Organize, man, train and equip To 7.4 Headquartere, the Test Support Unit and the F-SKI Samnling.&&ement. This task has been delegated to the Air Force I Special weapons Center, Kirtland Air Force Bass, *cc, *_ been delegated to the Wright Air D&elopment Center, he two 2) B-36 high altitude sampler airf#d--- h .(b) Provide a trained air crew and maintenepce~personnel

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(4) Air Materiel Command: (a) Provide supplies and equipment to TO 7.4 as required. b, .Toinsure coordinationand timely execution of all phases of TG 7.4 CASTLE(~S~ICTED,SI) mission, this headquarterswill request that Insure that elements and units are prepared and trained to accomplish their ultimate tasks ai outlined in paragraph 3 of this order. +fe,availabJg required elements and units for the Submit to this headquartersfinal werseas movement requirements for TG 7.k elements prior to 15 October 1953. Center to prepare allF-840 aircraft for movement to the forward area aboard the CVE upon direction of Comdr JTF SHE% pating parent~commands,or their designatedagencies. and provide them assistanceas required in accomplishmentof the TG 7.4 CASTLE (RESTRICTED, f. Pperatlonal control of personnel will remain with parent commandsuntil they arrive at their first TO 7.4 dnty station. TG 7.4 will assume operationalcontrol of personnemtheir first TG 7.4 duty station and retain this control until personnel departfrom their last TG 7.4 duty station. Fare& commands will assum* operational control of personnel upon departure from their last TG 7.4 duty station.

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support oroup WIXL be designateh aa Commander of the Test Suppart Unit. the Test Alrcraft Unit. vices Unit will be desig-

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TASK GROUP 7.4, PROVISIONAL Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico Prior to the arrival in the operating area,&...units dent to the orgsnisstion, manning, equipping and training of all units b. Upon arrival in the operating area, all elements of TG 7.4 based on ENImETOK ATOLL, will rec$ve general administrativeand TG 7.1 will provide technical advice on restricted material and'kl. assist in radiologicalsafety measures for TG 7.4 ’ Detailedinfcrmation concerningthe methods of supply, supply.levels . and accounting procedures are contained in Appendix 1 (Supply), and attachments thereto. Land, sea and ai< transportationwill be furnished to'kts of TG 7.4 in accordance with procedureslaid down in Appendix 2 .’ JTF SEVW is responsiblefor coordinatingall requests for constructionon ENIEETOK. J&r Force reauests for such construction (1’) All units and elements of TG 7.4 mill be canable ’_ assigned aircraft in accordancewith the provisions _ofUSAF message AFOBC 56991,dated 23 May 1953

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,,..,.,..._,.:....,...eof TG 7.4, will furnish maintenancepersonnel in accordancewith the foregoing cited USAF message. (2) The Test Support Unit will provide field maintenance ing a surveyingofficer for lost, damaged …