Operation Castle - Radiological Safety (Deleted)

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Pacific Proving Grounds Joint Task Force Seven This is an extract of WT-942, Operation CASTLE, which remains classified SECRET/RESTRICTED DATA as of Extract version prepared for: DEFENSE NUCLEAR AGENCY Approved for public release;

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1. ncronl nuw8CII 1. GOVT Accrs~lori rco Operation CASTLE - Radiological Safety LOS Alamos Scientific Laboratory LOS Alamos, New Mexico BEFORE COMPLETING FORY . TYPE Or RLPORT b PERIOD COVERI . PERFORUING ORG. REPORT HUYBEII IO. PROGRAY EI_EUENT.PROJLCT. TAS AREA 9 WORU UNIT NUU8ERS II. NUMBER OF PAGES Approved for public release; unlimited distribution. This report has had the classified information removed and has been republished in unclassified form for public release. This work was performed by Kaman Tempo under contract DNAOOl-79-C-0455 with the close cooperation of the Classification Management Division of the Defense Nuclear Agency.

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This report has had classified material removed in order to make the information available on an unclassified, open publication basis, to any interested parties. This effort to declassify this report has been accomplished specifically to support the Department of Defense Nuclear Test Personnel Review (NTPR) Program. The objective is to facilitate studies of the low levels of radiation received by some individuals during the atmospheric nuclear test program by making as much information as possible available to all interested parties. The material which has been deleted is all currently classified as Restricted Data or Formerly Restricted Data under the provision of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, (as amended) or is National Security Information. This report has been reproduced directly from available copies of the original material. The locations from which material has been deleted is generally obvious by the spacings and "holes" in the text. Thus the context of the material deleted is identified to assist the reader in the determination of whether the deleted information is germane to his study. It is the belief of the individuals who have participated in preparing this report by deleting the classified material and of the Defense Nuclear Agency that the report accurately portrays the contents of the original and that the deleted material is of little or no significance to studies into the amounts or types of radiation received by any individuals during the atmospheric nuclear test program.

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This report contains a description of the mission, responsibilities, organization, and activities of Tast Unit 7, the Radiological Safety Unit of Task Group 7.1 during Operation Castle. The chapters are devoted to a general discussion of the organization, activities, and, recommendations of the scientific sections necessary to implement a thermonuclear test Appendixes and illustrations contain specific details of certain operational procedures, radiological situation data, and fall-out decay curves. As a result of Pad-Safe operations during Castle, it was determined that contamination resulting from high-yield surface bursts creates radioactive hazards over such large areas that land-based operations at the Pacific Proving Grounds are in constant jeopardy. Watersurface detonations of thermonuclear devices created less of a radiological problem than ground-surface d,.tonations; however, the most important factor in the over-all radiological situation was the disposition of the winds between 10,000 and 60,000 ft at the time of detonation.

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Operation Castle must be reported as the nightmare of radiological-safety test operations. The extended nature of the operation in the presence of high-level contamination in the Bikini area of the Pacific Proving Grounds, the completely shipborne operation some distance from a supply base, the decentralized system of operational control, instrument-humiditydifficulties, morale problems, and poor communications tend to make this documentation an excellent guide or source of information to personnel who may be detailed or ordered to organize or work with a similar organization in possible future operations of this nature. This report cannot be rightly attributed to any one individual since it resulted from the wholehearted cooperation and efforts of all the personnel in the unit. Their work under extremely difficult working and housing conditions is to be commended.

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The Radiological Safety Unit wishes to acknowledge the generous cooperation and support of a number of organizations that assisted in the accomplishment of the radiological-safety Health Division, Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory (LASL) ‘I&Sk Group 7.2, Joint Task Force ‘7 Division of Biology and Medicine, Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) 1st Radiological Safety Support Unit, Chemical Corps Training Supply and Property Department, LASL Las Vegas Field Office, AEC Eniwetok Field Office, AEC Office of the Chief Chemical Officer, Washington, D. C. Holmes and Narver, Inc., Los Angeles, Calif. The Unit wishes to express personal appreciation to the following individuals for their close support and constructive criticism throughout the planning, operational, a.nd roll-up phases: Thomas L. Shipman, Heaith Division, LASL Thomas N. White, Health Division, LASL James Terrill, U. S. Public Health Service William Kennedy, Health Division, LASL

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CHAPTER 1 TASK GROUP ORGANIZATION FOR RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY . 1.5 Conclusions and Recommendations . CHAPTER 2 PROCUREMENT OF PERSONNEL 2.4 Conclusions and Recommendations .. CHAPTER 3 TRAINING AND INDOCTRINATION 3.5 Conclusions and Recommendations .

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CHAPTER 4 CONTROL GROUP Conclusions and Recommendations . 5.3 Photodosimetry. and Records Section 5.5 Conclusions and Recommendations . CHAPTER 6 DECONTAMINATION GROUP . Conclusions and Recommendations . 7.4 Conclusions and Recommendations .

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A.1 Accuracy of Du Pant Film Packet 559 as a Personnel A.2 Relative Sensitivity of Films Behind Lead Filters . . A.4 Variations Between 559 Packets and Project CHAPTER 1 TASK GROUP ORGANIZATION FOR RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY CHAPTER 4 CONTROL GROUP

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5.1 Water Samples Analyzed During Operation Castle 5.3 Decay Rate, Air Sampler ..... 5.1 Sample Slope Decay Curver ....

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ORGANIZATION FOR RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY A radiological-safety unit, Task Unit 7 (TU-7), was continued from Operation Ivy to accomplish the missions and responsibilities of radiological safety for Operation Castle. TU-7 operated radiological-safety centers at Parry Island, at Eniwetok Island, and aboard ships at Bikini in the accomplishment of these missions. The concept of operations for this test series caused a change of philosophy; consequently the Rad-Safe Unit became a technical service for unit and project officers and assisted the supervisory personnel by providing technical advice and training for project personnel designated as ‘*monitors.” This practice permitted the unit to reduce its personnel requirements by TU-7 was designated the radiation-safety organization for Task Groups (TG) 7.1 and 7.5, as well as the technical Rad-Safe Unit for Joint Task Force 7 (JTF-7). By direction of paragraph lc, Annex F to Commander, Task Group 7.1 (CTG-7.1), Operation Plan No. l-53, the Commander was to provide for: 1. Radiological protection of TG-7.1 and TG-7.5 personnel. 2. Maintenance of operational efficiency for TG-7.1 and TG-7.5 in the presence of radio3. Technical assistance to task force and task group commanders, program directors, and project leaders on nonmedical matters pertaining to radiological safety. To effect accomplishment of the above mission, the Commander, Task Unit 7 (CTU-‘I), performed the following tasks: 1. Organized and commanded a radiological-safety unit. 2. Supervised all ground-monitoring services associated with scientific missions, which included monitoring of water supplies at inhabited distant atolls and establishing suitable tables of allowable residual radiation levels for equipment, personnel, vehicles, boats, etc. 9. Furnished laboratory services and technical assistance to all task groups, including: a. Procurement, storage, and issuance of film badges and specified items of radi-

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b. Development and interpretation of exposed film badges. d. Provision of facilities at the Parry Island Rad-Safe Center and aboard the USS ’ Bairoko for calibration, repair, and maintenance of monitoring instruments and for storage and issuance of spare radiac-equipment parts. 4. Procured radiological-safety clothing for JTF-7 personnel. 5. Procured and issued special high-density goggles to specified personnel of JTF-7. 6. Provided decontamination facilities for personnel and equipment. 7. Conducted laboratory studies to determine the nature of radiological hazards. The organizational chart for TU-7 is shown in Fig. 1.1. 1 Fig. 1.1 TU-7 organizational chart. Two radiological-safety centers were established for Operation Castle, one at Parry Island and one aboard the USS Bairoko in the Bikini lagoon. Each center was equipped so as to accomplish the unit mission independently. TU-7 personnel were transferred freely between the two centers, according to the radiological situation and the extent of personal exposure. Subcenters of the Bikini Rad-Safe Center were established aboard a barge adjacent to the USliS Ains\?orth, aboard the USS Curtiss, and aboard the USS Estes. These substations acted primarily as control and personnel-decontamination points for TG-7.1 and TG-‘7.5 projects. Since the establishment of subcenters had not been anticipated in the preliminary personnelprocurement planning, TU-7 personnel were very thinly scattered throughout. This extension of personnel reduced the effectiveness of TU-7 in some areas but permitted decentralized and controlled recovery operations. Communicstions between the Bairoko Rad-Safe Center and the subcenters were maintained through the task group administrative net and a special frequency Rad-Safe net. These nets permitted direct communication between control points and the dosimetry record unit aboard the USS Bairoko. 1.5 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 1. The organization for radiological safety at Operation Castle was adequate in structure but inadequate in number of personnel. 2. The responsibilities of procuring, developing, and interpreting film badges and the maintenance of film-badge exposure records should be delegated to the individual task groups.

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S. The responsibility of providing special high-density goggles shouldbe delegated to the various task group supply sections. 1. The task force should incorporate within the Operation Plan the directives that each task group will be responsible for its dosimetric program and records and that the methods of dosimetry will be specified in a task force standing operating procedure. 2. The task force should direct each task group to be responsible for the procurement of adequate numbers of special high-density goggles.

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PROCUREMENT OF PERSONNEL 2.1 SOURCES OF PERSONNEL As in the past, primary sources for technically qualified health physics per!sonnel are the Health Division, Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory (LASL) and special organizations within the Department of Defense. In the interim period between Ivy and Castle, the Department of the Army authorized the Chief Chemical Officer to establish the 1st Rad-Safe Support Unit (RSSU) with a mission of supporting test operations at the Nevada and Pacific Proving Grounds. This organization was established at the Chemical Corps Training Command, Ft. McClellan, Ala., in the summer of 1953. This activity provided the bulk of Army personnel for TU-7. The technically trained Navy personnel were provided from the National Naval Medical Center; Special Weapons Unit, Pacific Fleet; Sandia Base, Armed Forces Special Weapons Project (AFSWP); and the Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory. One Marine Corps noncommissioned officer was obtained from the second Marine Division, FMF. 2.2 METHOD OF PROCUREMENT In January 1953, TU-7 advised the J-l Section of an anticipated personnel requirement of 86 enlisted men and 14 officers. After a conference with the Scientific Deputy and the Task Group Commander, a revised personnel request was submitted late in March 1953 for 36 enlisted men &d 12 officers. This reduction in personnel was directed by the adoption of a policy 1. Training programs would be initiated by the Task Group Rad-Safe Officer to qualify program and project personnel in’ radiological-safety principles and techniques of monitoring. 2. Consolidation of the radiological-safety organizations of TG-7.1 and TG-7.5 would be 3. An increase of the military-support mission of CTG-7.2 would be made so that the folcal-safety program by training and providing radiological-safety monitors as needed and (b) support of the over-all radiological-safety program by training and providing decontamination personnel as needed. In early April JTF-7 was requested by CTG-7.1 to procure from the military services, prior to 1 September 1953, 1 executive officer, 7 control officers, 4 laboratory officers, 10 monitors, 4 laboratory technicians, 8 photodosimetry technicians, 4 radiological-instrument repairmen, 3 supply clerks, 1 supply sergeant, and 6 clerk-typists. In mid-August the 1st RSSU received its first notice of TU-7 personnel requirements. This created a strain on the organization since the RSSU had ody nine men available for duty.

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Additional difficulties were being encountered by the release of experienced men from the military service. In spite of these difficulties 2 officers and 2b enlisted men were designated by 1 ated action in the latter part of August. The Air Force declined to participate in the operation. Orders for 1st RSSU personnel were issued by the Chemical Corps Training Command in October 1953. Orders for three radiological-safety engineers were issued by the Army Chemical Center in November 1953. Orders for Naval personnel were issued by the Chief of Naval Personnel in October 1953. CTU-7, through invitation, securei the services of three LASL health physicists as techOwing to staff delays in the procurement of military personnel, the unit performed its mission with a shortage of 3 control officers, 1 laboratory officer, and 1 photodosimetry technician. The last-minute deletion of the 3 control officers materially hampered the effectiveness of TU-7 in its extended decentralized system of controlled recovery operations and required the utilization of the supply and laboratory officers in secondary control functions. In the procurement of personnel on a temporary-duty basis, little time is allotted to qualify individuals in a selected occupation, and therefore procurement must consider certain qualifications in the selection of individuals for assignment to the Rad-Safe Unit. The Control Officer serves as an adviser and technical expert on all matters pertaining to the nonmedical aspect of radiological contamination. He assists project leaders in recovery plans for test equipment, performs surveys of areas subjected to radiological contamination, controls entry of personnel to cqntaminated arers, and assists in the control of radiological hazards. He is best qualified by excellent performance in atomic-defense schools and by experience in previous test operations. The Laboratory Officer supervises the assembly of technical information from radioanalysis of radioactive material in order to assist the commander in the establishment of the true radiological hazards. He supervises the processing of film badges and the maintenance and repair of radiation-detection instruments. The Laboratory Officer is best qualified by having civilian or military heal* physics experience in laboratories handling radioactive materials and by having extensive nuclear physics training. The Rad-Safe Monitor performs surveys of areas subjected to radiological contamination, advises personnel of the nature and the extent of hazards to be encountered in contaminated areas, procures protective equipment and dosimetric devices for individuals entering contaminated areas, requires the proper use of protective clothing and equipment, supervises personnel-decontamination procedures, and accomplishes equipment decontamination. He is best qualified by satisfactory completion of an atomic-defense school and/or by previous experience at test operations. Laboratory technicians are selected personnel, especially trained in nuclear analyses and radiation measurement, who perform routine operations in laboratories that are assigned these functions. The best qualifications are experience in civilian or military laboratories and commensurate educational background.

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Photodosimetry technicians are specialized photographic laboratory technicians who are skilled in the development of dental x-ray film, operation of film-density meters, and interpretation of readings. The best qualification is laboratory or test experience in photodosimetry. The radiological-instrument repairman installs, inspects, tests, calibrates, maintains, and repairs all types of radiological-detection instruments. He is beet qualified by laboratory or test experience in radlac-instrument repair and/or by training in military lnstrument-re2.4 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 1. The present system of personnel procurement for temporary duty is unsatisfactory since screening of personnel prior to selection is not practiced. 2. Slow staff action …