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Declassified record · U.S. Department of Energy

Operation Greenhouse, Scientific Director's Report, Annex 9.3, Radiological Safety, Nuclear Explosions, 1951 (Eniwetok)

Dated
Jul 1, 1951
Document type
Appendix
Length
77 pages
Open the original scanArchive record OSTI ID 16016769 · public domain

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Machine-read from the scan, so expect some errors. Lines that couldn’t be read are left out.

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Isat Classification Rcvirr; - Operation Ctecnhousc Report Reference is made to your request regarding the declassification of WT-89 Cited report vas declassified on 17 September 1974 and so noted in TID The declassification action teferenced in paragraph 2 above W R S astcrtained 4. HK. Cucchiara further advised that the TID 1400 S2 is Ln na state of revision . and that a copy was not available f o r out use. 5. 'Based on paragraph 2 above, this DF is the authority to declassify WT-89. . Director for Intel & Scty

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PHOTOGRAPH THIS SHEET I DATE RECEIVED IN DTlC PHOTOGRAPH THIS SHEm AND RETURN TO MIC-DDA-2 DOCUMENT PROCESSING SHEE

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DEPARTYIENT OF DEFENSE Armed Forces specll Weapons Armed Forces Special Weapons his tant Chief of Staff, G 4 Chlef Chemlcal Officer Chief Signal Officer chiel of Engineerr Operations Research Office C2.n~ Bureau a( Mediche and Surgery Chief of Naval Operatlam conunudurt, Marine Carpa Alr Force Cambridga Reme8rch Air Remarch ud Development Air Target. Divieion, Directorate d Assistant for Atomlc Energy hrtrtrat for Develonmcnt Planning Deputy Chief d Staff for Derelopmcnt Uonr Analyasb Dlvision) Director of Plana (AFOPD-PI) Director of Requiremcnte Oglla Air Force Base, Air E& Alr Force Base, Air Defense Langley Air Force Base, Tactical MI Commaud Maxwell Air Force Base, Air Offutt Air Force Ikure, Strategic 1009th special weapons squrdtoa Scott Air Force Base, Air Wr!ght Air Development Center Wright Air Materiel Commvd ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION Los Alamor Bcientific Lpbonrorg, I Technical Informatim Service, Univerrlty of California RadiaUm Weapon Tea Rem Group, TIB

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2.6.4 Intensity of Radiation from Dog Shot Fall-at 3.6.6 Particles from Dog Gbot Fall-oat on Atoll . 2.6.7 A i r Sampling on Dastroyer, Easy Day 26.9 Number of Active Heavy Particles Nacdcd 3.7.2 Curnulathe Radiation Dose Due to Dog Day F.ll-art 27.3 External Radiation Doses to 27 Aprll 1951 . . 27.6 External Radiation from FalI-out following Rem S&t 27.4 External Radiation Doses to 15 Ahy 1951. . . 2.9.2 Geiger blueller Typc Field Surtrey lnBtrument.8 .

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Moll bland6 Ea8t pad Southeast af Engebi, Euy sbot . APPENDIX A SHOT BLAND BuRvEY8, DOG

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In January 1019 Alvin C. Graves, Scientific Dinctor, asked Brig G e n James P. Cooney (NC,U8A) to commrrd the radiological safety orgmh & b of the Scientific Task Gratp (TG S.l) in p r m atomic reapon testa at dered to command TUL Unit 3.1.5 (TU 3.1.5) and to act an Special AsristPnt f9r Radiological The ndiological safety policy and org dz a - tloo u planned for Operatho Greenlioue were pinsd at Alamogordo, Operation Crossrod., the 'dforce waa divided into kch m a to have its crm rldiologicll de certain l.bor ~ fo Dc tion swere to be supplied all t..L g m ~ sby TU 3.1.5. T'he radiological problem dlvided itself into permanel, and instrument., ?nd c Test phpre-evaluation ofand protecllar dorlng the detonation; crrluation of a d protcctlon from radiattcm hazard. after 6 Final phose or dsum6-evaluation d radiological safety operations duriag Gen Cooac~,assisted by Karl 2. Morgan, and preparation of tir tea blade for Opu~Uon were exceeded in d y limited are= of some Greenhouse test isWa Them areus were those WrOILndfne t a r siter for Operatkin It waa cmelrlred &isable to avoid l l l ~possible artrarposrvc to radiation, d therefore work Mperfarmed to decontamhte the area8 where the radbtion level waa greater thin toldozing the top (heaviest contlmiantsd) layer 0: earth into the crater and covering it with=- dueto were avoidedbyretting the soil &ormade the final m q of tb entire Atoll doring the period 5 to 11 M8y 1950. Be concluded that there was no posllIbility of overexposurc to Eniwetolt Atoll and that this condition w d d hc d true up to the time dthe next testa on- atol; It VLI drcided, therefore, to discontinme the we oflflm badger mall Islandamd totermiAlamor, and Charles D. nation Pctlritlcr, Thanrs N. whitc, h o -08, nate the full-tine podtion of ndlologiul safety

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repreoentative of the Loa Alamoe Scientific Opcrationa plana for TU 3.1.5 were prepared Experience gained from Operations Crossand mbmitted to TG 3.1 as required. rold. and Sandstone clearly indicated that a cl-r relationshlp between the radiologicd safety unit and the scientific group was necos-. Durfng Crossroads a d svdstone the radiological monitors were assigned to the varioos scientific group0 caly a few days before the tests, and in m y instYlces met the scientists f o r the first time while m the way to the acbrol operation. In most caaes tbe monitor had not been briefed 011 tba scientific problem. HU job was merely tbat of a meter reader. A l h C. Graves and Gen Cooney decided that a much betbr integrated progrim between the groups was necessary. Thy felt that the mod- +bpmj& which he was to monitnr. He should ing to obtain, the method used in obtaining it, gistaace in helping the scientirrb &Wn thin information by solving the problem of radio- -!wards. It Mdecided, therefue, that avial conference for the radiologiczl monitors would be held at u s Alamos 1 to 6 October Maj P a p S. Harris, and u Col Leonard A. oddg d Lo8 Alnmom arranged an excellent prog m n in which every project director or his representative presented his program in minute detail to the entire group of monitors. These tion was to be OLlmBed. h Pretest phase-what equipment w to be 0.66,where and when it was to be placed, and M evaluation of the hazard in retrieving tba equipment after the shots. c Operational plan-den it was neceswy to obtatn the da!a and the plan for doing so. After the entire program had been discussed, the monitors were asked to &ate a preference for the projects on which they would like to work In most Instances it waa poesble to make the leslgnmente requested. Tbe monitors then rpent a day with the project d.b?ctors discussing detail6 of their respective Op ed iOM. As a result of the information gained from this meeting an operations plan for TU 3.1.5 was outlined. F3ch monitor was given a SP@- cific assignment and remained with the same project throughout all teste, when this was mIt was felt that this meeting was extremely profitable to a l l concerned. In lddition to the scientific projects, various -ive of departure for Eniwetok, duration d testr. mode of travel, physical examinatimn, paydent of perscmel, etc. As a result of this metthg the t.dioloqiCd complish ita mimion. Operational planning continued in the United mtes unUl the departure of the first large At conferencts in W&ngtan 9 and 10 November 1949, attended by represmtrrtives of Project (AFSWP), and the Services, it was decided that JTPC would coordinate promremeat of military personnel required by J-Division and its various agencies. AccordFts$y, Alvin C. Graves, leader af J-Division, appointed military personnel and mked, through him, that Gen Cooney state hls military perecmael feGen Cooney established the retphment for 50 personnel: 30 officer monitors and 20 logirtics and laboratory persoanel. He anvaaeed ground and submltted the names of tbo8e rho might be available. CTG 3.1 requested CJTF-3 to procure the personnel, some by name and some by job description ody, from the Services on p temporary duty or temporary .MiUonal duty statu during the operational pbroc. One civilian, Carl E Menzer, was to be requested through civilian channels. It was also .greed

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that nine clvillpn monitorr from LA8L aoold wh.n the conference of monitors was bdd at LABL in October 1950, It wan for the first time pcuelble to analyze the operation6 plan6 d the ruiour rcientfffc progr ~ sto determine the mmber of monftorr rsqulred. It became cridrat that tbe SO olllcer monltorr and 0 drillnn ntoaltorr varld nd be adwuate, and requirementa were e8tabW and approved by CJTF-S for elwen mom officer monitor& In a few amr paraomel rbo had been reque6ted were &mnd to be unavailable and were rep lw d Gea W y held a conference at h a AlPmor with Harry S. Allen and staff concerning tbe procurement pnd hawllhg of all supplies required for the mLs1m of TU 3.1.5. It v11 agreed that procurement of all equipment and mpplie#W d be handled by Allen's group. Bir ment to Parry Island,where it would be delivered to TU 3.1.5. beenstored at Loa Alamoa olttr Operation was checked for rcrvlceability. A complete list of additional Item lKcddd was II rere required by Allen's group regarAll radbhgical dety equipment which had

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Additfo~lto pad deletima from tbe personnel mrtcr continued until about 20 February 1951. Canaidarable difficulty in clearing personnel wan encountered because such rrdditiahe to the rorter occurred. In approximately twelve cases, mquedr for 0 clearance did not reach the FBI 1951 (D-2&YE) men enlisted men of TU 3.1.5 remained uncleared. It was only by changes in JTF-S order6 mor about 20 March 1951 that meleared peraoaael who bad been certified by tbelr commanding officers 88 good .ccur!ty rWt. wen permitted to remain 011 Parry Island and cmthued me of their services ccruld be planned by CTU 3.1.5. For future operations it 1.derirable that five or si. month8 be allowed far 0M.faine Q dearmcea Ooe person of TU 3.1.5 ma cleared in exactly three mdntha after the requert for clearance reached the FBL A l l others required conriderably more tlme. It is LmmrteriaI whether the delay in granting clearances is due to time needed for the FBI investigation or to t h e needed for proccsring within the AEC. me ment of applier and equipment to the Forvud Area ccatirmtd In general, the supply and equipment rituatloa KIP excellent throughm t Operation Greenhouse. The only major Item. d equipment with which difficulty waa tmining rat and Ycne Safety Appliance Co. dust collecton. Eighty-five of the Radiac training retr warn ordered and scheduled for delivery h th.Forward Area on 1 February 1951. A change in the original order specified that the lnatrument. were to be equipped with batteries d that 100 per cent replacement for battorla would .LMbe furnbhed. On 31 March lS51,W of the AN/PDR-TlB's were delivered witbout batterlea. Batteries for 10 AN/PDR-TlB'r were obtained, lud tbc instruments wen d during Dog shot oparationr The remainder d the instruments old sufficient brtterice for dl 85 AN/PDR-TlB'r arrived shortly after Dog dust collectors did not arrive until shortly kfore the hat ahot and were of little we. bhement d perMawl to the Forward A m began o I4 February 1951 with the departure cisco. The Aultmpn carried 21 officer md torr and TU 3.1.5 rtptf yld re- Eniwetok 90 27 February 1951. Gen Cooruy uri red by air 011 the same date and on-the-site orgmiulion, trw,and operatiom d Tb 3.1.5 begaa, Tlu next major movement of personnel, including most of the enlisted men, arrived on the US6 Curtis8 011 8 March 1951. Small groups and individual members d TU 3.1.5 continued to arrive until about 28 March 1951, when the roster d TU 3.1.5 could be considered eucn - The M of TU 3.1.5 Morganized PII Commander Brig Gen Jamer P.

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CAPT Harry H. Haight, Maj Pape S. Harris, Prof Carl E Menzer, Imtromcnts Unlveraitp of Iowa Monitor- for exposure to tritium was curled mtder supervision of Dean D. Meyer, LAB& An accowt of Uwork ia given in Greenbnase Report, Aaaex 1.10. TU 3.1.5 headquarters was loclted IA an kuhad been checked and approved by Gen Cooney. The buildbg, although adequate, was not 80 large u would have been desirable. Office @pace,In partlculu, Mcramped. Fortunately, tho Officers' Beach Club was located very near TU 3.15 head mr8 and was available for group meetings. It waa found necessvy to have rather frequent group meetings of the monitors, ing# rbould make provisions for space in which weh meetings can be held. Trajning of mOnitOrr began shortly after their arrival In the Forward Area. Instrument with radiatica detection instrumenb was mode an important part of tho training program. Yanllorr were maigned ta the various projecta on rbaat 10 March 1951 pod began work with project dlrectors. The Pssignment of monitor6 to project8 *nil in advance of the shot date was an hm ation and had not been dme at previous weppoo tmta Thie plan waa a definite improvement mer previolu methods of opcratiaa rince tbe mooitor8 were fuUy familiar with their pr0)ecta and with the proamel with whom they were to work prior to ah& time. Weekly meew were held 011 Wurdap mornings for purpowr of critique. orientation, and education. Talks at these meetings were given by outatand3.1.5 staff, and Cen Cooney. The winds and weather predlction fot Dog ahd indicated that ideal conditions wodd prevail. From the surface up to 20,000 R the winds were from the east and east-northeast with velocities all above 15 knots. Above this level the winds shifted gradually from the north to the west. On the basis of Sandstone data no fall-out problem could be foreseen and CTU 3.1.5 80 advised CJTF-3. Winds and rat bc r at zero hour were as predicted. About 1 hr 40 min after the shot, the recording instruments in the radiological safety center Irdicated that a radioactive fall-out was occurnotified and asked to notUy all project directare d hie unit to take measures lo protect photo- '%e cccurrencr of fdl-aut at such a short time after zero hour was a cause of coas?dcrable concern from a health standpoint. The problem presented two aspects, the crtcmal ud internal hazards to personnel. Tbe LtCnsiQ, as it krcrezsed, was constantly Cbcckd both fnand out-of-doors. The radiochemical section of TU 3.1.5 began a s M y of the particle size. For out a d particle sizes involved, see Sec. 2.6. At about 1400 of D-day the intensib agyl to decrease, and it became obvi- tha! external rrdfiffon accumulated by pereoMcl umld not be large. More detailed Wormrtion coocernirg radiation dosages appears in Sees. 2.6 rrd 2.7. It is a well-established fact that particlee must be 5 microns or rmaller in size (0 constitute an internal hazard. All data and facts at hand indicate thpt no particles smaller than 20 microns in size were present on populated bsludrr. Therefore it b asrumcd that 110 Internol hazards were present. Three samples shored somewhat htgb counts A total of 125 urine samples wen dyzed on the firs! specimens, but a second mple an each Lndividual, collected under eupurtrlan, TU 3.1.5 encountered no other radiological problems In the test progrpm. Excellent co-

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opcratiaa wan given by all scientific groups, and PI1 work could have been dcne under norrml condltlons with no exposures exceeding 300 mr. The fntegratfon of the monitors witb their respective programs proved very effective. Wexcept for 0110 Item, the air fIlterIng devices. Them dust collectors were ordered more than nine mor~thain advance from the Mine Safety rn this order, and dellvery Mrepeatedly mmated. liad this equipment been present, the Iml.uezUoa of the fall-out rould have been R e d t 8 of island surveys following Dog shot veym are given in Table 2.1. 15 miIes eaet of …

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